بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

In the Name of Allah
the Merciful, the Compassionate

Editorial Board

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AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

1. To provide a forum for scholars to make analytical studies of Islamic topics and themes.

2. To advance the cause of better understanding of the Qur'ān and the Ahl al-Bayt's contribution to Islam.

3. To publish English translations of Arabic and Persian works of Muslim scholars.

4. To endeavour to find Islamic answers to questions relating to the social, political, and moral problems of today.

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Scholars and writers from all over the world are invited to contribute to this journal.

Manuscripts should be sent typed double-spaced on one side of the sheet.

References and notes should be listed at the end of the article and should contain complete bibliographical information.

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The Hadith al-Thaqalayn:
Its Meaning and Narration *Part 2*

'Alī Qulī Qarā'ī

The Claims of the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (Contd.)

Al-Jahiz in *al-Bayān wa al-tabyīn* (Egypt, 1366), iii, 44, has recorded a sermon of Imām 'Alī ('a) in which the Imam said:

انَّ أبرازَ عتْرَتِي وأطَائْبَ أرُومَتِي أحْلَمُ النَّاسِ صِغَاراً وأعْلَمُ [حم] كباراً.الأوَ إنّا أَهْلُ بَيْتِ مِن عِلْمِ اللهِ عَلِمْنا، ويِحْكمِ اللهِ حُكِمْناَومِن قَوْلِ صادِقٍ سَمِعْنا، فإنْ تَتِّبِعُوا آثارَ نا تَهْتَدوا بِبِصائِرِنا، و إنْ لَمْ تَفعلوا يُهْلِكَكُمُ اللهُ بِأَيْدينا. مَعتارايَةُ الحقِّ، مِن تَبْعِها لَحِقَ، وَمَنْ تأ خَّرَ عنها غَرِقَ. الا وَبِناتُدْ رَكُ تِرَةُ كلِّ مُومِن وبِناتُخْلَعُ رِبْقَةُ الذُلِّ عَن أعْناقِكُم وبِنا فُتِحَ لا بِكُم وبِنا يُخْتَمُ لا بِكُم

Indeed, the pious of my family and the best ones of my descent are the most discerning of men in their childhood and the most discerning of men in their childhood and the most knowledgeable of them in their grown-up years. Verily, we the People of the Household--our knowledge is derived from God's knowledge and our verdict is the verdict of God, and we have heard the speech of the truthful one (i.e. the Prophet). So, if you follow in our footsteps, you will be guided by our vision, and if you fail to do that, God shall make you perish at our hands. With us is the banner of the Truth: whoever follows it shall pass over and whoever stays behind shall be drowned. Verily, through us every believer will be redressed from his suffering, and by our means the noose of abasement shall be taken off your necks. With us--not with you--was the opening, and with us--not with you--shall be the closing.

Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd in his *Sharh Nahj al-Balūghah* has recorded a sermon of Imam 'Alī ('a) that he delivered during the early days of his caliphate. In that sermon he declares:

لَمَّا قَبَضَ اللهُ نَبِيَّهُ صلى الله عليه و آله قُلنا نَحْنُ أَهلُهُ و وَرَثَتُهُ و عِترَتُهُ و أُولِياؤُهُ دُوْنَ
النّاسِ، لا يُنازَعُنا سُلطانُهُ أَحَدُ، ولا يَطْمَعُ في حَقِّنا طامِعُ، إذ انْبَرى لنا قومُنا فَغَصَبونا
سُلطانَ نَبِيِّنا فَصارَت الإ مُرَةُ لِغَيرنا و صِرْنا سُوقَةً يَطْمَعُ فينا الضَّعيفُ و يَتَعزَّزُ
عَلَيْنا الذَّلِيلُ

When God took away His prophet—may God bless him and his Family—we said that we are the people of his household, his heirs, his kindred and his successors, not the people. No one would contest with us regarding his authority, and no one would crave after what is our right. But then our people rose against us, usurping the authority of our Prophet from us. Whereupon leadership passed to the others and we became subjects, with the weak harbouring malicious schemes against us and the lowly lording it over us.

Following is part of a tradition of Imam 'Alī ('a) addressed to his disciple Kumayl ibn Ziyad. Although the following excerpt is cited from the *Nahj al-balāghah* (*Hikam*: 147), the tradition has been narrated widely by other Shī'ī and non-Shī'ī writers, such as al-Mufīd in his *Amālī* (*majlis* 29), al-Ṭūsī in his *Amālī* (I, 13), 'Alī al-Muttlaqī al-Hindī in *Kanz al-'ummāl* (cf. *'Abaqat*, ii, 247), al-Ḥammū'ī in *Farā'id al-simṭayn* (p. 46, *hadīth* 340), and Ibn 'Asākir in *Ta'rīkh Dimashq* (xii, 160), in the biographical account of al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad ibn Salamah.

...لاتَخلَو الأَرضُ مِن قائِم لله بِحُجَّة، إمّا ظاهِراً، أَوخائفاً مَغْموراً، لئَلّا تبطُل حُجَجُ الله
وبَيِّناتُهُ. وكَمْ ذاوأَيْنَ أُولئكَ؟ أُولئكَ –واللهِ–الأَقَلُّونَ عَدَداً، والأَعظَمونَ عنداللهِ قَدْراً.
يَحْفَظُ اللهُ بِهِمْ حُجَجَهُ وبَيِّناتِهِ، حَتّى يُودِ عُوهانَظَراءَهُمْ، ويَزْرَعُوها في قُلوب
أَشْباهِهِمْ. هَجَمَ بِهِمُ العِلْمُ عَلى حَقيقَةِ البَصيرَة، وباشَرُوا رُوحَ اليَقينِ،
واستَلانُوا مااستَوعَرَهُ المُترَفونَ، وأَنِسوا بِمَااستَوحَشَ مِنْهُ الجاهِلونَ، وصَحِبُوا الدُّنيا
بِأَبدانٍ أَرواحُها مُعَلَّقَةٌ بِالمَحَلِّ الأَعلى. أُولئكَ خُلَفاءُ اللهِ في أَرْضِهِ، والدُّ عاةُ إلى دينِهِ.
آه آه شَوْقاً إلى رُؤيَتِهِمْ.

. . .But the earth is never devoid of one who stands with a proof to fulfil God's purposes. He is either manifest and renowned, or apprehensive and concealed, so that God's proofs and His clear signs may not be invalidated (by his death). How many are they, and where are they? By God, they are few in number, but great in honour before God. Though then God maintains His proofs and signs,

till they entrust them to others like themselves and plant them in the hearts of their likes. Knowledge has led them to real insight, and they have imbibed the spirit of certitude. That which is hard upon the seekers of comfort comes easy to them; they endear what the ignorant regard with aversion. They dwell in the world with their bodies, but their spirits abide in a higher realm. They are the vicegerents (*khulafa'*) of God in His earth and His callers to His faith. Oh, how much do I yearn to see them!

In a sermon of the *Nahj al-balāghah*, Imam 'Alī refers to the other Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) in these words:

ألا بأبي وَ أمّي، هُمْ مِن عِدَّةٍ أَسْماءٌ هم في السماءِ مَعروفةٌ وفي الأْ رضِ مجهُولة.

May my father and mother be sacrificed for those few whose names are renowned in heaven and unknown on earth. (*Khuṭbah* 187)

ألا إنَّ مَثَلَ آلِ محمَّدٍ صلى الله عليه و آله، كَمَثَلِ نُجومِ السَّماءِ إذا خوى نَجمٌ طَلَعَ نَجمٌ،

Lo! The parable of the Household of Muhammad--may God bless him and his Household--is that of the stars in the sky: when one star sets, another rises. (*khuṭbah* 100)

وَاعلَمُوا أنَّكُمْ لنْ تَعرِ فُواالرُّشْدَ حتّى تَعرِ فُواالذي تَرَكَهُ، وَلَنْ تأْ خُذُوابِمِيثاقِ الكِتابِ حتّى تَعرِفُواالذي نَبَذَهُ، فالْتَمِسُوا ذلكَ مِنْ عِنْدِ أهلِه فإنَّهُمْ عَيْشُ العِلمِ ومَوْتُ الجَهْلِ. هُمُ الذينَ يُخبِرُ كُمْ حُكْمُهُمْ عَنْ عِلمِهِمْ، وَصَمْتُهُمْ عَنْ مَنْطِقِهِمْ، وظَاهِرُهُمْ عَنْ باطِنِهِم.

Know that you would never know what is righteousness unless you recognize those who have abandoned it. You will never abide by the covenant of the Book unless you recognize those who have broken it. You will never cling to it unless you recognize those who cast it away. So seek these from their possessors, for, indeed, they are the life of knowledge and the death of ignorance. They are those whose judgements shall reveal to you their learning, their silence will inform you of their speech, and their outward will tell you of their inward. (*Khuṭbah* 147)

One of the distinctive qualities of an Imam is his unparalleled knowledge. No one in the history of Islam has claimed to the kind of knowledge possessed by the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) . Thus there is a *mutawātir* tradition narrated from Imam 'Alī ('a) that he used to declare: سَلُونِي قَبَلَ أَنْ تَفْقِدُونِي (Ask me before you lose me!).

Ibn Abī Shaybah in his *Musannaf* (see 'Allāmah Amīnī, *Thamarāt al-'asfār*, i, 206) has recorded this statement of Imam 'Alī which he made in the course of a sermon:

سَلُونِي أَلَّا تَسْأَلُونِي؟ فَإِنَّكُم لاَتَسْأَلُونِي عَن شَيْءٍ فِيما بَيْنَكُم وبَيْنَ السَّاعَةِ، وَلاَعن فِئَةٍ تَهدِي مِأَةً أَو تُضِلُّ مِأَةً إِلاَّ حَدَّثْتُكُمْ [بِناعِقهِاوَقاندِمَا] وسائقها.

> Question me! Why don't you question me? For if you question me concerning anything that shall happen between your time and the Judgement's day, or about a group that shall guide a hundred or one which shall mislead a hundred, I will inform you about its caller, its chief, and leader.

Al-Ḥākim al-Ḥashbānī has recorded this statement of Imam 'Alī ('a) in his *Shawāhid al-tanzīl* (i, 31):

سَلُونِي فَوَاللهِ لا تَسْأَلُونِي عَنْ شيِ مِنْ كِتابِ اللهِ الأَ أنْحبِر نُكُمْ بِهِ بِلَيلِ نَزِ لَتْ أَمْ بِنْهارِ بِهِ أَوفِى سَهْلٍ أَو جَبلٍ

> Question me! By God, if you ask me concerning anything from the Book of God, I will inform you whether it was revealed during night or during day, on mountainside or on level land.

Al-Shaykh Bāqir al-Mahmūdī in his valuable work *Nahj al-sa'ādah fī mustadrak Nahj al-balāghah* (Beirut: Dār al-Ta'āruf li al-Matbū'āt, 1396/1976) has cited a number of other non-Shī'ī sources of this famous statement of 'Alī (see, for instance, pp. 620, 624, 625, 626, 628, 676, 681, 682). In the seven volumes of that work he has collected a large number of Imam 'Alī's sermons, epistles and aphorisms, from Shī'ī and Sunnī sources, which do not appear in the *Nahj al-balāghah*.

Imam 'Ali's ('a) Statements Concerning the Ahl al-Bayt:

In the *Nahj al-balāghah* there are several references to the station of the Ahl al-Bayt in Islam. Here we will cite some relevant passages from the Imam's sermons:

..إِنَّمَا الْأَئِمَّةُ قُوَّامُ اللهِ عَلَى خَلْقِهِ، وَعُرَفَاؤُهُ عَلَى عِبَادِهِ، وَلَا يَدْخُلُ الْجَنَّةَ إِلَّا مَنْ عَرَفَهُمْ وَعَرَفُوهُ، وَلَا يَدْخُلُ النَّارَ إِلَّا مَنْ أَنْكَرَهُمْ وَأَنْكَرُوهُ.

Certainly, the Imams are the *quwwām* (pl. of *qa'im*) of God over His creatures, and the dispensers of the knowledge of God to them. No one except he who knows them and is known to them (as their follower) shall enter Paradise, and none except he who does not recognize them and is not recognized by them (as their follower) shall enter Hellfire. (Kh: 152)

..إِنَّ الْأَئِمَّةَ مِنْ قُرَيْشٍ غُرِسُوا فِي هذَا الْبَطْنِ مِنْ هَاشِمٍ، لَاتَصْلُحُ عَلَى سِوَاهُمْ، وَلَا تَصْلُحُ الْوُلَاةُ مِنْ غَيْرِهِمْ.

Surely the Imams belong to Quraysh. They have been *planted* in this line through Hashim. Neither it (*Imāmah*) suits others, nor anyone except them is competent to assume leadership. (Kh: 144)

وَالْهِجْرَةُ قَائِمَةٌ عَلَى حَدِّهَا الْأَوَّلِ، مَاكَانَ للهِ فِي أَهْلِ الْأَرْضِ حَاجَةٌ مِنْ مُسْتَسِرِّ الْأُمَّةِ وَمُعْلِنِهَا. لَايَقَعُ اسْمُ الْهِجْرَةِ عَلَى أَحَدٍ بِمَعْرِفَةِ الْحُجَّةِ فِي الْأَرْضِ، فَمَنْ عَرَفَهَا وَأَقَرَّ بِهَا فَهُوَ مُهَاجِرٌ، وَلَا يَقَعُ اسْمُ الْاسْتِضْعَافِ عَلَى مَنْ بَلَغَتْهُ الْحُجَّةُ فَسَمِعَتْهَا أُذُنُهُ وَوَعَاهَا قَلْبُهُ.

Hijrah stands at its original definition...The name *hijrah* does not apply to unless he has the knowledge (*ma'rifah*) of the ..?...of God on earth. Whoever recognizes him and acknowledges him is a *muhājir* (one who migrates). And the name *istid'āf* does not apply to anyone whom (the knowledge of) the *Hujjah* reaches and his ears hear about it and his heart attains its cognition. (Kh: 189)

فَإِنَّهُ مَنْ مَاتَ مِنْكُمْ عَلَى فِرَاشِهِ وَهُوَ عَلَى مَعْرِفَةِ حَقِّ رَبِّهِ وَحَقِّ رَسُولِهِ وَأَهْلِ بَيْتِهِ مَاتَ

فَشهيداً، وَوَقَعَ أَجْرُهُ عَلَى اللَّهِ، وَاسْتَوْجَبَ ثَوابَ مانَوَى مِنْ صالِحِ عَمَلِهِ، وَقامَتِ النِّيَّةُ مَقامَ إِصْلا تِهِ لِسَيْفِهِ...

...Indeed anyone of you who dies in his bed with the knowledge (ma'rifah) of the right (haqq) of his Lord, the right of His Messenger and the right of his Ahl al-Bayt, dies a martyr (shahīd) and his reward lies with God. He deserves the reward of the righteous deeds that he had intended to do, and his intention takes the place (in this case) of the actual drawing of the sword. (Kh:190)

...لا يُخالِفُونَ الدِّينَ وَلايَخْتَلِفُونَ فيهِ، فَهُوَ بَيْنَهُمْ شاهِدٌ صادِقٌ، وَصامِتٌ ناطِقٌ.

They do not go against the Dīn, nor do they disagree with one another regarding it. It is to them a truthful witness, which is articulate despite being silent (to others). (Kh: 147)

هُمْ عَيْشُ الْعِلْمِ، وَمَوْتُ الْجَهْلِ، يُخْبِرُكُمْ حِلْمُهُمْ عَنْ عِلْمِهِمْ، وَظاهِرُهُمْ عَنْ باطِنِهِمْ، وَصَمْتُهُمْ عَنْ حِكَمِ مَنْطِقِهِمْ، لايُخالِفُونَ الْحَقَّ وَلا يَخْتَلِفُونَ فيهِ. وَهُمْ دَعائِمُ الْإِسْلامِ، وَوَلائِعُ الْإِعْتِصامِ، بِهِمْ عادَالْحَقُّ إِلى نِصابِهِ، وَانْزاحَ الْباطِلُ عَنْ مَقامِهِ، وَانْقَطَعَ لِسانُهُ عَنْ مَنْبِتِهِ. عَقَلُوا الدِّينَ عَقْلَ وِعايَةٍ وَرِعايَةٍ، لاعَقْلَ سَماعٍ وَرِوايَةٍ. فَإِنَّ رُواةَ الْعِلْمِ كَثيرٌ، وَرُعاتَهُ قَليلٌ.

They are life for knowledge and death for ignorance. Their temperance will inform you of their learning and their outward appearance of their inner self. Their silence will speak of their wise speech. They do not oppose the truth, nor do they disagree regarding it. They are the pillars of Islam and its sanctuaries. Through them righteousness takes its position and falsehood is forced to retreat, its tongue having been severed from its root. They have understood the Dīn through consciousness and practice, not through hearsay and narration (from others). Indeed, the narrators of the knowledge are many, but there are few who practice it. [Kh:239]

· فيهِم كَرائِمُ الْقُرآنِ، وَهُمْ كُنُوزُالرَّحْمنِ. إِنْ نَطَقُوا، وَإِنْ صَمَتُوالَمْ يُسْبَقُوا.

The (verses mentioning) noble stations in the Qur'ān are about them, and they are the treasures of the Beneficent. When they speak, they speak the truth; and when they are silent, no one gets ahead of them (i.e. does not surpass them by his speech and they are not left behind due to their silence). (Kh:154)

دنَأ بْنَ تَذْهَبُونَ؟ وَأَنَّى تُؤْفَكُونَه وَالأَعْلامُ قَائِمَةٌ، والأَبْياتُ واضحَةٌ، وَالْمَنارُ مَنْصُوبَةٌ، فَأَيْنَ يُتاهُ بِكُمْ وَكَيْفَ تَعْمَهونَ وَبَيْنَكُمْ عِتْرَةُ نَبِيَّكُمْ وَهُمْ أَزِمَّةُ الْحَقِّ وَأَعْلامُ الدّينِ وَأَلْسِنَةُ الصّدقِ. فَأَنْزِلُوهُمْ بِأَحْسَنِ مَنازِلِ الْقُرآنِ وَرِدُوهُمْ وُرُودَ الْهِيمِ الْعِطاشِ.

Where are you going and whither are you being misled? The ensigns (of guidance) are standing, the landmarks are clear, the minarets are firmly fixed. Where are you being led astray and why do you grope in darkness when the *'Itrah* of your Prophet (ṣ) is among you? They are the reins of righteousness, the standards of the *Dīn* and the tongues of truth. Accord to them the best stations of the Qur'ān and approach them like thirsty camels approaching water. (Kh:87)

انْظُرُوا أَهْلَ بَيْتِ نَبِيَّكُمْ فَالْزَمُوا سَمْتَهُمْ، وَاتَّبِعُوا آثارَهُمْ، فَلَنْ يُخْرِجُوكُمْ مِنْ هُدىً، وَلَنْ يُعيدُوكُمْ في رَدىً. قإِنْ لَبِدُوا فَالْبُدُوا، وَإِنْ نَهَضُوا فَانْهَضُوا. وَلا تَسْبِقُوهُمْ فَتَضِلُّوا، وَلاتَتَأَخَّرُوا عَنْهُمْ فَتَهْلَكُوا.

Look at the Ahl al-Bayt of your Prophet and adhere to their path. Follow their footsteps, for they will never lead you out of guidance or into destruction. If they stand you also stand up, and if they rise up you also rise. Do not overtake them, nor lag behind them, for that would ruin you. (Kh:97)

..أَيْنَ الَّذينَ زَعَمُوا أَنَّهُمُ الرّاسِخُونَ في الْعِلْمِ دُونَنا، كَذِباً وَبَغْياً عَلَيْنا، أَنْ رَفَعَنا اللهُ وَوَضَعَهُمْ، وَأَعْطانا وَحَرَمَهُمْ، وَأَدْخَلَنا وَأَخْرَجَهُمْ. بِنا يُسْتَعْطَى الْهُدى، وَبِنا يُسْتَجْلى الْعَمى.

Where are those who falsely and insolently claimed that they are 'those firmly rooted in knowledge' (al-rāsikhūna fī al-'ilm; ref. to 3:7; 4:162) and not we? Because God has raised us in station and kept them down; He bestowed upon us and deprived them; He allowed us entry and kept them out. Through us guidance is sought and (spiritual) blindness is turned into illumination. (Kh:144)

In another place, where they are refered to as *Awliyā' Allāh*, the reciprocal relationship between the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) and the Qur'an is stated clearly:

إنّ أوْلياءَالله هُمُ الَّذِينَ نَظَرُوالِى باطِنِ الدُّنْيا إذا نظَرَ النّاسُ إلى ظاهِرِها، وَاشْتَغَلُوا بِآجِلِها إذا اشْتَغَلَ النّاسُ بِعاجِلِها، فَأماتُوا مِنها ماخَشُوا أنْ يَميتَهُمْ، وَتركُوامِنْها ما عَلِمُوا أنّهُ سَيَترُ كُهُمْ وَرَأوْا اسْتِكْثارَ غَيرهِم مِنها اسْتِقْلالاً، وَذَركَهُمْ لها قَرْبًا،أعْداءُ ما سالَمَ النّاسُ، وَسِلمُ ما عادى النّاسُ بِهِمْ عُلِمَ الْكِتابُ وَبِه عُلِمُوا، وَبِهِمْ قامَ الْكِتابُ وَبِه قامُوا...

> The *Awliyā'* of Allāh are those who look at the inward side of the world while the people look only at its outward side. They devote themselves to its ultimate benefits, while the people pursue its immediate gains. They make those aspects (of their being) to die which they fear will deaden them, and abandon those things which they know depart from them. They regard the pursuit of affluence by others as pursuit of poverty and their gains as losses. They are hostile to that with which the people compromise, and they reconcile with that to which the people are hostile. Through them, the Book is known and they through the Book. Through them the Qur'ān stands and they through it. (Ḥ:432)

The Tawātur of Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn

Muslim scholars have adopted certain criteria for ascertaining the authenticity of traditions narrated from the Prophet Muḥammad—may Allah bless him and his Household. They have also developed a terminology for classifying *ḥadīth* on the basis of fame and the relative strength or weakness of different chains of transmission (*ṭuruq*; singular, *ṭarīq*). Thus traditions are characterized mainly as *ṣaḥīḥ, ḥasan, muwaththaq,* and *ḍa'īf* depending on the character of their chain(s) of transmission. Opinions vary concerning the exact meaning of these terms. A *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* generally considers as one which has been transmitted by an unbroken chain of trustworthy narrators from the Prophet (*ṣ*) (here the Shī'ah include traditions narrated from the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt ['a], whereas the Sunnīs include instead the reports of the statements and/or acts of the *Ṣaḥābah* and at times the *Tābi'ūn*).

A '*mutawātir*' tradition is one which has been narrated so extensively

and through so many different chains of transmission as to exclude any possibility of fabrication. The term *mutawātir* (from which 'tawātur' is derived) needs some elucidation. To explain, our knowledge of the towns and countries we have not seen of persons who lived in the past or those whom we have not met is based on what we have heard from others. That is our sources of information about them are so many and various that it would be unreasonable to suspect that they have all conspired to mislead us. In all such cases, the knowledge of such persons, places or things, based on the reports relating to them is considered quite reliable by all sane persons. In fact we regard such reports are trustworthy information, and a large part of our knowledge of the world that we live in is based on *tawātur*, that is, multiple independent sources.

Dr. Subḥī al-Ṣāliḥ, a Sunni scholar, in his book '*Ulūm al-ḥadīth* defines a *mutawātir ḥadīth* as "a ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth which is narrated by a group [of narrators] who cannot ordinarily and reasonably be suspected of having conspired to fabricate a falsehood, from others like them at the biginning, middle, and end of the chain(s) of transmission (*sanad*)." This means that a *ḥadīth* can be considered to be *mutawātir* when it is reported through so many different chains of transmission and such a number of narrators from different places in every generation as cannot reasonably be suspected of having conspired to fabricate a false report in the normal course of things.

Now scholarly opinion differs concerning the number of narrators required for *tawātur*. As mentioned by Dr. Subḥī al-Ṣāliḥ in the same place in his book, some require a minimum of four narrators; others, five, ten, twelve, twenty, forty, seventy and some have gone to the extreme of requiring 313 men and two women—equalling the number of people in the Muslim army at the Battle of Badr. However, the more balanced and the generally held opinion is that there are no valid grounds for specifying a particular number and that the number of narrators capable of producing certitude varies with the listner and the contents of the report.

A tradition that does not possess the requirements of *tawātur* is called *aḥad*, of which there are numerous kinds. For instance, if narrated by a single narrator (in the first *ṭabaqah*), it is called '*gharīb*'. If the narrators are two or more it is called '*azīz*. The *mashhūr* is a tradition which is

well-known amongst the traditionists. A great number of traditions found in ḥadīth compilations are *āḥād*.

In any case, when a tradition is recognized as *mutawātir*, its *isnād* and chains of transmission are not scrutinized in the way other traditions are examined by *'ilm al-dirāyah*. Thus Ibn Ḥajar states, "*Tawātur* is not one of the topics discussed by *'ilm al-'isnād*. Because that which is discussed in *'ilm al-'isnād* is the *ṣiḥḥah* (lit. authenticity) or *ḍa'f* (lit. weakness) of a *ḥadīth*--so that it is either acted upon or abandoned--from the viewpoint of the qualities of its transmitters (*rijāl*) and the terms used to signify the manner of transmission (*ṣīyāgh al-'adā'*). But no (such) discussion is done concerning the transmitters of a *mutawātir* tradition. Rather, it is obligatory to act upon it without any discussion." This is so because it is in the very nature of a *mutawātir* report--whatever its nature and content--to inspire conviction and give rise to certainty and reliance.

With this short introduction, let us now turn to the *tawātur* of the *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn*. When we examine the source books of *ḥadīth*, Shī'ī as well as non-Shī'ī, we find that it has been extensively narrated by the traditionists of each of these schools. To the Shī'ī Muslims who follow the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) in matters of doctrine and law, there is not the slightest amount of doubt concerning the authenticity and import of the *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn*. In fact the Imams themselves are amongst the narrators of this *ḥadīth* as recorded in Shī'ī collections of *ḥadīth* and they have repeatedly confirmed its doctrinal import. Also the Shī'ī *ḥadīth* corpus is itself sufficient to establish the *tawātur* of this tradition.

Apart from the Shī'ī corpus, when we examine the ḥadīth corpus that has come down to us through non-Shī'ī transmission, we see that this tradition of the Prophet (ṣ) has been as widely--if not more--narrated by every generation of transmitters and recorded in the well-known collections of ḥadīth including some of the *Ṣiḥāḥ Sittah*, the six authoritative collections of ḥadīth of the Ahl al-Sunnah. According to the research done by the eminent Shī'ī scholar from India, Sayyid Ḥāmid Ḥusayn Lacknowī in his great work the *'Abaqāt al-'anwār* and the findings of a contemporary scholar, this tradition has been narrated in the Sunnī sources by thirty-six authorities from among the Ṣaḥābah, the Prophet's Companions. Twenty-two narrators from among the Tābi'ūn have narrated

this tradition from the Companions. Thirty-six traditionists belonging to the 2nd/8th century, sixty-eight of them from the 3rd/9th, thirty-eight from the 4th/10th, and twenty-two from the fifth have narrated this tradition as recorded in the related hadīth literature. The research done by Sayyid Hamid Husayn (1246-1306/1830-1888) more than a hundred years ago showed that 187 traditionists and authors from the era of the Companions to the time of the author have narrated this tradition or cited it in their books. Further research by Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azīz Tabātabā'ī, a contempory scholar, has brought this number to 378. Among Sunnī authors, al-Hāfiz Abū al-Fadl Muhammad ibn Tāhir al-Maqdisī (448-507/1056-1113), known as Ibn al-Qaysarānī, is known to have written a book on the subject of the chains of transmission of the *Hadīth al-Thaqalayn* mentioned by Sunnī biographers.

THE NARRATORS OF THE HADĪTH THAQALAYN

Narrators from among the Sahābah:

Following are the narrators of the *Hadīth al-Thaqalayn* from among the Sahābah, under whose names are given the Sunnī sources that record the *riwāyāt* pertaining to this *hadīth*. Some of these works are not extant but their relevant fragments exist as citations in extant works, some of which exist as unpublished manuscripts:

1. Amīr al-Mu'minīn 'Alī ibn Abī Tālib ('a) (23 B.H.—40 H./ 600-661).

(1) Ibn Rāhwayh Ishāq ibn Ibrāhīm al-Hanzalī, (2) Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn 'Umar al-Shaybānī, (3) Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Khāliq al-Bazzāz, (4) Abū Ja'far Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, (5) Abū Bishr Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Dūlabī, (6) Abū 'Abd-Allāh Husayn ibn Ismā'īl al-Muhāmilī, (7) Abū al-'Abbās ibn 'Uqdah al-Kūfī, (8) Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn 'Umar ibn al-Ji'ābī, (9) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (10) Jalāl al-dīn al-Suyūtī, (11) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (12) 'Alī al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, (13) Ahmad ibn al-Fadl ibn Muhammad Bā Kathīr al-Makkī, (14) Mahmūd ibn Muhammad al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī, (15) Sulaymān ibn

Ibrāhīm al-Qundūzī.

2. Al-'Imām al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ('a) (3--50/624--670).
Al-Qundūzī.

3. Salmān al-Fārsī (d. 36/656).
Al-Qundūzī.

4. Jundub ibn Junādah, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, (d. 32/650).
(1) Muḥammad ibn 'Īsā al-Tirmidhī, (2) Ibn 'Uqdah, (3) Abū Muḥammad
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-'Āṣimī, (4) Ibn 'Uqdah, (3) Abū Muḥammad
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-'Āṣimī, (4) Ibn Kathīr, (5) al-Sakhāwī, (6)
al-Samhūdī, (7) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Muḥammad Bā Kathīr.

5. 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Abbās (3 B.H.--68/619--687).
Sulaymān ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qundūzī.

6. Sa'd ibn Mālik, Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī (10 B.H.--74/613--693).
(1) 'Abd al-Malik al-'Arzamī, (2) Sulaymān ibn Mihrān al-'A'mash, (3)
Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq al-Madanī, (4) 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mas'ūdī, (5)
Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥah al-Yāmī, (6) 'Abd Allāh ibn Numayr
al-Hamadānī, (7) 'Abd al-Malik al-'Uqdī, (8) Ibn Sa'd al-Zuhrī, (9)
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, (10) 'Abbād ibn Ya'qūb al-Rawājinī, (11) Muḥammad
ibn Aḥmad al-Riyāḥī, (12) 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, (13) Abū
Ya'lā al-Tamīmī, (14) Abū Ja'far al-Ṭabarī, (15) Abū al-Qāsim
al-Baghawī, (16) Ibn 'Uqdah, (17) Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, (18) Abū
Ṭāhir al-Dhahabī, (19) Abū Isḥāq al-Tha'labī, (20) Abū Nu'aym
al-'Iṣfahānī, (21) Abū Ghālib Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Naḥwī, (22) Ibn
'Abd al-Barr, (23) Abū Muḥammad al-Ghandajānī, (24) Abū al-Ḥasan
al-Jullābī, (25) Abū al-Muẓaffar al-Sam'ānī, (26) Abū Muḥammad ibn
al-'Anmāṭī, (27) Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, (28) Abū Muḥammad ibn
al-'Akhḍar, (29) Abū al-Fatḥ al-'Abīwardī, (30) Aḥmad ibn 'Abd Allāh
al-Ṭabarī, (31) al-Niẓām al-'A'raj al-Nīshābūrī, (32) Ibrāhīm
al-Ḥamawī, (33) Abū al-Ḥajjāj al-Mizzī, (34) Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf
al-Zarandī, (35) Ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī, (36) al-Sayyid 'Alī al-Ḥamdānī,

(37) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (38) Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, (39) Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qasṭallānī, (40) 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bukhārī, (41) 'Alī al-Qārī al-Hindī, (42) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Bā Kathīr, (43) Maḥmūd al-Qādirī al-Shaykhānī, (44) Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Bāqī al-Zarqānī, (45) al-Mīrzā Muḥammad al-Badakhshānī al-Ḥārithī, (46) Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Ṣan'ānī, (47) Sulaymān ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qundūzī, and others.

7. Jābir ibn 'Abd Allāh al-'Anṣārī (16 B.H.–78/607–697).

(1) Abū Bakr ibn Abī Shaybah al-'Absī, (2) Naṣr al-Washshā' al-Kūfī (3) al-Tirmidhī, (4) Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, (5) al-Nasā'ī, (6) Abū al-'Abbās ibn 'Uqdah, (7) Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Baghdādī, (8) al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, (9) Abū Bakr al-Baghawī, (10) Ibn al-'Athīr al-Jazarī, (11) al-Khaṭīb al-Tabrīzī, (12) Abū al-Ḥajjāj al-Mizzī, (13) al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭayyibī, (14) Muḥammad ibn al-Muẓaffar al-Khalkhālī, (15) Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Zarandī, (16) Ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī, (17) Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥāfizī al-Bukhārī, (18) Shihāb al-Dīn al-Dawlatābādī, (19) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (20) Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, (21) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (22) 'Alī al-Qārī al-Hindī, (23) Aḥmad ibn Bā Kathīr, (24) Shihāb al-Dīn al-Khafājī, (25) Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sahāranpūrī, (26) al-Mīrzā Muḥammad al-Badakhshānī, (27) Muḥammad Muhīn al-Lakhnowī, (28) al-Mīrzā Ḥasan 'Alī Muḥaddith al-Lakhnowī, (29) al-Shaykh Sulaymān al-Qundūzī, (30) al-Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān al-Qannawjī.

8. Abū al-Haytham Mālik ibn al-Tayhān (d. 20/641).

(1) Abū al-'Abbās ibn 'Uqdah, (2) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (3) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (4) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Muḥammad Bā Kathīr, (5) al-Shaykh Sulaymān al-Qundūzī.

9. Ibrāhīm Abū Rāfi', one of the Prophet's *mawālī* (d. after 40/661).

(1) Ibn 'Uqdah, (2) al-Sakhāwī, (3) al-Samhūdī, (4) Ibn Bā Kathīr, (5) al-Qundūzī.

10. Ḥudhayfah ibn al-Yamān (d. 36/656).

(1) Al-Shaykh Sulaymān ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qundūzī.

11. Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd al-Ghifārī.

(1) Naṣr ibn ʿAlī al-Jahdamī, (2) Abū ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī, (3) al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, (4) Abū al-ʿAbbās ibn ʿUqdah, (5) Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, (6) Abū Nuʿaym al-ʾIṣfāhānī, (7) Abū al-Qāsim ibn ʿAsākir, (8) Abū Mūsā al-Madīnī, (9) Abū al-Futūḥ al-ʿIjlī, (10) ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn al-ʿAthīr, (11) al-Ḍiyāʾ al-Maqdisī, (12) Ibrāhīm al-Ḥamawī, (13) Ibn Kathīr al-Dimashqī, (14) Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Bukhārī, (15) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (16) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (17) ʿAṭāʾ Allāh al-Shīrāzī, (18) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Bā Kathīr, (19) al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī, (20) Muḥammad Ṣadr al-ʿĀlam.

12. Khuzaymah ibn Thābit Dhū Shahādatayn (d. 37/657).

(1) Abū al-ʿAbbās Ibn ʿUqdah, (2) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (3) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (4) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Bā Kathīr, (5) al-Shaykh Sulaymān al-Qundūzī.

13. Zayd ibn Thābit (11 B.H.--45/611-665).

(1) Al-Rukayn ibn al-Rabīʿ al-Fazārī, (2) Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq, (3) Sharīk al-Qāḍī, (4) Abū Aḥmad al-Zubayrī, (5) Aswad ibn ʿĀmir al-Shāmī, (6) Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, (7) ʿAbd ibn Ḥamīd al-Kashshī, (8) Aḥmad ibn ʿAmr al-Shaybānī, (9) ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, (10) Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭabarī, (11) Abū Bakr ibn al-ʾAnbārī, (12) Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, (13) Abū Manṣūr al-ʾAzharī, (14) Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Kanjī al-Shāfiʿī, (15) Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Haythamī, (16) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (17) Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, (18) ʿAlī al-Qārī al-Hindī, (19) ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Munāwī, (20) ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-ʾAzīzī, (21) al-Mīrzā Muḥammad al-Badakhshī, (22) Sulaymān ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qundūzī, (23) Ḥasan al-Zamān al-Hindī.

14. Abū Hurayrah, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Ṣakhr (d. 59/679).

(1) Abū Bakr al-Bazzāz, (2) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (3) Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, (4) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Bā Kathīr, (5) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (6) Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī.

15. 'Abd Allāh ibn Ḥanṭab.
(1) Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, (2) 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn al-'Athīr, (3) Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī.

16. Jubayr ibn Muṭ'im (d. 59/679).
(1) Abū Nu'aym al-'Iṣfahānī, (2) al-Sayyid 'Alī al-Hamadānī, (3) al-Shaykh Sulaymān al-Qundūzī.

17. Al-Barā' ibn 'Āzib (d. 71/690).
(1) Abū Nu'aym al-'Iṣfahānī.

18. Anas ibn Mālik (10 B.H.--93/612--712).
(1) Abū Nu'aym al-'Iṣfahānī.

19. Ṭalḥah ibn 'Ubayd Allāh al-Taymī (28 B.H.--36/595--656).
(1) Al-Shaykh Sulaymān al-Qundūzī.

20. 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf (44 B.H.--32/580--652).
Al-Qundūzī.

21. Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ (d. 23 B.H.--55/600--675).
(1) Al-Qundūzī.

22. 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ (50 B.H.--43/574--664).
Al-Muwaffaq ibn Aḥmad al-Khwārazmī.

23. Sahl ibn Sa'd al-'Anṣārī (d. 91/710).
(1) Ibn 'Uqdah al-Kūfī, (2) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (3) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (4) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Bā Katnīr, (5) Sulaymān al-Qundūzī.

24. 'Adī ibn Ḥātim (d. 68/687).
(1) Ibn 'Uqdah, (2) al-Sakhāwī, (3) al-Samhūdī, (4) Ibn Bā Kathīr, (5) al-Qundūzī.

25. 'Aqabah ibn 'Āmir (d. 58/678).

(1) Ibn 'Uqdah, (2) al-Sakhāwī, (3) al-Samhūdī, (4) Ibn Bā Kathīr, (5) al-Qundūzī.

26. Abū Ayyūb al-'Anṣārī, Khūlid ibn Zayd (d. 52/672).

27. Abū Shurayḥ al-Khuzā'ī, Khuwaylid ibn 'Amr (d. 68/687).

28. Abū Qudāmah, al-'Anṣārī (martyred 37/657).

29. Abū Layla al-'Anṣārī (martyred 37/657).

30. 'Umayrah al-'Aslamī.

Hadīth al-Thaqalayn has been narrated from all the above five (26--30) by (1) Ibn 'Uqdah, (2) al-Sakhāwī, (3) al-Samhūdī, (4) Ibn Bā Kathīr, (5) al-Qundūzī.

31. 'Amir ibn Laylā ibn Ḍamrah.

(1) Ibn 'Uqdah, (2) Abū Mūsā al-Madīnī, (3) Abū al-Futūḥ al-'Ijlī, (4) 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn al-'Athīr, (5) Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, (6) Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, (7) Nūr al-Dīn al-Samhūdī, (8) Aḥmad ibn al-Faḍl ibn Muḥammad Bā Kathīr, (9) al-Qundūzī.

32. Zayd ibn Arqam (d. 68/687).

(1) Al-Nasā'ī (2) al-Ḥākim, (3) al-Ṭabarānī, (4) 'Alī al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, (5) Muḥammad Ṣadr al-'Ālam, (6) Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Ṣan'ānī, (7) al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī, (8) al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Zarandī, (9) al-Samhūdī, (10) Aḥmad ibn Bā Kathīr, and many others.

33. 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Umar (10 B.H.--73/613--692).

34. Faṭimah al-Zahrā' ('a) (18 B.H.--11/604--632).

Al-Shaykh Sulaymān al-Qundūzī.

35. Umm Salamuh, Hind bint Suhayl (28 B.H.--62/596--681).

(1) Ibn 'Uqdah, (2) Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'Umar al-Dārquṭnī, (3) al-Sakhāwī, (4) al-Samhūdī, (5) Aḥmad ibn Bā Kathīr, (6) al-Shaykhānī al-Qādirī, (7) al-Razzāz, as in *Wasīlat al-maʾāl.*

36. Umm Hānī, Fākhtah bint Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661).

(1) Ibn 'Uqdah, (2) al-Sakhāwī, (3) al-Samhūdī, (4) Ibn Bā Kathīr.

Narrators of Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn from Among the Tābiʿūn:

A good number of narrators from among the Tābiʿūn have narrated this tradition from one or more of the Ṣaḥābah mentioned above. Some of them are:

37. Abū al-Ṭufayl 'Āmir ibn Wāthilah al-Laythī (3--100/625--718).

38. 'Aṭiyyah ibn Saʿd al-ʿAwfī.

39. Ḥanash ibn al-Muʿtamir.

40. Al-Ḥārith al-Ḥamdānī.

41. Ḥabīb ibn Abī Thābit.

42. 'Alī ibn Rabīʿah.

43. Al-Qāsim ibn Ḥassān.

44. Ḥusayn ibn Sabrah.

45. 'Amr ibn Muslim.

46. Abū al-Duḥā Muslim ibn Ṣubīḥ.

47. Yaḥyā ibn Juʿdah.

48. Al-'Aṣbagh ibn Nubātah.

49. 'Abd Allāh ibn Abī Rāfi'.

50. Al-Muṭṭalib ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Ḥanṭab al-Makhzūmī.

51. 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

52. 'Umar ibn 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.

53. Fāṭimah ibnat 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.

54. Al-Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.

55. Zayn al-'Ābidīn 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ('a).

56. Yazīd ibn Ḥayyān.

57. Mālik ibn Ḍamrah.

58. Abū Ṣāliḥ.

Second/Eighth Century: :

59. Sa'īd ibn Masrūq al-Thawrī (d. 126/743).
His narration is recorded in Muslim (*Saḥīḥ*, ii, 238) from Zayd ibn Arqam.

60. Al-Rukayn ibn al-Rabī' Abū al-Rabī' al-Fazārī al-Kūfī (d. 131/748).
In Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (*Musnad*, v, 181, 182) from Zayd ibn Thābit.

61. Yaḥyā ibn Sa'īd ibn Ḥayyān, Abū Ḥayyān al-Taymī al-Kūfī (d. 145/762).
In Muslim (*Saḥīḥ*, ii, 237–238) and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (*Musnad*, iv, 371)
from Zayd ibn Arqam.

62. 'Abd al-Malik ibn Abī Sulaymān Maysarah al-'Arzamī al-Kūfī (d. 145/762).

In Aḥmad (*Musnad*, iii, 26) from 'Aṭiyyah from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

63. Al-'A'mash, Sulaymān ibn Mihrān al-'Asadī al-Kūfī al-Kāhilī (61--147/680--764).

In al-Tirmidhī (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, ii, 220) 'Aṭiyyah from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī and also from Ḥabīb ibn Abī Thābit from Zayd ibn Arqam.

64. Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Yasār al-Thaqafī al-Madanī (d. 151/768).

His *marfū'* narrations from Zayd ibn Arqam and Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī have been recorded by Ibn Manẓūr (*Lisān al-'Arab*, iv, 538).

65. Isrā'īl ibn Yūnus al-Sabī'ī, Abū Yūsuf al-Kūfī (d. 160/776).

In Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (*Musnad*, iv, 371) from Zayd ibn Arqam.

66. 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Utbah ibn Mas'ūd al-Kūfī al-Mas'ūdī (d. 160/776).

Al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu'jam al-ṣaghīr*, i, 135) from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

67. Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥah ibn Muṣarrif al-Yāmī al-Kūfī (d. 167/783).

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal in *Musnad*, Ibn al-Maghāzilī in *al-Manāqib* and al-Ḥamawī in *Farā'id al-simṭayn* have narrated *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn* from him.

68. Abū 'Awānah al-Waḍḍāḥ ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Yashkarī al-Wāsiṭī al-Bazzāz (d. 176/792).

Al-Nasā'ī in *Khaṣā'iṣ*, al-Ḥākim in *al-Mustadrak* and Khwārazmī in *al-Manāqib* have narrated *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn* from him.

69. Sharik ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Qāḍī (d. 177/793).
In *Musnad Ahmad* (v, 181, 183) from Zayd ibn Thābit.

70. Ḥassān ibn Ibrāhim ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Kirmāni (d. 176/792).
Muslim in his *Saḥīḥ* and al-Ḥākim in *al-Mustadrak*.

71. Jarīr ibn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Ḍabbī al-Kūfī (d. 188/803).
Muslim in his *Saḥīḥ* mentions his narration of *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn*.

72. Abū Bishr Ismā'īl ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muqsim al-'Asadī al-Baṣrī, known as Ibn 'Ulayyah (d. 193/808).
His narration of *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn* is recorded by Muslim in his *Saḥīḥ* and Ahmad in his *Musnad*. One of the leading traditionists and jurists of Baṣrah.

73. Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn al-Fuḍayl al-Ḍabbī al-Kūfī (d. 194/809).
His narration of *Ḥadīth al-Thaqalayn* is mentioned by Muslim and al-Tirmidhī in their books.

74. 'Abd Allāh ibn Numayr al-Hamdānī (d. 199/814).
Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal in his *Musnad* and *Kitāb al-manāqib*.

75. Ḥabīb ibn Abī Thābit (d. 118/737).
His narration is mentioned by al-Nasā'ī (*Khaṣā'iṣ*, i, 133) and in Ibn Kathīr (*al-Bidāyah wa al-nihāyah*, v, 209) from Ibn al-Ṭufayl from Zayd ibn Arqam.

76. Abū Isḥāq 'Amr ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Subī'ī (d. 129/746).
His narration is mentioned by al-Dārquṭnī in *Kitāb al-'Ilal* (ii, 78) from Ḥanash ibn al-Mu'tamir from Abū Dharr.

77. Muḥammad ibn 'Umar ibn 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.
In al-Dulabī, *al-Dhurriyyat al-ṭāhirah*, from his father, from his grandfather ('a).

78. Ḥakīm ibn Jubayr al-'Asadī.

In al-Ṭabarānī (al-Mu'jam al-kabīr, iii, No. 2681), from him, from Abū al-Ṭufayl, from Zayd ibn Arqam.

79. Zakariyyā ibn Abī Zā'idah (d. 147/764).

In al-Muḥāmilī (al-'Amālī, iii, 38b, ms. in Dār al-Kutub al-Ẓāhiriyyah, Damascus), from him, from 'Aṭiyyah al-'Awfī from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

80. Fiṭr ibn Khalīfah al-Makhzūmī (d. 153 or 155/770 or 772).

In al-Samhūdī (Jawāhir al-'iqdayn, ms. 86a) and al-Sakhāwī (al-'Istijlāb, ms., 22b), from him, from Abū al-Ṭufayl.

81. Kathīr ibn Zayd (d. 158/774).

In Abū Ja'far al-Ṭaḥāwī (Mushkil al-'athār, ii, 307) and al-Dūlābī (al-Dhurriyyat al-ṭāhirah, 168) from him, from Muḥammad ibn 'Umar ibn 'Alī, from 'Alī ('a).

82. Ma'rūf ibn Kharrabūdh al-Makkī.

In Abū al-'Abbās al-Ḥasan ibn Sufyān al-Nasawī (al-Musnad al-kabīr), Abū Nu'aym (Ḥilayt al-'awliyā', i, 355), al-Samhūdī (Jawāhir al-'iqdayn), al-Ṭabarānī (al-Mu'jam al-kabīr), al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Haythamī (Majma' al-zawā'id), al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Ibn 'Asākir, Ibn Ḥajar and others, from him from Abū al-Ṭufayl, from Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd al-Ghifārī. He is among the rijāl of al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dawūd and Ibn Mājah.

83. Abū al-Jaḥḥāf Dawūd ibn Abī 'Awf al-Tamīmī.

In Imām Aḥmad's Faḍā'il 'Alī, from him, from 'Aṭiyyah, from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī. Tawthīq by Ibn Mu'īn and Sufyān. Among the rijāl of al-Tirmidhī, Ibn Mājah, and al-Nasā'ī.

84. Ṣāliḥ ibn Abī al-'Aswad al-Laythī.

In al-Ṭabarānī (al-Mu'jam al-kabīr, ii, No. 2679) from al-'A'mash from 'Aṭiyyah from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

85. Abū al-Jārūd Ziyād ibn al-Mundhir al-'Abdī.

In al-Samhūdī (*Jawāhir al-'iqdayn*) and al-Sakhāwī (*al-'Istijlāb*) from him, from Abū al-Tufayl.

86. Ḥātim ibn Ismā'īl al-Madanī (d. 186/802).

In al-'Uqaylī (*Kitāb al-ḍu'afā'*), from Ja'far ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ('a) . *Tawthīq* by Ibn Sa'd, Ibn Ḥibbān and al-'Ijlī.

87. Kathīr ibn Ismā'īl al-Nawā' al-Kūfī.

In al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu'jam al-ṣaghīr*, i, 131) from him, from 'Aṭiyyah. Among the rijāl of al-Tirmidhī.

88. Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Musahhar al-Qarashī (d. 189/805).

In al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu'jam al-kabīr*, ii, No. 2678), from Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥaḍramī, from Manjāb ibn al-Ḥārith, from him, from 'Abd al-Malik ibn Abī Sulaymān, from 'Aṭiyyah, from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

89. 'Alī ibn Thābit al-Jazarī.

In al-Bazzāz (*Musnad*, see no. 136), from him, from Sufyān ibn Sulaymān, from Abū Isḥāq, from al-Ḥārith, from 'Alī ('a).

90. 'Abd Allāh ibn Sinān al-Zuhrī.

In Ibn 'Uqdah (*al-Muwālāt*), Abū Mūsā al-Madīnī (*Kitāb al-Ṣaḥābah*), al-Samhūdī (*op. cit.*), and al-Sakhāwī (*op. cit.*), from him, from Abū al-Tufayl.

91. Hārūn ibn Sa'd al-'Ijlī.

In al-'Uqaylī (*Kitāb al-ḍu'afā'*, ms. xii, 288) from Muḥammad ibn Abī Hafṣ al-'Aṭṭār, from him, from 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Sa'īd al-Khudrī. Among the rijāl of Muslim.

92. Yūnus ibn Arqam.

In al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu'jam al-ṣaghīr*, i, 135) and al-Khaṭīb (*Talkhīṣ al-mutashābih fī al-rasm*, ms. folio 29), from 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Ṣabīb, from him, from Hārūn ibn Sa'd, from 'Aṭiyyah.

93. 'Uthmān ibn Abī Zur'ah al-Mughīrah al-Thaqafī al-Kūfī.

In al-Ṭaḥāwī (*Mushkil al-'āthār*, iv, 368) and Aḥmad (*al-Musnad*, iv, 37), from Isrā'īl ibn Yūnus al-Sabī'ī, from him, from 'Alī ibn Rabī'ah. Among the rijāl of al-Bukhārī.

94. Zayd ibn al-Ḥasan al-Qarashī al-'Anmāṭī, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Kūfī.

In al-Nasawī (*al-Musnad al-kabīr*), Abū Nu'aym al-'Iṣfahānī (*Ḥilyat al-'awliyā'*), al-Samhūdī (*Jawāhir al-'iqdayn*), al-Ṭabarānī, (*al-Mu'jam al-kabīr*, iii, no.2683), al-Haythamī (*Majma' al-zawā'id*, ix, 164), al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (*Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, viii, 442), Ibn 'Asākir (*Ta'rīkh Dimashq*), Ibn Kathīr (*al-Bidāyah wa al-nihāyah*) and others, from him, from Ja'far ibn Muḥammad ('a), from Jābir; and from him, from Ma'rūf ibn Kharrabūdh, from Abū al-Ṭufayl, from Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd.

Third/Ninth Century:

95. Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh Abū Aḥmad al-Zubayrī al-Ḥabbāl al-Kūfī (d. 203/818).

In *Musnad Aḥmad* (v, 189) from him, from Sharīk, from al-Rukayn, from al-Qāsim ibn Ḥassān, from Zayd ibn Thābit.

96. Abū 'Āmir 'Abd al-Malik ibn 'Amr ibn Qays al-'Aqadī al-Baṣrī (d. 204/819).

In Ibn al-Maghāzilī (*al-Manāqib*), from him, from Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥah, from al-'A'mash, from 'Aṭiyyah, from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

97. Ja'far ibn 'Awn al-Makhzūmī al-Kūfī (d. 206/821).

In 'Abd ibn Ḥamīd al-Kashshī (*Musnad*, ms. 894, Ayasofia Library, folio 40b), al-Dārimī (*Sunan*, x, 113), al-Bayhaqī (*Sunan*, ii, 148, vii, 30) and others, from him, from Abū Ḥayyān al-Taymī.

98. Yazīd ibn Hārūn al-Wāsiṭī (d. 206/821).

In al-Muḥāmilī (*al-'Amālī*, ms. Dār al-Kutub al-Ẓāhiriyyah, folio 38b),

from him, from Zakariyya ibn Abī Zā'idah.

99. Al-'Aswad ibn 'Āmir Shādhān al-Wāsiṭī (d. 205/820).
In *Musnad Aḥmad* iv, 371) from him, from Isrā'īl ibn 'Uthmān, from 'Alī ibn Rabī'ah, from Zayd ibn Arqam.

100. Ya'lā ibn 'Ubayd al-Ṭanāfisī (d. 209/824).
In al-Bayhaqī (*Sunan*, x, 113), from him, from Abū Ḥayyān al-Taymī, from Zayd ibn Arqam.

101. 'Ubayd Allāh ibn Mūsā al-'Absī al-Kūfī (d. 213/828).
In al-Bazzāz, al-Fasawī (*al-Ma'rifah wa al-ta'rīkh*, i, 536), Abū Bakr al-Ji'ābī (*Kitāb al-Ṭālibiyyīn*), al-Sakhāwī (*al-'Istijlab*, ms. folio 24b), al-Samhūdī (*Jawāhir al-'iqdayn*, ii, folio 87a), from him, and he has narrated the tradition from his father and Isrā'īl ibn Yūnus as well as Sharīk ibn 'Abd Allāh, from Abū Isrā'īl and Fuḍayl ibn Marzūq.

102. Talīd ibn Sulaymān al-Muḥāribī al-Kūfī.
In Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal's *al-Faḍā'il*, 'Abd Allāh ibn Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal, from Ismā'īl ibn Mūsā ibn bint al-Suddī, from him, from Abū al-Jaḥḥāf, from 'Aṭiyyah, from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

103. Hāshim ibn al-Qāsim Abū al-Naṣr (Naḍr) al-Kinānī al-Baghdādī (d. 207/822).
In Ibn Sa'd (*al-Ṭabaqāt*, ii, 194) from him, from Muhammad ibn Ṭalḥah, from al-'A'mash, from 'Aṭiyyah, from Abū Sa'īd.

104. Yaḥyā ibn Ḥammād ibn Abī Ziyād al-Shaybānī al-Baṣrī (d. 215/830).
In al-Nasā'ī (*al-Khasā'is*), al-Ḥākim (*al-Mustadrak*), and al-Khwārazmī (*al-Manāqib*), from Muhammad ibn al-Muthannā, from him, from Abū 'Awānah, from Sulaymān, from Ḥabīb ibn Abī Thābit, from Abū al-Ṭufayl, from Zayd ibn Arqam.

105. Abū Ghassān al-Nahdī, Mālik ibn Ismā'īl al-Kūfī (d. 219/834).

In al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (*Mushkil al-'athār*, iv, 268), from Fahd ibn Sulaymān, from him, from Isrā'īl ibn Yūnus al-Sabī'ī.

106. Muḥammad ibn Sa'īd ibn Sulaymān, Ibn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 220/835).

In al-'Uqaylī (*al-Ḍu'afā*; vi, ms. folio 104) from Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl, from him, from Ḥātim ibn Ismā'īl, from Ja'far ibn Muḥammad ('a), from his father ('a), from Jābir.

107. Muḥammad ibn Kathīr al-'Abdī al-Baṣrī (d. 223/837).

In al-Samhūdī (*Jawāhir al-'iqdayn*, ii, ms. folio 86a) and al-Sakhāwī (*al-'Istijlāb*, ms. folio 22b), from him, from Fiṭr ibn Khalīfah and Abū al-Jārūd, from Abū al-Ṭufayl.

108. Sa'īd ibn Sulaymān al-Wāsiṭī al-Baghdādī (d. 225/839).

In al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu'jam al-kabīr*, iii, No. 3052) from Aḥmad ibn al-Qāsim, from him, from Zayd ibn al-Ḥasan al-'Anmāṭī, from Ma'rūf ibn Kharrabūdh, from Abū al-Ṭufayl, from Ḥudhayfah ibn Usayd.

109. 'Abd Allāh ibn Bukayr al-Ghanawī.

In al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu'jam al-kabīr*, iii, No. 2681) from Muṭayyan, from Ja'far ibn Ḥamīd, from him, from Ḥakīm ibn Zuhayr, from Abū al-Ṭufayl, from Zayd ibn Arqam.

110. Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Hāshimī al-Baghdādī (d. 215/830).

In his book *al-Munammaq*, p. 9.

111. Sa'īd ibn Manṣūr al-Khurāsānī (d. 227/841).

In his *Sunan* with his *isnād* from Zayd ibn Thābit, as cited in *Kanz al-'ummāl*, i, 47.

112. Dāwūd ibn 'Amr al-Ḍabbī al-Baghdādī (d. 228/842).

In Abū Bakr al-Bazzāz (*Musnad*; see no. 136) and al-'Asqalānī (*Zawā'id Musnad al-Bazzāz*, see under Aḥmad ibn al-Manṣūr) from Aḥmad ibn

al-Manṣūr al-Ramādī, from him, from Ṣāliḥ ibn Mūsā ibn 'Abd Allāh, from 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn Rāfi', from Abū Ṣāliḥ from Abū Hurayrah.

113. 'Ammār ibn Naṣr al-Marūzī al-Baghdādī (d. 229/843).

In Abū Nu'aym (*Hilyat al-'awliyā'*, ix, 64) from 'Abd Allāh ibn Ja'far, from Aḥmad ibn Yūnus al-Ḍabbī, from him, from Ibrāhīm ibn al-Yasa', from Ja'far ibn Muḥammad ('a), from his father ('a), from his grandfather ('a), from 'Alī ('a).

114. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Sa'd al-Zuhrī al-Baṣrī (d. 230/844).

In al-Suyūṭī (*al-Durr al-manthūr*, ii, 60), from him with his *isnād* from Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī.

115. Abū Muḥammad Khalaf ibn Sālim al-Mukharrimī al-Muhallabī al-Sindī al-Baghdādī (d. 231/845).

In al-Ḥākim (*al-Mustadrak*, iii, 109) and al-Khwārazmī (*al-Manāqib*) from Ṣāliḥ ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Baghdādī, from him, from Yaḥyā ibn Ḥammād, from 'Abū 'Awānah, from al-'A'mash, from Ḥabīb ibn Abī Thābit, from Abū al-Ṭufayl, from Zayd ibn Arqam.

116. Minjāb ibn al-Ḥārith al-Tamīmī al-Kūfī (d. 231/845).

In al-Ṭabarānī (*al-Mu'jam al-kabīr* iii, No. 2678) from him, from 'Alī ibn Musahhar (88). Among the rijāl of Muslim and Ibn Mājah.

117. Zuhayr ibn Ḥarb ibn Shaddād, Abū Khaythamah al-Nasā'ī (d. 234/848).

In *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (ii, 237–238) from him, and Shujā' ibn Makhlad, from Ibn 'Ulayyah (72), from Yazīd ibn Ḥayyān (56), from Zayd ibn Arqam.

118. Abū al-Faḍl Shujā' ibn Makhlad al-Fallās al-Baghawī al-Baghdādī (d. 235/849).

In *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*; see 117 above.

To be continued—inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

9. *'Ulūm al-ḥadīth* (Qumm: Manshūrat al-Raḍī, 1363 Sh.), p. 147:

فالمتواتر هوالحديث الصحيح الذي يرويه جمع يحيل العقل والعادة تواطؤهم على
الكذب، عن جمع مثلهم في اوّل السَّند ووسطه وآخره.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 151–152, citing Ibn Ḥajar, *Sharḥ al-nukhbah*, p. 4:

لأنّ التواتر ليس من مباحث علم الإسناد، إذ علم الإسناد يُبحث فيه عن صحّة
الحديث أو ضعفه ليُعمل به أو يُترك من حيث صفاتُ الرّجال و صِيغُ الأداء، والمُتواترُ لا
يُبحث عن رجاله، بل يجب العملُ به من غير بحث.

11. See 'Alī al-Ḥusaynī al-Mīlānī, *Khulāṣat 'Abaqāt al-'anwār* (Tehran: Mu'assasat al-Bi'thah, 1405), vol. i, pp. 17-187.

12. *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 96—104.

13. See Ismā'īl Pāshā in *Hadiyyat al-'ārifīn*, ii, 82, *al-'Ansāb al-muttafiqah*, and *al-Jam' bayna rijāl al-Ṣaḥīḥayn* (Hyderabad); cf. Al-Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī, "Ahl al-Bayt ('a) fī al-maktabat al-'arabiyyah," *Turāthunā*, no. 15, 4/2, pp. 84-93.

Unpublished Versions of the Sahifah Sajjadiyah

Mohammad Husain Jalali

Introduction:

The spirit of Shī'ī faith shines through the *Sahīfah*, the legacy of the fourth Imam 'Alī ibn Husayn al-Sajjād (d. 95/713), the great grandson of the Prophet Muḥammad (ṣ). The Shī'ī community has from earliest times transmitted the *Sahīfah* generation after generation as a prayer book for worship, an outline of major themes of the faith, and as a guide of the duties of individual Shī'ī Muslims towards their Lord, the society in which they live, and each other. Thus the *Sahīfah* touches on a variety of topics, such as praise of God and worship of Him, prayers for help and protection in times of stress and difficulty, pleas for God's forgiveness, and petition for His grace and blessing. The two main reporters of the *Sahīfah* are the two sons of the fourth Imam, al-Bāqir (d. 114/732) and Zayd al-Shahīd (d. 122/739). The chain of *Isnād* of all the manuscripts discovered so far goes back to 'Umayr, son of Mutawakkil al-Thaqafī al-Balkhī who reports from both Yaḥyā son of Zayd (d. 126/743) and Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765). The reporters of the *Sahīfah* from Mutawakkil, however, are many and the manuscripts vary greatly in the number, length, and the arrangement of the invocations. The main aim of this discussion is to describe the variant manuscripts of the *Sahīfah* which I was able to examine. First, however, it will be useful to shed some light on the devotional works of the Shī'ī faith. We shall then speak of the author of the *Sahīfah*, the origin of its title, and its composition, and finally proceed to a comparison between the three available manuscripts of the *Sahīfah*.

The Merit of Invocation:

"Du'ā" is a term derived from the Arabic root "Du'ā", that is, to call. In Islamic literature, when "Du'ā" is used with the preposition "ilah", it refers to the direct call, addressed to God alone, requesting blessings, or cursing whomever deserves it when it is used with the preposition "la". The term has been rendered variously as invocation, supplication, and spoken prayer. Thus, Du'ā' differs from Ṣalāt, the ritual prayer, and also from Dhikr, the remembrance of God. Du'ā' may be used as a liturgy in a congregational gathering, or individually as a private prayer. Shī'īs consider, "Du'ā'" an important source of spiritual guidance in accordance with the Qur'ānic injunction: "Call upon me, I will reply." (Qur'an, 40:60). Many sayings of the Prophet and the Imams on the merit and significance of invocations are reported in Shī'ī collections of Ḥadīth. For instance, the Prophet says, "Invocation is the essence of worship."; and Imām 'Alī says, "Invocation is the key to mercy and success."

Shī'ī scholars, furthermore, have specified many conditions for Du'ā' such as being in a state of purity, eating lawful foods, facing the Qiblah (the direction of the ritual prayers), and most importantly, being obedient to God's commands. (For details see: Ibn Fahd, 'Uddat al-dā'ī, p. 24 and Majlisī II, Biḥār al-'anwār, v. 93 pp. 299-394).

Āqā Buzurg Tehrānī lists 126 books on Du'ā' (See Tehrānī, Dhar I'ah v. 8 pp. 177-206). The following are some sources of Du'ā' commonly used by the Shī'ī community today:

1. *Kāmil al-ziyārah* by Ja'far ibn Muḥammad ibn Qūlawayh, (d. 367/977), Najaf: Murtaḍawiyyah Press, 1356/1974.

2. *Miṣbāḥ al-mutahajjid* by Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), Ed. Ismā'īl Anṣārī Qum: 1401/1980.

3. *Iqbāl al-'a'māl* by 'Alī b. Mūsā ibn Ṭāwūs (d. 664/1265). Tehran: Dār al-kutub al-Islāmiyyah, 1390/1970.

4. *Al-Balad al-'amīn* by Ibrāhīm Taqī al-Dīn Kaf'amī (d.c. 895/1489), Iran: 1382/1962.

5. *'Uddat al-dā'ī* by Aḥmad ibn Fahd al-Ḥillī (d. 841/1437). Qum: Wujdānī Bookstore, 1392/1972.

6. *Tuḥfat al-zā'ir* by Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī II (d. 1111/1699).

7. *Taḥiyyat al-zā'ir* by Mirzā Ḥusayn Nūrī (d. 1320/1902).

8. *Miftāḥ al-jannāt* by Muḥsin Amīn al-'Āmilī (d. 1371/1951).

9. *Mafātīḥ al-jinān* by Shaykh 'Abbās Qummī (d. 1359/1940).

These popular books of prayer and liturgy have always been widely in use by the Shī'ī communities of Iraq and Iran and have appeared in many editions. They are mainly concerned with the life of the infallible Shī'ī Imams, in particular the martyrdom of Imām Ḥusayn. In fact, it is the commemoration of the mrtyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn which has given rise to much Shī'ī devotional terminology such as *Ziyārah* (liturgy), *Majālis* (memorial services), and *Qārī* in Arabic, *Rawz-e-khān* in Persian, and *Dhākir* in Urdu for the one who recites the events of the tragedy of Karbala'. Several of these liturgies list the names and biographies of those who took part in the events of Karbalā'. The author of the *Saḥifah* was an eyewitness to this tragedy from its beginning to its end.

The Author of the *Saḥīfah*:

Al-'Imām al-Sajjād, 'Alī ibnal-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī (d. 95/713) also known as Zayn al-'Ābidīn is considered the author of the present *Saḥīfah*. It is said that he dictated the work to his two sons al-Bāqir d. 114/732 and Zayd (d. 122/739). Al-Imām al-Sajjād was born in Medinah, 38/658, and grew up under the direct supervision of his father, al-Imām al-Ḥusayn, the grandson of the Prophet (ṣ). In 61/680, he witnessed the tragedy of Karbalā'. His father and other male relatives and followers were massacred; al-Sajjād was the only male who was saved, for his illness kept him from taking an active part in the battle. After the events of Karbalā' and captivity in Damascus, the Imam returned to his residence in Medinah, where he stayed until his death in 95/713. In Medinah, he kept totally aloof from politics and devoted himself exclusively to worship. Worship was the only means to teach his children and the followers the principles of spiritual growth which were so greatly needed in those times. The fourth Imam was dedicated to educating his children as a living example of resistance to the oppressive rulers of his time by dictating these

invocations. The *Ṣaḥifah* was also intended as a vehicle of repentance, providing the means to purify the Shī'īs of any guilt they may have felt for not participating in the events of Karbalā'. The fourth Imam left the *Ṣaḥifah* as a legacy for generations of Shī'ī to come; it is a true mirror of Shī'ī thought in the aftermath of Karbalā'.

The Title of the *Ṣaḥifah*:

Imam Sajjād's collection of devotions has been referred to by various descriptive titles:

1. *Al-Kāmil*, i.e. the perfect [devotion]. In manuscript no. 2, Ibn 'Umayr reports from al-Ṣādiq saying that his father, al-Bāqir, used to worship by reciting this collection of devotions and used to call it "*al-Kāmil*". Manuscript no. 3 also uses the word "*al-Kāmil*" as an adjective for the devotion (see: p. 6). Some Yemeni manuscripts have the title, *Ṣaḥifat al-Kāmil,* that is the book of the perfect [author] (see; 'Īsawī manuscript no. 57 p. 364).

2. *Du'ā' al-Ṣaḥifah.* The early Shī'ī bibliographical sources refer to this collection as *Du'ā' al-Ṣaḥifah.* Both Najāshī (d. 450/1058), and Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) refer to it by this title (see: Najāshī, *al-Rijāl* p. 301, and Ṭūsī, *al-Rijāl* p. 489, and *al-Fihrist* p. 199). Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192) also mentions this title (*Ma'ālim al-'ulamā'* p. 112). Here devotion is used in the singular, indicating the unity of the whole collection with one chain of *Isnad* back to the Imām. Tustarī, however, believes that this title is not accurate since the collection in fact contains more than one *Du'ā'* (Tustarī, *Qāmūs al-rijāl* 7:38).

3. *Zabūr Al-Muḥammad,* i.e. Psalms of the House of Muḥammad. The earliest source to refer to the *Ṣaḥifah* by this title is Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192) (*Ma'ālim al-'ulamā'* 112, also note the misreading of the editor as Ibn Nūr Al Muḥammad). A comparison between this collection and *The Psalm of David* in the *Old Testament* seems to justify this title, for there is a common theme and a similar style.

4. *Injīl Ahl al-Bayt* (the Gospel of the people of the House). Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1191) in the biography of Yaḥyā b. 'Alī al-Riqqī refers to a collection by this title (see: Ibn Shahrāshūb, *Ma'ālim al-'ulamā'* p.

118). Majlisī I, Muhammad Taqī (d. 1070/1659) and Muhammad Bāqir Damād (d. 1041/1631) are of the opinion that this title refers to the *Sahīfah*. However, Effendī questions the accuracy of this opinion and believes that this title refers to one of the Imām's *Du'ā*'s known as *al-Munājat al-injīliyyah*, (the Evangelical fervent prayer) and not to the *Sahīfah* collection (See: Effendi p. 102). A comparison between the collection and the commonly used *Gospel* of today shows this title to be unjustified since the *Sahīfah* and *Gospel* have entirely different themes and styles.

5. *Al-Sahīfah al-kāmilah*, i.e. the perfect or complete collection of papers. The earliest reference to this title is by Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192) in his biographical source, *Ma'ālim al-'ulamā'* (p. 3). The word *Sahīfah* as it is used here means a collection of leaves of devotional literature. Manuscript no. 3 uses this title because it is the popular title of the collection since the time of Majlisī I (d. 1070/1659). The collection also has been referred to as *al-Sahīfah al-Sajjādiyyah* or *al-Sahifah al-kāmilah al-Sajjādiyyah*. Obviously, *al-Sajjādiyyah* indicates the attribution of the work to its author, Imām Zayn al-'Ābidīn, also known al-Sajjād. The adjective *al-kāmilah* bears two possible meanings. It could mean "perfect", indicating the perfection of the devotion, or it could mean complete, meaning that nothing is missing from it. Sayyid 'Alī Khān Madanī (d. 1120/1708) is of the first opinion (See: Madanī, *Riyad al-sālihīn*, p. 13), while Sayyid Mar'ashī (d. 1411/1990) seems to support the second. Mar'ashī says that Jamāl al-Dīn Kawkabānī of Yemen had told him that an incomplete version of the *Sahīfah* is in use among Zaydīs (Mar'ashī, p. 29). Comparing the three manuscripts available at hand proves the second opinion. Manuscript no. 3 is the complete version, while both mss. 1 and 2 are incomplete. They have fewer and shorter invocations.

The Zaydī Version:

The Zaydī school of thought honours the *Sahīfah Sajjādiyyah* in the same manner as the Ja'farī school does. The Zaydīs made the *Sahīfah* a text-book to be studied by their Imāms. The earliest Zaydī *Ijāzah* of the *Sahīfah* discovered so far is by Ahmad b. Jamāl al-Nahadī in 606/1209. It

indicates that he had read *Ṣaḥīfah* with his teacher Yaḥyā b. Ismā'īl b. 'Alī al-Ḥusynī. This teacher narrates from Shaykh Ḥasan b. 'Alī al-'Alawī from 'Alī b. Aḥmad al-Mughathī, in 597/1200 (Miswarī p.152). All the Zaydī manuscripts at the al-Maktabah al-Gharbiyya in Ṣan'a', Yemen seem to be identical with the popular Shī'ī version, judging from their description in the catalogue of the library (see: 'Isawī, p. 364). Mar'ashī is thus absolutely correct when he says that the word *kāmilah* means a complete version of the *Ṣaḥīfah* in contrast to the incomplete version. The incomplete version, however, is not necessarily the Zaydī version as the description of these manuscripts indicates.

The Composition of the *Ṣaḥīfah*:

All extant manuscripts of the *Ṣaḥīfah* agree that it was dictated by Imam Zayn al-'Ābidīn al-Sajjād. Manuscript no. 1 mentions that he dictated the *Ṣaḥīfah* to his son al-Bāqir (d. 114/732). Al-Bāqir, in turn, dictated to his son al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), and al-Ṣādiq dictated it to his companion 'Umayr b. al-Mutawakkil. Manuscript no. 1 does not give details about how the *Ṣaḥīfah* was transmitted between these three generations. Manuscripts no. 2 and 3, however, contain prefaces in which it is described how the *Ṣaḥīfah* was kept safe with Mutawakkil b. 'Umayr and was transferred to the next generation. According to these manuscripts the Imām also dictated to his other son, Zayd al-Shahīd, (d. 122/739) after Zayd, his son Yaḥyā of Juzjān (d. 126/743) inherited the *Ṣaḥīfah*. Subsequently, Mutawakkil met Yaḥyā and during a dialogue between the two, 'Umayr revealed that al-Ṣādiq had dictated the *Ṣaḥīfah* to him. Mutawakkil further mentioned the concerns of al-Ṣādiq about this collection of *Du'ā'* for fear of it being lost or confiscated by the Ummayyads. Likewise, Yaḥyā revealed to Mutawwakkil that he had inherited a *Ṣaḥīfah* from his father Zayd, which was dictated by his grandfather, Imām Sajjād. When the two manuscripts were compared, they were found to be identical. Yaḥyā, according to the prefaces in manuscripts 2 and 3, then entrusted Mutawakkil with the return of the *Ṣaḥīfah* to Medinah and its safekeeping with his relatives, due to the same fear that al-Ṣādiq had. The number of invocations of the *Ṣaḥīfah* were 75,

but Mutawakkil lost 11. The third manuscript relates the same episode but
with additional details. Neither manuscripts 1 nor 2 have any addenda; the
third one, however, adds several invocations of the Imām known as the
addenda of the *Şahîfah* as well as other invocations. All of the three
manuscripts agree that the compositon of the *Şahîfah* was by *Imlā'*, that is,
by dictation. The word *Imlā'* is used here in its primary meaning. It means
to dictate orally to others, with the author being the one who dictates and
not the one who records. Therefore, it is logical to consider al-'Imām
al-Şajjād as the author of this collection, as it is likewise logical to regard
variations in number and length of invocations as stemming from the
nature of the process of dictation.

Supplements to the *Şahîfah*:

Shî'î scholars have made serious attempts to find the missing eleven
invocations of the original *Şahifah* lost by Mutawakkil b. 'Umayr as well as
the other ten invocations lost for unknown reasons. Thus, there are found
in Shî'î libraries a series of works of devotional literature known as
al-Şahîfah al-Sajjādiyyah with additional numbers, such as second, third,
and so on. They are as follows:

The First Şahîfah is the original *Şahifah.*

The Second Şahîfah by Muhammad b. Hasan al-Hurr al-'Āmilî, (d.
1104/1692) also known as *Ukhı al-Şahîfah* published in Bombay in
1311/1893 (See: *Dharî'ah*, v. 15 p. 20).

The Third Şahîfah, also known as *al-Durr al-manthūr* by Mirzā 'Abd
Allah b. 'Isā Isfahānî al-Effendî (d. c. 12th/18th) Qum: Maktabat
al-Thaqalayn, 1400/1979.

The Fourth Şahîfah by Mirzā Husayn b. Muhammad Taqî al-Nûrî (d.
1320/1902). Qum: Maktabat al-Thaqalayn 1398/1977.

The Fifth Şahîfah by Sayyid Muhsin b. 'Abd al-Karîm al-'Amîn
al-'Āmilî (d. 1371/1951). Damascus: 1330/1911. al-'Amîn found 52
additonal invocations attributed to Imām Sajjād. This edition contains all
of the supplements mentioned in the previous works and has a total of 182
invocations.

The Sixth Şahîfah by Muhammad Şālih al-Hā'irî al-Māzandarānî.

This title is mentioned in the list of his works (see *Dharī'ah* v. 15 pp. 18-21).

Effendi indicates that it was his intention to find the missing invocations (Effendi p. 90). The aim of other scholars, on the other hand, seems to have been to collect whatever invocations could be attributed to al-'Imām al-Sajjād, regardless of their authenticity or style. There scholars did not consider the distinctive style of the *Ṣaḥīfah* in searching for its supplements. They simply basically compiled whatever invocations they were able to find attributed to the Imam which did not appear in the original popular version of *Ṣaḥīfah*. Some of these devotions are very different from the length and style of composition of the authentic *Ṣaḥīfah*.

Addenda to the *Ṣaḥīfah*:

The popular edition of the *Ṣaḥīfah* today has several addenda which do not match the length and style of the *Ṣaḥīfah*. Manuscripts 1 and 2 do not have any addenda. Manuscript 3, however, has a few. Even Sayyid 'Alī Khān Madanī's commentary, however, does not contain any commentary to these addenda. Manuscript no. 3 is the oldest manuscript with addenda dated 1079/1668. It contains at the end many added *Du'ās*. They are as follows:

a. *Du'ā' al-Simāt* pp. 124-128.

b. *Khātam al-Nubuwwah*, the diagram of the seal of prophethood, p. 129.

c. 15 Addenda to *Ṣaḥīfah* pp. 130-136.

d. Weekly prayers pp. 137-140.

e. *Munājāt* (Fervent Prayers) pp. 141-166.

f. and *Ṣabāḥ* Invocation by Imām 'Alī pp. 167-173.

Obviously, these addenda were not in the original manuscript and the writer of this manuscript, Muḥammad 'Alī, copied them as he saw fit. The oldest manuscript containing a number of *Munājāt Zayn al-'Ābidīn*, i.e. Fervent Prayers, dated 722/1322 preserved at Ankara 'Umūmī Kutub O. 324 pp. 117-130. It has been published by 'Afīf 'Asīran, Catholic Press,

Beirut: 1960. This edition is based on a manuscript at Ankara 'Umūmī
Kutub. O. 324 pp. 117-130.

Authenticity of the Ṣaḥīfah:

Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192) considers Ṣaḥīfah Sajjādiyyah the sixth
book written in Islam (Ma'ālīm al-'ulamā' p. 1). Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī
I d. 1070/1659 says, "There is no doubt that the Ṣaḥīfah Kāmilah belongs
to Imām Zayn al-'Ābidīn (the master of worshippers). Ibn Shahrāshūb
supports his view on the basis of the content and the style of the Ṣaḥīfah.
He says, "It cannot be but of an infallible person." (See: Majlisī ii, Bihār
al-'anwār v. 110, p. 66). In general, Shī'ī scholars after Majlisī I agree
with his opinion. Effendī says that Ṣaḥīfah is "mutawātir", a historical
fact, and does not need any chain of Isnad to prove its authenticity (see
Effendi p. 5). Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir (d. 1266/1849) says, "The attribution of the
Ṣaḥīfah to the Imam is certain." (See: Najafī, Jawāhir al-kalām, 11:158).
Burūjerdī (d. 1380/1960) says, "It is obvious that the Ṣaḥīfah is of the
Imam." He, then mentions the Isnad of others as well as his own Isnad
(See: al-Badr al-zāhir, p. 25). Āqā Buzurg (d. 1389/1969) says, "Ṣaḥīfah i s
mutawātir" according to the Shī'ī scholars, through their special Ijazah
narration, generation after generation down to the Imam (see: Dhari'ah
15:18).

In accord with a strong belief in Ṣaḥīfah's authenticity, some Shī'ī
scholars attempt to prove theories which are not related to religious
matters. Bahrānī (d. 1186/1772), also known as Ṣāḥib al-Hadā'iq,
comments on a phrase in the Ṣaḥīfah which reads "Laka waḥdāniyyt
al-'adad": to You [O' God], belongs the oddness of the number one and
the property of eternal power (see Chittik p. 101 invocation no. 28).
Bahrānī explains in detail that the number one is not a number, but rather
a basic element which composes other numbers. For example, two is
composed of two ones and so on (see: al-Durrah al-Najafiyyah p. 76).
al-Khū'ī, (d. 1413/1992) explains a natural phenomenon based on two
sentences of the Ṣaḥīfah describing the day and night. He quotes the Imam
as saying: "He makes each of them [day and night] to enter in its
companion and causes its companion to enter into it." (Ṣaḥīfah invocation

no. 6 see Chittik p. 32). al-Khū'ī further explains that this phrase proves
that the Earth is round and not flat. Otherwise, he says, one of these two
sentences "Yūliju kulla waḥidin fi ṣāḥibih", and "Yūliju yaḥibahu fihi"
would be redundant. According to Khū'ī, both phrases refer to a natural
phenomenon happening simultaneously. It is impossible that it be both day
and night at the same place. Therefore, day and night must be at two
different places opposite to each other; only then can both day and night
exist at the same time. This can only happen when the earth is round, in
which case, the place where it is day is opposite to the place where is night
(see: al-Bayān p. 76). Khū'ī reconciles between this statement and the
scientifically proven theory that Earth has been shaped by the mighty force
of its own gravity. Because of a pull of the heavy interior and outer parts of
the planet, the surface tends to settle as near the center as possible. As a
result, it is held as a curving shape around the centre. Al-Khū'ī's
explanation indicates the highest opinions that he has on the authenticity
of the Ṣaḥīfah. Ironically, he does regard al-Mutawakkil, the main
narrator of the Ṣaḥīfah, as a reporter not proven to be reliable. (See:
Khū'ī, Mu'jam rijāl al-Ḥadīth 14:187). That is to say that technically the
chain of Isnad of the Ṣaḥīfah is considered to be weak for the biography of
Mutawakkil, the main narrator of all the Ṣaḥīfah's versions, is not known.
Therefore, Imām Khumaynī (d. 1410/1989) says, "The honoured Ṣaḥīfah
Sajjādiyyah has a weak Isnad though its great contents and eloquence make
us have some degree of confidence that it has been narrated from Imām.
But this does not prove the authenticity of each phrase of the Ṣaḥīfah."
(see: Khumaynī, al-Makāsib al-muḥarramah, 1:320). He, however, does
not hold the same view regarding other Shī'ī literature which is less
important than the Ṣaḥīfah.

The popular manuscript of the Ṣaḥīfah was in the hands of Majlisī I
d. 1070/1659. He mentions the traditional argument to prove the
authenticity of the Ṣaḥīfah through chains of Ijaza, and he adds that the
chains of the Ṣaḥīfah are endless (See: Rawḍat al-muttaqīn, v. 14 p. 422).
Further, Majlisī I mentions an episode which sheds some light on the
popularity of manuscript no. 3, the popular version of Ṣaḥīfah. Majlisī I
says that it was revealed to him at the beginning of the age of maturity in a
dream while half asleep that Ṣāḥib al-zamān al-Mehdī was standing at the

old *masjid* of Iṣfahān. Majlisī asks the Imām about some personal and scholarly questions for which he receives the answer. Then, Majlisī I asks him for a reference book to consult whenever is needed. The Imām in reply says, "I have given a book for you to Mawlānā Muḥammad al-Tāj. Go and take it." In his dream, Majlisī goes to the man and takes the book. When he wakes up, Majlisī says, "I thought that the man called Tāj must be Shaykh Muḥammad [i.e. Bahā' al-Dīn al-'Āmilī d. 1031/1621]. Majlisī says, "I went to his school and saw him editing the *Ṣaḥīfah Sajjādiyyah* with Sayyid Ṣāliḥ Amīr Dhulfiqār. When I told him my dream, he interpreted my dream as a good news; that is to obtain some divine knowledge. I left him to the destination to which I went in my dream. I met a man called Agha Ḥasan Tāja and after introduction, he gave me the same book which I saw in my dream. I came back to the Shaykh [Bahā' al-Dīn al-'Āmilī]." Majlisī I further says, "I started to copy with him manuscripts which his grandfather had copied from the manuscript of Shahīd. Shahīd had copied his manuscript from the manuscript of 'Alī b. 'Amīd al-Sadīd. 'Alī copied his from Ibn Saktūn and compared it with the manuscript of Ibn Idrīs, directly or indirectly". Majlisī adds that the manuscript which Ṣāhib al-zamān gave me was copied from the manuscript of Shahīd. [They were] totally identical in the style of writing. People began to copy the *Ṣaḥīfah* from me. Now the *Ṣaḥīfah* is distributed in all cities, especially in Iṣfahān (see: Majlisī I, *Rawḍat al-muttaqīn* v. 14: p. 431). This long episode explains in part why manuscript no. 3 of the *Ṣaḥīfah* is popular today and not the other two versions. According to Majlisī I (since the beginning of his age of maturity) in approximately c. 1018/1509 [Majlisī I was born in 1003/1595; the Shī'ī school of thought considers 15 to be the age of maturity for males], there was a serious attempt on the part of these two scholars of the Safavid era, namely Majlisī I and Shaykh Bahā' al-Din al-'Āmilī (d. 1031/1621), to distribute manuscript no. 3. The efforts of these two scholars in particular resulted in the popularity of the *Ṣaḥīfah* version which is commonly in use today.

Manuscripts of the *Ṣaḥīfah*:

A comparison between the three manuscripts at hand answers many

questions. Manuscript no. 1 lacks any. It contains only one *Isnad* to the Imam, while manuscript no. 2 has a short preface with one *Isnad* to the Imam. And manuscript no. 3 is the most complete with a long preface and two *Isnads* to the Imām. As a result, there are three versions of the *Ṣaḥīfah* at hand: those of al-Muṭahharī's, Ibn al-'Aʿlam's and Ibn Malik. Only two of these three versions, those of al-Muṭahharī and Ibn al-'Aʿlam, constitute the popular *Ṣaḥīfah* commonly known as *al-Ṣaḥīfah kāmilah*.

Manuscript no. 1, al-Muṭahharī's Version:

This manuscript has 41 invocations; its *Isnad* is short. It has no preface and was written by Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn Shīrāzī on 11th Rabīʿ al-'Ākhir 695/1295 in 73 folios (see: Ḥusaynī, 10:81). The *Isnad* of this manuscript goes back to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq as follows:

1. Abū al-Mufaḍḍal.
2. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Rūzbeh b. Abī Bakr al-Madāʾinī.
3. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Musallim al-Muṭahharī.
4. [His father].
5. 'Umayr b. Mutawakkil b. Hārūn al-Balkhī.
6. [His father].
7. al-Ṣādiq.
8. al-Bāqir.
9. al-Sajjād.

Names 5-9 are common with the other manuscripts. The first name, Abu al-Mufaḍḍal refers to Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib al-Shaybānī (d. 387/997), as comparison with the other two manuscripts indicates. Both Najāshī (d. 450/1058) and Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) have mentioned their *Isnads* to Muṭahhari's version in their bibliographical works (see: Najāshī, *al-Rijāl* p. 301, and Ṭūsī, *al-Rijāl* p. 489, and *al-Fihrist* p. 199).

Manuscript no. 2, Ibn Mālik's Version:

This manuscript contains 37 invocations. In the preface, there is a
reference to the two manuscripts of Zayd and al-Sādiq. This manuscript
has no date and the name of the copyist is not known; however, on page 12
a reference to Bahā' al-Millah wa al-Dīn appears. The manuscript is in 78
folios at the Mar'ashī Library, in Qum, # 198 (see: Husaynī, v. 1 p. 230).
This name most likely refers to Muḥammad al-'Āmilī (d. 1031/1621) who
advocated the popular version of the *Sahīfah*. If this reference is correct,
Bahā' al-Dīn popularized his version for an unknown reason. Following
the third page, two pages are missing, as the contents clearly indicate. The
Isnad of this manuscript reads as follows:

1. Abū 'Alī b. Humām b. Suhayl al-'Iskāf in Baghdad [d. 332/943].

2. 'Alī b. Mālik [Tūsī d. 460/1067 mentions this version in *Rijāl* p.
485].

3. Aḥmad h. 'Abd Allah [? Ibn Marwān al-'Anbārī see: Tūsī, *Rijāl* p.
428].

4. Muḥammad b. Sāliḥ [? b. Mas'ūd al-Jadalī al-Kūfī, see: Tūsī, *Rijāl*
p. 291.

5. 'Umar b. al-Mutawakkil h. Hārūn al-Thaqafī al-Balkhī.

6. Al-Mutawakkil [His father].

7. Yaḥyā and al-Sādiq.

8. [Their fathers] al-Bāqir and Zayd.

9. Al-Sajjād.

The editor of *al-Rijāl* by al-Tūsī believes that Tūsī's *Isnad* refers to
only one *Du'ā'*, namely invocation no. 3 (see: Tūsī, *Rijāl* p. 480). This not
correct. On the contrary, this manuscript proves the unity of all
invocations in one *Isnad*. There is a great discrepancy between this version
and the popular version of the *Sahīfah* as the following examples clearly
prove. In the popular *Sahīfah*, invocation no. 27, the invocation for the

fifth of the booty which they gain. Indeed, it is a compensation for what you have forbidden to us, according to the statement of your Prophet, of the *ṣadaqah*, which is intended [to wash] the sins of people. [This is] to purify Your Prophet, his family, his progeny, his children, and his kin. And [also inspire the people of the frontiers to know] the sins and the great faults of those who prevent it from us and Your revenge, whether it comes sooner or later, upon those who have treated us unjustly. O, God, purify the Muslims' frontiers through Your might, support the defenders through Your strength..." (Invocation no. 17 manuscript 2, pp. 31-32). This first paragraph is totally missing from invocation no. 27 of the popular *Ṣaḥīfah*. (See: Chittick, p. 94). The popular *Ṣaḥīfah* begins directly with the second paragraph, with the additional commonly used phrase: "*Allāhumma Ṣallī 'alā Muḥammad wa Āle Muḥammad*", that is, O' God, bless Muḥammad and his Household. The missing paragraph refers to several important aspects of Shī'ī thought, such as the principle of *Khums*. The Imam in this paragraph shows his intention to send his message to a remote place and important audience: the warriors at the frontiers of the Islamic territories.

Another *Du'ā'*, no. 36 of manuscript no. 2, is also entirely missing from the popular *Ṣaḥīfah*. The first paragraph of this *Du'ā'* reads as follows:

(Among his invocations is the invocation of acceptance)

"O' God, indeed, appeal is difficult and means also very difficult except with You. The channels are narrow, the objectives impossible [to obtain], such desires are rarely realized, and all avenues are cut off except to You. [All] hopes are in vain, all the expectations are cut off but of You. And trust is falling and good opinions are disappointed but of You..." (*Ṣaḥīfah* Ms. no. 2, invocation no. 36).

The entire invocation is a contrast between the mercy of Almighty God and the true nature of humans. By the contrast between the two, the *Du'ā'* identifies the only path to salvation as total reliance on God alone.

Effendi refers to an old *Ṣaḥīfah* which he has seen and says, it was known as *al-Ma'ṣūmah*, that is, the infallible book, meaning that it was the most correct version of the *Ṣaḥīfah* (Effendi p. 57). It is quite possible that Effendi refers to this version of *Ṣaḥīfah* manuscript no. 2, for it seems to be more correct than the popular version. For example, the word

al-Saqālibah, referring to the Slavic race has been written, incorrectly, with *Sīn* in the popular version, (See: Chittik *Du'ā'* no. 27 p. 97 line 3). In a manuscript no. 2, it is written with *Sād* not *Sīn* (see *Du'ā'* no. 36 p. 77 line of Ms no. 2).

Manuscript no. 3, Ibn al-'Ā'lam Version:

This is the popular version of the *Sahīfah.* It consists of 123 folios written by Ghulam 'Ali, known as Muhammad Amīn, son of Muhammad 'Ali, in 10 Dhul Hijjah 1079/1668. It was copied from a manuscript written by Muhammad b. Makkī also known as al-Shahīd al-'Awwal in 11 Sha'bān 772/1370. His manuscript was copied by 'Ali b. Ahmad al-Sadīd in 642/1244. Al-Sadīd in turn made his copy from a manuscript of 'Ali b. Sakūn. At the end of this manuscript, many *Du'ā*'s are included such as *Mashlūl, Sabāh,* and *al-I'tisam* and others. Also on the margin of this manuscript Fayd al-Kāshānī (d. 1091/1680) has written some notes, (see: Monzavī, p. 167). This manuscript was the basis for the edition of the *Sahīfah* edited by *Mishkat,* Tehran 1361/1942.

The *Isnad* of this manuscript of the *Sahīfah* reads as follows:

1. Najm al-Din Bahā' al-Sharaf Abū al-Hasan Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. Ahmad b. 'Ali b. Muhammad b. 'Umar b. Yahyā al-'Alawī al-Husaynī.

2. Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Shahrayār al-Khāzin, in 516/1122.

3. Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-'Ukharī al-Mu'addal [d. 472/1079].

4. Abū al-Mufaddāl Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Muttallib al-Shaybānī [d. 387/997].

5. Ja'far b. Muhammad b. Ja'far b. Hasan b. Ja'far b. Hasan b. Hasan b. Amir al-Mu'minīn 'Ali b. Abī Tālib [d. 308/920].

6. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar b. Khattāb al-Zayyāt in 265/878.

7. His uncle, 'Ali b. Nu'mān al-'A'lam [al-Nakhā'ī al-Kūfī].

8. 'Umayr b. al-Mutawakkil al-Thaqafī al-Balkhī.

9. His father Mutawakkil b. Harun.

10. Yahya and Ja'far from their father.

11. Al-Baqir and Zayd.

12. Al-Sajjad.

Names 8 to 12 are common with the *Isnad* of the manuscript no. 2.
This manuscript has 54 invocations. It is the most complete version of all
three manuscripts. The preface to this manuscript is longer than that of
no. 2. What makes this manuscript unique is that someone in the chain of
Isnad has combined two versions of the *Ṣaḥīfah* into one. These are the
versions of Ibn al-'A'lam and Muṭahharī. The result of this combination is
manuscript no. 3, which is known as *al-Ṣaḥīfah al-kāmilah.* Most likely,
the one who is responsible for this combination is Muḥammad b.
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-'Ukbarī d. 742/1079. The line on page 13 of
manuscript 3 reads, "*wa ḥaddathanā Abū al-Mufaḍḍal*". This obviously
belongs to the first *Isnad* mentioned on page 2. In the first *Isnad,* the one
who reports from Abū al-Mufaḍḍal is described as al-Shaykh, the truthful,
Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-'Ukbarī al-Mu'addal [d. 472/1079 see:
al-'Ansāb by Sam'ānī [9:246 Hyderabad, 1928].

By comparing these three manuscripts, we find a new meaning for the
phrase "*Wa bāqī al-'abwāb*" (and the rest of the chapters) in the preface
of the popular *Ṣaḥīfah* (see: Chittick, *The Psalm of Islam* p. 15). Surely,
this phrase refers to the other version of the combined manuscripts.
Apparently, 'Ukbarī had a copy of Ibn al-'A'lam's version, which he then
combined with Muṭahharī's version. Whatever additional invocations
were in Ibn al-'Alam's version were referred to as "*Bāqī al-'abwāb*".
Further, he mentioned the table of contents of al-Muṭahharī's version in
order to distinguish the two versions. Someone must have failed to
understand this and included in the table of contents all the headings of
the invocations, whether in Muṭahharī's or Ibn al-'Alam's version. In
other words by adding Muṭahharī's version to Ibn al-'Alam's version, the
Ṣaḥīfah became complete. This fine point makes the meaning of the
phrase "*Bāqī al-'abwāb*" very clear; it means the rest of the invocations.
Madani seems to miss this fine point. He believes that the phrase "*Bāqī
al-'abwāb*" refers only to the heading title of each invocation within the
Ṣaḥīfah (See: Madanī, *Riyāḍ al-sāliḥīn* p. 31). The English translation
picks up this opinion and translates the phrase as, "The remaining chapter
headings." (See: *Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādiyyah* Trans. Chittick, 15).

The Ṣaḥīfah up to the Present Time:

The *Ṣaḥīfah* has been since its completion in the 1st/7th century in use by scholars of both the Shī'ī and Zaydī schools. We can identify the following phases in its history:

Dictation:

In the first phase, from the time of al-'Imām al-Sajjād up to the generation of 'Umayr b. Mutawakkil, The *Ṣaḥīfah* was transmitted by dictation. Ibn al-Mutawakkil reports the *Ṣaḥīfah* from Yaḥya and al-Ṣādīq, both of whom report it from their fathers, then, from their grandfather al-Sajjād, (see: Ms. 1, p. 1; Ms. 2 p. 2; and Ms. 3 p. 5).

Narration:

In the second phase, Mutawakkil receives the *Ṣaḥīfah* by narration using the term "*Ḥaddathanā*", that is, (reported to us), rather than by dictation. Most likely he transmitted *Ṣaḥīfah* by reading the text to others. The earliest manuscript of the *Ṣaḥīfah* written by Yāqūt al-Musta'ṣimī in 694/1294 indicates that the copy was read to Abū al-Mufaḍḍal Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib al-Shuybānī at his residence in the quarter of Marta'al Khāqān, (See: Atabai, p. 787). Judging from the little information given in this catalogue, this manuscript seems to be the same as Ibn al-'A'lam's version.

Transmission by Ijāzah:

During the third phase, the *Ṣaḥīfah* was transmitted by a Shaykh. He usually permits his students to attribute a book to a name in the list of his chain of *Isnad*. *Ijāzah* usually does not accompany *imlā'*, that is, dictation, as it was the case during the first phase, nor reading, which was the case during the second phase. The transmission is rather accomplished by permission, either orally or in writing. The purpose of the *Ijāzah* is to attribute a text to its author, or to enable oneself be included in the chain

of *Isnad* for the sake of blessing. Apart from these two points, there is no significance in such *Ijazah*. The one who most advocated this method was Majlisi I (d. 1070/1659). He calculated the *Isnad* of the *Ṣaḥīfah* to be 56, 100 *Isnads* (see Majlisī ii, *Bihār al-'anwār* v. 110 p. 51).

Commentary:

In the fourth phase, the main objective of the scholar becomes to write commentaries on the *Ṣaḥīfah*, explaining the text by *Sharh*, (commentary) or *Hashiyah*, (marginal notes), or *Ta'liqah*, (short separate notes). Tehrānī lists 64 commentaries on the *Ṣaḥīfah* (*Dhari'ah* v. 13 pp. 309-340) and 16 marginal notes (*Dharī'ah* v. 4 pp. 111-113). Maḥfūẓ further lists 14 translations, (Mahfuz p. 70). The earliest commentary listed is of Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Kaf'amī (d.c. 895/1489), and the most comprehensive commentary in use is of Sayyid 'Alī Khān Madanī, d. 1120/1708, known as *Riyāḍ al-ṣāliḥīn* (printed in Iran 1334/195 and reprinted afterwards, by Mu'assasat Ahl al-Bayt Qum n.d.

The following commentaries should also be added to the list:

1. *Fī ḍilāl al-Ṣaḥīfah* by Muḥammad Jawād Mughniyyah (d. 1400/1979). Beirut: Dār al-Ta'āruf, 1979.

2. *Sharh al-Ṣaḥīfah* by 'Alī Naqī Fayḍ al-'Islām, Tehran: 1376/1956.

3. *Sharh al-Ṣaḥīfah* by Sayyid Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī. Najaf: Nu'mān Press, 1387/1967.

4. *Shroh al-Ṣaḥīfah* by 'Izz al-Dīn Jazā'irī, Beirut: 1402/1982.

Publication:

Of the manuscripts of the *Ṣaḥīfah* preserved at public and private libraries, I was able to locate 141 manuscripts of the *Ṣaḥīfah*. This is not, by any means, a comprehensive list; this will need much further research. The oldest manuscript of the *Ṣaḥīfah* found is written by Yāqūt b. 'Abd al-Allāh al-Musta'ṣimī in 694/1294 is preserved at the Kitābkhān -e-Salṭanatī Tehran, Iran (See: Atabai, p. 787). It is ironic that with so many manuscripts of the *Ṣaḥīfah*, no manuscript of the *Ṣaḥīfah* has been

mentioned in the lately published catalogue by the Royal Institute for Islamic Research of Amman, Jordan. Only one manuscript of the *Saḥīfah* is listed and is wrongly attributed to Imam 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (See: *al-Fihris al-shāmil li al-turāth al-'Arabī al-'Islāmī al-makhṭūṭ*, i.e., The Comprehensive Catalogue of the Arabic Islamic Manuscript v. 2 p. 1049).

The earliest edition was printed 1262/1845 in Tabriz, lithograph (see: *Mushar* p. 588). Further, *Mushar* lists 16 editions of the *Saḥīfah* (see: *Mushar* p. 588). Maḥfūẓ lists 5 Indian editions and 11 Iranian editions (see: Maḥfūz p. 71). However, the following editions should be added to the list:

1. *Saḥīfah Kāmilah mutarjam wa muḥashshā* with Urdu translation by Muhammad Hārūn Zangīpūr, Delhi: Matba' Yūsuf Dehli 1333/1914.

2. Cairo by Ahl al-Bayt Society, Gilani press, with a foreword by Dr. Aḥmad Wā'ilī n.d.

3. Beirut, Dār al-Ta'āruf with a foreword by Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr.

4. Tehran with an introduction by Muḥammad Mishkāt, 1361/1942. This edition is so far considered the most authoritative edition of the *Saḥīfah*. It was published based on Manuscript no. 3.

5. Damascus, 1405/1984 edited by 'Alī Anṣārīyān. It includes:

a. the text of the popular *Saḥīfah*, p. 1-232,

b. subject index by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Muẓaffarī pp. 233-336, and a

c. word index by 'Alī Akbar Qurayshī, pp. 336-589.

This edition is the most elaborately illuminated of all editions.

All the editions I was able to examine are of the popular version being almost identical to manuscript no. 3.

English Translations:

So far there are two English translations of the *Saḥīfah* available:

1. By Aḥmad 'Alī Mohanī published in 1929 and in 1931 by Mu'ayyad al-'Ulūm Association, Lucknow, (see: Maḥfūz, p. 70). This translation has also been published by Imam Sahe-bu-Zaman Association, New Jersey, 1405/1984.

2. *Psalm of Islam* by William C. Chittik with a foreword by S.H. Ja'farī, published by the Muhammadī Trust of the U.K., 1988. This translation is based on "The modern Iranian editions" as the translator

Indicates (see: p. xxi).

Final Note:

Constance E. Padwick says that *Ṣaḥīfah Kāmilah Sajjādiyyah* is in use in Iran and Syria as the sister book in use in India (*Muslim Devotions* p. xv). The author seems to suggest that the Indian edition in use in India is somehow different from the edition in use in Iran and Syria. This is not an accurate description of the following Indo-Pakistani editions I was able to examine:

1. *Ṣaḥīfah Kāmilah muṭarjam wa muḥashshā* with Urdu translation by Muḥammad Harun Zangipur, Dehli: Maṭbaʿat Yūsuf Dehli 1333/1914.

2. *Ṣaḥīfah Kamilah yaʿnī Zabūr-e ʿĀl-e Muḥammad* with Urdu translation by Sayyid Qāsim Riẓā Nasīm Amr Dehlwī, Pakistan, Lahore: Shaykh Ghulām ʿAlī Publishers n.d.

3. *Ṣaḥīfah Kāmilah* with Urdu translation by Sayyid ʿAlī Saheb, Pakistan, Lahore: Maktabah Razawiyyah n.d.

Conclusion:

Examination of the three manuscripts at hand leads us from speculation closer to certainty, at least on three points:

1. There are basically three variants of the *Ṣaḥīfah*, those of Ibn al-ʾAʿlam, al-Muṭahharī, and Ibn Mālik. Some scholar, most likely al-ʿUkbarī (d. 472/1079), combined two of these versions--those of Ibn al-ʾAʿlam and Muṭahharī, in one volume. This is the provenance of the popular version of the *Ṣaḥīfah* in use today in the Shīʿī community worldwide. It is because of this combination that the *Ṣaḥīfah* is called *al-Kāmilah* i.e the complete one (see Chart 1).

2. There is a difference between the two versions of Ibn al-ʾAʿlam and Ibn Mālik of 18 invocations. The unpublished manuscript no. 2 has 37 invocations, while the popular one has 54 invocations. The following invocations are included in the popular version, but missing from the other: 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 38, 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, and 53. (See: Chart # 2).

3. The addenda of the published *Sahifah* are not part of the work itself. These definitely do not share the chain of *Isnad* of the three manuscripts and are moreover vary in style of composition. Despite this, manuscript no. 3 has at the end a few additional invocations, such as the *Du'ā' Shabur* and *Sabāh* but these are presented as addenda and not as part of the work itself.

In short, the *Sahifah* has gone through phases of dictation, narration, *ijazah* transmission, commentary, publication, and translation. The popularity of the combined version of the *Sahifah* in use is due in part to the diligent work of two scholars, Baha' al-Dīn Muḥammad al-'Āmilī (d. 1031/1621), and Majlisī I (d. 1070/1659). Other versions of the *Sahifah* received attention during the first and the second phases, but not afterwards. Regrettably, so far there is no scholarly edition of the complete versions of this masterpiece of Shī'ī devotional literature.

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Chart # 1   The Origin of the Popular *Ṣaḥifah*

The 4th Imam 'Ali b. Ḥusayn Zayn al-'Ābidīn al-Sajjād d. 95/713

The 5th Imām al-Bāqir d. 114/732   Zayd al-Shahīd d. 122/739

The 6th Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq d. 148/765   Yaḥyā al-Shahīd d. 126/743

Mutawakkil b. Hārūn al-Balkhī al-Thaqafī

[His son 'Umayr]

(Both Najāshī d.450/1058 and Ṭūsī   (only Ṭūsī mentions this Ms.)
d. 460/1067 have *Isnād* to the Ms. # 1

Ms. # 1   Ms. # 2

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad   'Alī b. Nu'mān al-'A'lam   Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ
b. Muslim al-Muṭahharī

Muḥammad b. Ḥasan   'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar b. Khaṭṭāb   Aḥmad b. 'Abd
b. Rūzbah al-Madā'inī   al-Zayyāt in 270/883

Abū 'Abd Allāh Ja'far b. Muḥ. b.   'Alī h. Mālik
al-Ḥasan al-'Alawī in 380/990

Abū 'Alī Muḥammad b.
Humām b. Suhayl al-'Askaf
d.332/943

Abū al-Mufaddal Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh
b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib al-Shaybānī d. 380/990

Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-'Ukbarī d. 472/1079.

Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Shahrayār al-Khāzin in 516/1122.

Najm al-Dīn Bahā' al-Sharaf Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Aḥmad al-'Alawī.

(This is the popular version of *Ṣaḥifah* identical to Ms. no.3.)

Chart # 2

(A comparison between Ms. no. 3 of *Sahifah*, the popular version and the two unpopular Mss. no. 2 and 3)

The following chart indicates the sequences and the missing invocations in both manuscripts. Ms. no. 2 has one invocation which is not in the popular manuscript. The popular one has 18 invocations more. They are 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 38, 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, and 53. The common invocations between the two, however, differ in their texts and their length.

Ms. # 2 Sequence		Ms. # 3		Ms. # 2 Sequence		Ms. # 3
1	=	1		20	=	31
2	=	37		21	=	13
3	=	8		22	=	14
4	=	9		23	=	16
5	=	10		24	=	6
6	=	11		25	=	7
7	=	12		26	=	35
8	=	39		27	=	43
9	=	28		28	=	17
10	=	41		29	=	15
11	=	29		30	=	18
12	=	40		31	=	36
13	=	30		32	=	34
14	=	32		33	=	33
15	=	24		34	=	46
16	=	26		35	=	54
17	=	27		36		Missing
18	=	44		37	=	51
19	=	45		....		....
				37	=	36

بسـم الله الرحمن الرحيم ۞ وما توفيقى الا بالله

قال ابو المفضل حدثنا محمد بن الحسن بن رُوَيْه ابن ابو بكر

المدائنى الكاتب نزيل الرحبه فى دارة قال حدثنى محمد

ابو احمد ابن مسلم المطهري قال سمعتى ابى عن عنصر

ابن متوكل ابن هرون البلخى عن ابيه المتوكل ابن هرون

قال املى على سيدى الصادق وجعفر بن محمد عليهما السلام

قال املى حدثى على ابن الحسين علي ابى محمد بن على مشهاد

مبيتى قال   فكان زهد عابه عليه السلام

اذ ابتداءه بالله جل جلاله بداءه بالتحميد له عز وجل

A Facsimile of the beginning of *Saḥīfah* Ms. no. 1 dated 695/1295.

أعضائي وتقطعت أوصالي ما أغفلني عمّا راد بي حولاي

فأرغمني في حشري ونشري واجعل ذلك في ذلك اليوم

مع أوليائك موقفي مجيب أحبابك سعدي وفي جوار أولك

مسكني يا رب العالمين م

تمت بحمد الله ومنّه وقعة

بتمام يوم الجمعة الحادي عشر من شهر ربيع الآخر سنة خمس

وتسعين وستمائة

كتبها الحسين بن محمد الحسني الشيرازي ببلدة الموصل

جمّلها الله تعالى نعمه وتسليما على مولانا وآله وسلّما

كتابخانه عمو مي آيت الله العظمى

A Facsimile of the end page of *Sahīfah* Ms. no. 1 dated 695/1295.

وقف كتاب هذا نمرة المتخلف ٥٥٠ وسهى آية اثنا الجلد

مير علي لكهنو - تم

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

حدثنا أبو علي بن هام بن سهل الإسكاف

ببغداد قال حدثنا علي بن مالك عن أحمد

بن عبد الله قال حدثنا محمد بن صالح بن عمر بن

المتوكل بن هرون قال حدثني أبي المتوكل

قال لقيت يحيى بن زيد بعد قتل أبيه وهو متوجه

إلى خراسان فسلمت عليه فقال من أين قلت قلت

من الحج فسألني عن أهله وبني عمه وأخبرته

بخبرهم وحزنهم على أبيه فقال كان عمي

A Facsimile of the beginning of the undated *Ṣaḥīfah* Ms. no. 2.

[١٧] وَاسْعَدْ بِهِمْ يَا اللَّهَ الْعَالَمِينَ وَجُودِ رِعَايَةٍ

عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لِأَهْلِ الثَّغُورِ وَالْحُصُونِ

اللَّهُمَّ الْمَهَمَّ أَهْلَ الثَّغُورِ عَلِمْ مَا لَنَا مِنَ الْحَقِّ

فِي خُمْرِ الْغَنَائِمِ الَّذِي يَغْنَمُونَهُ فَارْزُقْ ذَلِكَ

[٤] عَوِّضْ مِمَّا حَرَّمْتَهُ عَلَيْنَا عَلَى لِسَانِ نَبِيِّكَ

مِنَ الصَّدَقَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ غُسَالَاتُ الذُّنُوبِ

النَّاسِ مِنْ تَنْزِيهَا مِنْكَ لِنَبِيِّكَ وَالِدِ وَذُرِّيَّتِهِ

وَوَلَدٍ وَعِتْرَتِهِ وَمَا عَلَيْهِمَا لَضَا إِنَاهُمْ مِنَ

الذُّنُوبِ وَمِنْ عَظِيمِ الْحُوبِ وَانْتِقَامِكَ

[٥] مِمَّنْ ظَلَمْنَاهُ عَاجِلًا وَآجِلًا اللَّهُمَّ حَصِّنْ

ثُغُورَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ بِعِزَّتِكَ وَأَيِّدْ حُمَاتَهَا بِقُوَّتِكَ

A Facsimile of the beginning of invocation no. 17 of the undated *Saḥīfah*

Ms. no. 2.

The first paragraph is missing from the popular *Saḥīfah* cf. Chittick p. 94.

كَا فَضَّلَ مَا أَصَلَّيْتَ عَلَى أَحَدٍ قَبْلَهُ وَ اَنْتَصَلَ

عَلَى أَحَدٍ بَعْدَهُ وَ آتِنَا فِى الدُّنْيَا حَسَنَةً وَ فِى الْأَخِرَةِ

حَسَنَةً وَ قِنَا عَذَابَ النَّارِ وَ مَحَمَّدٍ دُعَائِه

عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ وَ اسْتَجَابَةُ دُعَائِه

اللَّهُمَّ قَدْ أَكْدَى الطَّلَبُ وَ أَعْيَتِ الْحِيَلُ

إِلَّا عِنْدَكَ وَ ضَاقَتِ الْمَذَاهِبُ وَ امْتَنَعَتِ الْمَطَالِبُ

وَ غُمِرَتِ الرَّغَائِبُ وَ انْقَطَعَتِ الطُّرُقُ إِلَّا إِلَيْكَ

وَ تَصَرَّمَتِ الْآمَالُ وَ انْقَطَعَ الرَّجَا الَّا مِنْكَ خَابَتِ

الثِّقَةُ وَ أَخْلَفَ النَّظَرُ إِلَّا بِكَ اَللَّهُمَّ اِنِّى أَجِدُ

سُبُلَ الْمَطَالِبِ إِلَيْكَ مَنْهَجَةً وَ مَنَاهِلَ الرَّجَا

لَدَيْكَ مُتْرَعَةً وَ أَبْوَابَ الدُّعَاءِ إِلَيْكَ مُفَتَّحَةً وَ اعْلَمُ

A Facsimile of the beginning of invocation no. 35 of the undated *Sah'ifah*
Ms. no. 2.

The entire invocation is missing from the popular *Sah'ifah*.

New Kalam and Justice:
A Comparison with Western Thought

Dr. 'A.N. Bāqirshāhī

The Concept of Justice in Western Philosophy:

Justice comprises the whole of virtue and signifies complete conformity with the approved pattern of moral conduct. For purposes of rational analysis the classical philosophers, following Aristotle preferred to restrict the term's reference to a particular virtue, distinguishing for example, between justice and equity or between justice and charity.

In the *Republic* justice regulates and equilibrates the other virtues. Its functions are to achieve harmony and to maintain equilibrium. Justice resuts from each element in society in doing the appropriate task. In moving away from Plato's dualism, which would serve to exalt justice and denigrate positive law, Aristotle treated justice as immanent in the working of law and thus gave it a markedly more effective function. Since immanent justice necessarily evokes difficult antitheses and tensions, it is to Aristotle's enduring credit that unlike most of his successors, he candidly left the unresolvable. Kant and his disciple have elucidated the concept of justice only tangentially after giving a baldly positivistic definition of "just" and "unjust" in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Hume was concerned mainly with the coherence and consistency of morals and was content to enlist justice in its service by submitting that "public utiliy is the sole origin of justice."[1]

Unlike Saint Simon and various other socialist theoreticians and unlike many of their own disciples, Marx and Engels allowed no place for "justice" in their analysis of economic relations. Like Bentham, they rediculed the term, regarding it as a mere mask for capitalist exploitation

and hypocrisy.[2]

The Socialists attribute injustice in society to the rampant individualism which is responsible for existing social injustice and the degradation of the masses of the people. So they concluded that the failure of individualism compels the adaption of the only alternative system, socialism. Even the author of *Socialism* holds the view that "Socialism has come into the world because of Injustice."[3] But socialism also, by denying the existence of the individual, failed to establish equal opportunities of justice and maintenance of equal rights and freedom. Therefore, socialism gave birth to a new class in socialist countries.[4] In his book *The Open Society and its Enemies (II)*, Karl Popper also predicted the emergence of a new class in socialist countries.

The author of *Democracy Versus Socialism* elaborated the essential ethical differences between these two social systems as follows:

> Socialism, denying the existence of individual natural rights, seeks to reconstruct society in a direction opposite to its past evolution; to make the individual absolutely subservient to the state; to deprive him of his equal right with all others of exercising his industrial faculties as he will and to compel him to exercise them in such manner, time, and place as he is directed; to annul his right to benefit by his own beneficial acts; and to allot him a reward bearing no reference to the service rendered by him. Individualism affirming the existence of equal, natural individual rights, seeks the further evolution of society in the direction of its past evolution until society shall have become fully subservient to the welfare of the individuals composing it; seeking to attain such general welfare through the removal of the remaining infractions of the natural and equal rights of all individuals. The freedom of each to exercise all his faculties as he wills provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other; the right of each to the fullest opportunities for the exercise of his faculties, limited only by the equal righs of all others; and the unlimited right of each to benefit by his own beneficial acts, reward being proportioned to service rendered.[5]

But private ownership and monopolies in capialism deprive the majority of the people of the beneficial result of their acts and reduce their reward to below the value of the service which they render. Individualism also failed to procure freedom and justice for the majority of the people.

Muṭahharī, as the founder of the new kalām,* in his two books, namely *'Adl-e Ilāhī* (Divine Justice) and *Barrasī-ye ijmālī-ye mabānī-yi*

iqtiṣād-e Islāmī (A Brief Study of the Foundations of Islamic Economics)
has shed light on the issue of justice and social justice. In the first chaper
of *Divine Justice*, he discusses in detail the notion of justice from the
standpoint of two schools of thought in kalām, that is, Ash'arism and
Mu'tazilism. In his book, *Barrasī-ye ijmālī-ye mabānī-ye iqtiṣād-e Islāmī*,
he attempted to explain the concept of social justice from the Islamic point
of view. According to Muṭahharī, denial or approval of the principles of
justice played an important role in the development of social philosophy in
the Muslim world. Regarding the importance of the issue of social justice,
Muṭahharī says:

> Firstly, I would begin with discussing the issue of justice in order to explain the
> effect of justice upon the principle of social justice; secondly, the denial of the
> principle of justice, and its negative effect more or less in our thought, was the
> main cause of the decline of social justice in Islam which could have been
> developed on the basis of scientific and rational grounds   and could have
> become a guiding principle in jurisprudence. Consequently, a kind of
> jurisprudence emerged which is now inconsistent with the rest of the principles
> of Islam and has no secure basis for social philosophy. If there had remained
> freedom of thought (in the Islamic world) and if the Traditionalists (*Aṣḥāb
> al-Sunnah*) had not acquired dominance over the champions of justice (*Ahl
> al-'Adl,*) and if Shī'ah also did not have *Akhbārīgarī*, then we could have had a
> codified social philosophy and our jurisprudence also could have been based
> upon it and we would not have been plunged ino contradictions and dead eods.[6]

Ash'arite and Mu'tazalite Views on Justice in Muṭahharī's Works:

In his book *Āshnā'ī bā 'ulūm-e Islāmī* (An Introduction to the
Islamic Sciences), Muṭahharī holds that it is indeed evident that none of
the Islamic sects denied justice as one of the Divine Attributes. No one has

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[5] Dr. Riḍā Dawarī, the head of the Department of Philosopy of Tehran University,
in his article "Muṭahharī and New Kalām," contends that Muṭahharī is the
founder of a new kalām. Though kalam, after Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī, is also considered
to be new kalām which stand in contrast to Ash'arite and M'utazalite approaches to
kalām, but Muṭahharī's kalām is   new in the sense that it is related to
contemporary problems. By 'new kalām' here is meant a kind of reconstruction of
Islamic thought in the light of the needs of modern times. That is, to meet the
challenges from within and outside in a logical manner.

ever claimed that God is unjust. The difference between the Mu'tazilites
and their opponents is about the interpretation of justice. The Ash'arites
interpret it in such a way that it amounts, in the view of the Mu'tazilites, to
almost a denial of the Attribute of Justice. However, the Ash'arites
themselves are not at all willing to be considered the opponents of justice.

The Mu'tazilites believe that some acts are essentially "just" and some
intrinsically "unjust". For instance, rewarding the obedient and punishing
the sinners is justice; and God has to reward the obedient and punish the
sinner, and it is impossible for Him to act otherwise. Rewarding the
sinners and punishing the obedient is essentialy and intrinsically unjust,
and it is impossible for God to do such a thing. Similarly, compelling His
creatures to commit sin, or creating them without the power to do good,
creating at the same time the sinful acts of the sinners and then punishing
them on account of their sins, which were beyond their power, is nothing
but injustice, an ugly thing for God to do; it is unjustifiable and ungodly.[7]

But the Ash'arites believe that no act is intrinsically or essentially just or
unjust. Justice is essentially whatever God does. If supposedly God were to
punish the obedient and reward the sinners, it would be equally just.
Similarly, if God creates His creatures without any will, power or freedom
of action, and then if He causes them to commit sins and punishes them
for that it is not essential injustice. If we suppose that God acts in this
manner, it is justice. Hence, according to the Asha'rites, justice is
determined by Divine Will and Acts only.

In his book *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, H.A. Wolfson also holds that
since their (Mu'tazilites') assertion of free will was supported by them on
the ground of their particular conception of Divine Justice, and their
denial of the separate existence of Divine Attributes was supported by
them on the ground of their particular conception of Divine unity, the
Mu'tazilites came to be called "The Partisans of Justice and Unity" (*Aṣḥāb
al-'Adl wa al-Tawḥīd*).[8]

Shī'ī Kalām:

In the Shī'ī faith, the principle of Divine justice is considered one of
its five essential doctrines. According to this principle, justice is an

Attribute of God, identical to His Essence. It is God Who is the Maker of the law of justice. In this case, if God follows His own law, it does not in any sense mean curtailment of His Power. On the basis of this doctrine, they say that it is according to Divine justice that man should be free and capable of acting according to his will, otherwise man would not be responsible for his acts, and, consequently, he may not be rewarded or punished. They say further that if God does not reward the virtuous and does not punish the vicious He would be unjust, which is impossible.

In Shī'ī doctrine, human freedom is a logical corollary of Divine Justice. The Shī'ah, like some of the Ash'arites and all Mu'tazilites, hold that man's actions are of two types: reflexive that is unvoluntary, and willed or chosen. There is no dispute as regards the reflexive acts, for they are instinctive and man has no control over them, but the acts which are chosen by man to perform are voluntary acts. In these cases man can act in two ways, for he may choose between right and wrong, good and evil. We have seen that the Mu'tazilites believe in total freedom of man with regard to voluntary acts. This freedom is called *qadar* or *tafwīḍ*. The term *tafwīḍ* means 'delegation' or 'authorization.' According to some Mu'tazilites, God has delegated power to man for performing good or evil acts. This means that power is always with man. On the other hand, Abū al-Hasan al-'Ash'arī's discipline, Abū Bakr a-Bāqillānī, a later Mu'tazilites, believe that power being a Divine Attribute solely belongs to God, and He is the Creator of all kinds of acts. It is only God Who bestows power upon man to choose between good and evil, right and wrong acts. Man possesses this limited power only. This doctrine is called the doctrine of 'acquisition' or *kasb*. In this way, the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites take two extreme positions, while the Shī'ah, according to the teaching of the Imams of the Prophet's Family (*Ahl al-Bayt*), take an intermediate position. In this context, the saying of the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq ('a) is:

> Neither determinism nor freedom or delegated power, but an intermediate position.[5]

In *Uṣūl a-Kāfī*, in *kitāb a-tawḥīd*, there is a chapter entitled (*al-jabr wa al-qadar wa al-'amr bayn al-'amrayn*). The Persian translator and commentator, Sayyid Jawād Mustafawī, has defined *qadar* as synonymous

with another 'Arabic word *tafwīd*. After explaining the doctrine of
determinism and human free will, he writes:

> The doctrine of freedom or *amr bayn al-'amrayn* (an intermediate position)
> forms the content of all the traditions narrated in this chapter and all the
> traditions reaching us through the Imams of the Prophet's Family (*Ahl
> al-Bayt*). In all these Traditions *Jabr* and *tafwīd* (or *qadar*) have been rejected,
> and by refuting them an intermediate position ('*amr bayn al-'amrayn*) is
> posite;, that is, neither man is as helpless in his acts as a tool in the hands of a
> worker, without any power to do any thing or defend himself, nor is man fully
> capable of performing his acts independently, as if God has no power over his
> acts. In reality all his acts are related, on the one hand to God, and on the
> other to his ownself.[10]

Natural Right and Justice:

Regarding natural righs Muṭahharī holds that islam believes in
natural righs and universal Justice (inherent in the very laws of nature).
Without asserting an end or purpose for the world, that is a teleological
world view, natural laws cannot be justified.[11]

'He says that the universe's working according to natural laws
indicates that its working is purposive, and that the goal towards
attainment of which it is moving, is destined by its Creator, Allāh.

Hence, Muṭahharī concludes, the basic difference between Divine
logic and profane or non-Divine logic is that the former is based on the
belief that every one who is born in this world has a right over the world.
All human beings are children of the universe, and a child has rights over
his parents, and in return he will have to compensate for it in the future
(i.e. fulfil his obligations towards the world).[12]

In support of his view he quotes the following Qur'anic verses:

> *He it is Who created for you all that is in the earth. (1:29)*[13]

> *And the earth, He has set it for living creatures; (55:10)*[14]

> *And certainly We have established you in the earth and made in it means of
> livelihood for you; little it is that you give thanks. (7:10)*[15]

> *And surely We have honoured the children of Adam, and We carry them in the*

land and the sea. (17:70)[16]

These verses elaborate natural rights bestowed upon man, emphasizing that natural rights are essentially of Divine origin, that is conferred upon man by God Himself. This view is poles apart from the Marxist view that holds that man earns a right after he has fulfilled his obligations. Islam, on the contrary, first accords rights and then obliges man to do his duty towards the world and society. This controverts the basic principle of *The Communist Manifesto*: To everyone according to his work. The original Marxist principle that was modified was 'to every one according to his needs,' which was rather compatible with the Islamic idea of natural rights.

Now the question which arises is whether human right are prior to justice or vice versa; in other words, whether rights are determined on the basis of justice or vice versa. Muṭahharī holds the view that justice is the foundation and basis of rights. It is to be noted that Muṭahharī excluded the notion of freedom and equality from the category of rights, because he believes that rights are derived from freedom and equality, so the definition of right does not cover them and is not applicable to them.[17] Here one may find an amazing similarity between Muṭahharī's view of freedom and the existentialist notion of freedom, which, particulary in Sartre's philosophy, is considered as an ontological category, the ground and essence of human existence.

Faith and Justice:

Regarding the relaion of religion and justice, Muṭahharī maintains that this is a crucial issue on which advocates of different schools of kalām have differences of views. Mu'tazilites believe that justice is religion, that is, religion is constituted on the basis of justice. That is why Mu'tazilites are popularly known as *"'Adliyyah"* (the partisans of justice). But the Ash'arites believe that what religion says is justice. Muṭahharī sides with Mu'tazilites and holds the view that justice is the criterion of religion, or in other words justice is religion. Muṭahharī says in one of his stray writings, included in the introduction to *Barrasī-ye ijmālī-ye mabānī-ye*

iqtiṣād-e Islāmī:

> The principle of justice is the criterion of Islam, that is one has to evaluate all
> things in the light of this criterion. Justice belongs to the causes (or reasons) of
> religious laws and not one of the effects (or products) of the laws. What the
> faith prescribes is not just, but what justice demands is the faith.[18]

According to this view, justice provides ground for the faith, and is therefore, prior to faith. This view by implication indicates that *'adl* (justice) is the criterion of good and evil, which means that all good and evil are determined rationally. Here, there is similarity between Muṭahharī's view and Plato's view of justice.

Now the question is what is just law? To answer this question Muṭahharī says: First it should be clear as to what is justice and how social law and order should be laid down to pave the way for social justice? Nevertheless, justice and injustice beyond the context of society are meaningless. At the same time, they are not confined to man, i.e. it covers animals and plants as well. So animals also have rights in this universe; therefore, justice apart from its social context, covers non-human beings also.[19]

Coming to the notion of social justice, in his book *Barrasī-ye ijmālī-ye mabānī-ye iqtiṣād-e Islāmī,* Muṭahharī is of the view tha there is no contradiction between social justice and individual justice. That is, social justice does not hamper individual justice as possessing a Divine attribute whereas injustice being opposite to it would be punishable.

Ensuring human rights is obligatory upon all men, for being natural rights they are permanent and eternally universal. No expediency can take them away. For instance, the right to life, right to freedom, and right to equality cannot be abrogated. Muṭahharī holds that even in the interests of society one cannot be deprived of his natural right. But at the same time he concedes that when social interest as a whole is in danger, some of these rights can be taken away. For instance, if the society feels threatened one can be deprived of his natural right to life, but this is permissible in very extraordinary circumstances.

With reference to the "Declaration of human rights," he says that human rights are being violated covertly or overtly in our times in spite of

the technological and scientific development of human society. He concludes that only faith can guarantee natural rights and establish justice: faith in morals, faith in law, and faith in justice. Muṭahharī says that we cannot deny the role of science but science has its own scope and limitations. That is, it can be a good instrument and can serve as a light, but it is not an end in itself. Those who consider reason as sufficient for establishing the rule of justice, expect too much from it. Science and reason are instrumental in moving man forward, but the moving force behind them is faith, for which they are means.

In his book *Insān wa imān* (Man and Faith), Muṭahharī writes that the relation between science and faith has generated much interest among both religious and non-religious thinkers. 'Allāmah Muḥammad Iqbāl writes on this issue:

> Humanity needs three things today: a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe has, no doubt, built idealistic system on these lines, but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which revelation alone can bring. This is the reason why pure thought has so little influenced man while religion has always elevated individuals, and transformed whole societies. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerent democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich.[20]

As compared to contemporary Western thinkers, it may be jusifiably said that Muṭahharī has constructed his idea of justice on a securer grounds than that suggested by these Western thinkers. This ground is provided by Muṭahharī's conception of nature (*fiṭrah*) and the natural rights which are ensured by nature for all living beings. He gives priority to natural rights and is not prepared to accept that these rights may be taken away by any society except in extraordinary circumstances. In his view natural rights are of Divine origin. This theistic view of Muṭahharī is also logically superior to the atheistic view of contemporary Western philosophers. It is because of his unshakeable faith in Islam. He believes that it is only Islam, as against capitalism and socialism, which fully ensures man's natural rights and guarantees social justice for all men. It is

to be pointed out that the quintessence of Muṭahharī's thought throughout his works on social philosophy is the concept of man's nature (*fiṭrah*). This is the foundation of Muṭahharī's new *kalām*. The concept of *fiṭrah* helped Muṭahharī to criticize Western trends concerning the notion of justice and social justice and reconstruct Islamic thought.

NOTES:

1. David L. Sills, *Encyclopedia of Social Science*, (U.S.A. The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968).vol. 8, pp. 344–345.

2. *Ibid.*, p.

3. Ludwig Von Mises, *Socialism*, Trans. J. Kahane (London, Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1936).

4. For details on the new class see Milowan Djilas's book *New Class*.

5. Marx Hirsch (Melbourne), *Democracy versus Socialism* New York:Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1961), p. 253.

6. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *Barrasī-ye ijmālī-ye mabānī-ye iqtiṣād-e Islāmī*, (A Brief Study of the Foundation of Islamic Economics) (Tehran, Ḥikmat Publications, 1403 H.), p. 170.

7. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *An Introducton to 'Ilm al-Kalam*, "Al-Tawḥīd", A quarterly journal of Islamic Thought and Culture (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, January 1985), p. 63.

8. H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalām* (London, Cambridge, 1970).

9. Abū Ja'far Muhammad ibn Ya'qūb ibn Isḥāq al-Kulaynī (d. 328 or 329 H.), *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* (Tehran, Intishārāt-e Islāmī), Vol. 1, pp. 222–224.

10. Dr. Syed Laṭif Hussain Kāzmī, *Concept of Freedom in Sartre's and Iqbal's Philosophy*, Doctoral Thesis submitted to the Dept. of Philosophy, A.M.U. Aligarh, p. 186.

11. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *Barrasī-ye ijmālī-ye mabānī-ye iqtiṣād-e Islāmī, op. cit.*, p. 164.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

13. *The Qur'ān*, Sūrat al-Baqarah: 29.

14. *Ibid.*, Sūrat al-Raḥmān: 10.

15. *Ibid.*, Sūrat al-'A'rāf: 10.

16. *Ibid.*, Sūrat Isrā: 70.

17. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *Barrasī-ye ijmālī-ye mabānī-ye iqtiṣād-e Islāmī, op. cit.*, p. 165.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 170–171.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

20. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *Fundamentals of Islamic Thought* Trans. R. Campbell (California, Mizan Press, 1985), p. 34.

Popular Sovereignty in Contemporary Shi'i Political Thought

T.M. Aziz

The legacy of the Iranian revolution will most likely be its introduction of the concept of political Islam in the world arena. Although Islam was the political doctrine of many social movements in the Muslim World before the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, it was that upheaval in Iran that made the concept of political Islam more profound reality to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The revolution has shown that Islam is anew wave of revolutionary doctrine, besides liberalism and communism, that can motivate masses, topple regimes and beget political systems framed by its merits. As a result, the *mujāhidūn* all over the world of Islam have been regarded more dreadful to the status quo than their revolutionary predecessors, the Marxists and Jacobins. Their political agenda appears to advocate the establishment of Islamic political system that is anti-Western in every aspect.

Notwithstanding, the Muslim *mujāhidūn* have no unified plan to achieve their goal of Islamic political system. The gulf of their differences range from their views on what is the nature and structure of their upcoming political system, to the idea if there could be one or many Islamic states at one time. Still, one should keep in mind that they all have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the Iranian experience only because it was the first Islamic state to exist in modern history. Although, there are many Islamists who are critical of the Iranian revolutionary experience and its political setup, and even some consider it a misfortune to ideal Islamic teaching; the proponents of the Iranians, mostly Shi'as, consider the revolutionary Iranian regime as the best of all possible world or as the model to be followed. They regard it as a fulfilment of the long

waited dream of making Islam the solution to the agony of mankind. So to
many Shī'ī political movements, specially to those ones that are based in,
or financed by, Iran, are advocating or copying the Iranian political system
in other parts of the Muslim World. It is sufficed to mention, however, that
there are numbers of Shī'ah jurists who have exclaimed alternative
political settings and different socio-economic relationships within an
Islamic society to the form exist in the present regime in Iran. Some who
even reject the basic assumptions that the founder of the Iranian regime,
Āyatullāh Khumaynī, relied upon to justify his formation of the current
Iranian political system. Transpiring by the ongoing debate, I endeavour to
examine in this paper the conflicting political ideas of few contemporary
Shī'ah jurists and compare their political views. My aim is to introduce to
the reader the different approaches that the Shī'ah jurists have articulated
their views concerning political issues. Such study is extremely useful for
the reader to apprehend the ongoing political debate in Shī'ism and not to
view it molded with one dominating doctrine and mental framework of the
Iranian leadership.

Basically, I will structure the study into two parts. First I present the
views and the political doctrine of Āyatullāh Khumaynī and those who
advocate the idea of *"wilāyat al-faqīh,"* (Guardianship of the
jurisconsult),[1] which is the building blocks of the nature and structure of
the present Iranian regime. Then, I will introduce three prominent
contemporary Shī'ah jurists who give alternative political ideas about
governorship in the Islamic State. I will refer to the former as the statists
views where the jurist of *"wilāyat al-faqīh"* advocate total control of the
affairs of the *ummah*, the Islamic community, by the State; and to the latter
the populists where the jurists advocate more popular input into the
political system. However, this taxonomy serves us to monitor the
development of the concept of popular sovereignty within Shī'ī-Islamic
jurisprudence. Such development is critical within Shī'ism because the
essence of the whole Shī'ī movement in Islamic history is based on the
premise of "divine selection" of ruler (due to the Shī'ī-Sunnī long
historical conflict that centered around the legitimacy of succession to the
leadership of the community after the Prophet). The idea of popular
selection of political authority sounds foreign. In the popular Shī'ī

thoughts, not to mention it has rarely been advocated by prominent jurists. Although, most of their political treatises focused on the issue of the legitimacy of those who head the Islamic State some have attempted to inquire into other political issues such as the scope and limits of political authority or the rights and obligations of the people. However, I would find it necessary to examine in the process in examining their views or concepts that are related to the sovereignty and legitimacy of political authority. Additionally, I also would like to emphasize that this endeavour should not be taken as value-driven orchestration on my part to favour one idea or the other, but rather only to present the differences between the two extreme views on the political spectrum. Consequently, I will not indulge myself in proving or arguing the textual validity of either arguments because such intercourse should be reserved for jurisprudential studies, this one is not indeed. Yet basically, this study will present their main thesis and show the systematic development of the concept of popular sovereignty in Shī'ī jurisprudence.

The Statist Model:

Although, the idea of *"wilāyat al-faqīh"* can be regarded as a realistic attempt by the Shī'ah jurists to the problem of governorship in the Islamic society, the whole concept is a duly utopian in nature. It is based on the rational conclusion that any civil society needs a government and an orderly system to organize its affairs to immune it from anarchy and destruction.[2] Hence, there have always been social systems of some form and governing elite for the purpose of establishing order and dispensing justice throughout history. Consequently, there is no conceivable evidence that man has ever lived in what amounts to as the "state of nature" that European social-contract theorists had argued for. From the smallest social unit, the family, the clan or the tribe, to the most advanced and complex orders such as nations and empires, there is social hierarchy, division of labour and coercive measures to protect the existing social system.[3] Such political control mechanism provides legitimacy to the authority and maintains harmony between the members of any social order. So in every society, remarks Āyatullāh Khumaynī:

> Government is needed to establish justice, [system of] education, to
> secure order, to override justice, to protect the borders, and to safeguard
> people from foreign [enemy]; and such needs are obvious to human rational
> regardless of time and place.[4]

The jurists argued that the importance of government is so critical to
survival of man on earth that there should be a divine intervention to
guide man to a suitable political environment. History has shown that man
is incapable of electing the right individuals to leadership, or that his
ignorance has led him to institute unjust socio-economic order that
threatened his happiness or survival. It is because of this shortcoming in
human faculty of making the right decision on issues of that important that
God, the most Gracious, must have had specific revelation to direct people
toward their suitable leaders. The jurists' second argument to the necessity
of the divine intervention, however, has only a jurisprudential flavour.
They believe that since Islamic regulations and teaching encompasses all
aspects of human life,[5] then there must be a guidance ordained to mankind
on political issues. And whoever does not believe in such thoroughness of
Islam, they argue, must believe in the deficiencies of the message of the
Providence, God forbids.[6] On the contrary, the heritage, the teachings, and
the commands of Islam indicate that political issues are the centre piece of
its message. The Prophet of Islam has founded and led a political state;
adjudicated between people, punished the aggressors, and established a
system of justice. Moreover, the nature of Islam itself made it necessary for
believers to live only within the framework of Islamic State. For example,
the collection and distribution of the religious taxes according to God's
will, defending the Muslims and the land of Islam from oppressors and
invaders, enforcing Islamic moral and penal codes, and unifying the
Muslims in one community are some of the duties that can only be realized
by the instruments and power of a political state.[7] Based on the above two
facets of rational-religious argument, the legitimacy of the succession to
leadership and the formation of political order is divinely ordained, and it
is not contingent to individual choice and free will. Al-Ḥā'irī candidly
writes:

> There is no sense of having the legislative, and regulative functions, or to determine what type of political system, in the hand of people who are ignorant a great deal about themselves, not to mention their vast ignorance about the world and its mysteries, in contrast with the Divine Wise Creator who had revealed to them laws and commandments that give them happiness and guide them in the right path.
>
> Therefore, it is improper for a Muslim to believe in democracy or to practise it (even with regard to electing the executive branch only) except if Islam would ordain such thing.[8]

Jurists of this line of thought have argued that the most knowledgeable among people should rule the community because he will act on the best interests of the whole community and not out of ignorance that will cause broad harm on every member. The most knowledgeable should also be sincere and self-denying to look after the general well-being and not of his own.[9] So the Platonic philosopher-king of Islam is a God-fearing jurist, someone well-versed with Islamic teaching and laws, and pious enough to seek the grace of God and not his materialistic gains. On the other hand, the religious side of the argument upholds that divinely guided individuals, i.e., Prophets and Imams, are the natural mentors and guardians of the people. With their guidance and command, people can rest assure that their government is at the mercy of God. However, in the absence of the Twelfth Imam, al-Mahdī (the Saviour), the leadership of the Islamic community shall pass to the resemblance of those divine individuals, to the most pious and knowledgeable among people.

Jurists, therefore, are the "natural" inheritors of the authority of the Prophet because of their awareness of the teachings and commands of God, Almighty. They are the closest among people to the divine light. In other words, they resemble, theoretically and practically, the divinely guided individuals. The jurists' role is to safeguard religion, preach the words of God to people, and guide them toward their ultimate destiny, which is identical with the role of Prophets and Imams. Accordingly, Sharī'ah has instructed people to seek guidance from these learned men in all matters, which definitely include worldly affairs as well.[10] Emphasis added to show that supporters of this school of thought have always referred to *hadīths* of the Prophet or the holy Imams that advise people to

seek guidance in their life from those who know and teach Islam. Yet, the
interpretation of what matters that one should seek from jurists is what
divides the Shi'ah jurists to proponent and opponent of *wilāyat al-faqīh*.
Āyatullāh Khumaynī had argued that by not specifying the limits of the
term matters indicates that guidance should include temporal as well as
spiritual ones, or worldly as well as religious affairs. Accordingly,
Āyatullāh Khumaynī concludes that the jurists should inherit the political
authority of the Prophet and Imams in its totality, that is the authority in
its vast scope and limits.[11]

As for the means-and-ends of the jurists' political authority, there is,
for instance, one verse of the Qur'ān that is widely referred to by Āyatullāh
Khumaynī and his supporters implies that totalitarian power ought to be -
at the hand of divinely appointed governors:

The Prophet is more entitled to the believers than their own selves. (33:6)

Once the jurists are believed to be the legitimate successors of the
Prophet, accordingly, they are the natural inheritors of such power of
control on the life of believers. Therefore, the jurists' duties are to preach
to people words of God, to lead the community, to command the armies,
to collect the religious dues and charities, to distribute them to the needy
and to perform the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil in the
society as the Prophet used to do. They after all, Āyatullāh Khumaynī
writes, "are the Prophet's trustees in all matters associated with his
prophethood, which included the most obvious of them is the leadership of
the community and the dispensing of social justice."[12]

Wilāyat al-Faqīh in Perspective:

The entire endeavour of Āyatullāh Khumaynī works on Islamic
government was concentrated around the basic issue that has occupied the
Shī'ī jurisprudential and theological studies for centuries, which is the
legitimacy of those who hold political authority. Although the general
argument has evolved around the divine legitimacy of the Shī'ī holy
Twelve Imams to succeed the Prophet to lead the Islamic state, Āyatullāh

Khumaynī and the jurists of the Statist school advance the argument
proportionally to include the jurists on having the divine right to head the
Islamic community. The jurists' right to reign is argued to be legitimate
only because, according to Āyatullah Khumaynī, the religious texts
indicate without any reasonable doubt that the Prophet and holy Imams
chose them to be their heirs or deputies.[13] Hence, they are the legitimate
rulers who the Islamic community should recognize as their authority and
obey their guidance.

Once the jurists' legitimacy to political power has been established
juridically, then the domain of their rule and of people's obligation follows
logically. Consequently, the scope of their authority is almost as vast as
that of the Prophet, that is the total supervision of human activities and
relationships in the society. He must, therefore, perform with his capacity
the functions entrusted to the Holy Prophet and Imams. The only
distinction between the authority of infallible leaders and that of the
jurists is the fact that the jurists are not the lawgivers, but rather the
law-interpreters. This differentiation allows him only to extrapolate the
divine laws to meet rising circumstances. For that reason Āyatullāh
Khumaynī rejects the idea that the Islamic State should have legislative
body or a parliament but a Planning Council instead.[14] However, other
aspects of the authority of the Prophet and its jurisdictions are to be
passed to his successors, i.e. jurists. So even the matter of waging offensive
jihād against the unbelievers, which was historically believed by Shī'ah
jurists to be exclusively empowered with the Infallible Imams,[15] Āyatullah
Kāzim al-Hā'irī, a well reputable jurist and professor at Qum religious
academy, argues that such aspect of authority should also be within the
domain of jurist's authority.[16] In fact, the jurisdiction of the *wilāyat
al-faqīh* is comprehensive to all realm of human relationships. Case in
point, in 1988, when 'Alī Khāmene'ī, the present jurist-leader of Iran who
was the president then, publicly indicated on one Friday sermon that the
Islamic State has no jurisdiction to have total control on the personal life
or the private property of the individual, Āyatullāh Khumaynī openly
denounced him and proclaimed in a public statement that the Islamic
government, since it is the extension of the authority of the Prophet and
holy Imams, is considered one of Islam's fundamentals tenets of beliefs and

hence has precedence over the statutes of worships such as performing prayers, fasting or pilgrimages...So for example the government can abrogate the ritual duties of *Hajj* or revoke the legal contracts that it undertook with people when those contracts, on religious matters or otherwise, are perceived detrimental to its interests.[17]

Furthermore, since the political regime that the jurist govern is the only legitimate and divinely legitimate leadership on earth during Imam Mahdi's occultation, then total submission from the people to its authority is expected. It is because the state acts in the best interests of the people, since it is headed by the best mind and finest soul, i.e., qualified devout jurist. The jurist and his state have the responsibility to guide people to their destiny. Once people realize that their leadership is divinely legitimate then they must but obey its command and guidance. The rationalization behind such total obedience, according to al-Ḥā'irī, stems from the fact that rule of the jurist is for overcoming people's deficiencies of realizing or comprehending their own interests.[18] The jurist hence is portrayed like a father taking care of his children or that of a guardian to orphans.[19] Analogically, within the Islamic political system, as in the case of father, the ultimate welfare and the proper upbringing of minors are solely dependents on the best judgment of their guardian.[20] Accordingly, the "jurist-guardian" during the course of his ruling may seek advice of the others, or make consultation with experts, but he alone furnished with expertise and knowledge necessary for leadership and only he has the power to make decision.

> We should make use of those with scientific and technical expertise in the administrative, [planning] and management functions [of the state]. But as for the supreme administration of the state, the dispensing of justice, providing security and sanctioning equitable social relationships, and justly rule and adjudicate between people, these are precisely the functions of the jurist.[21]

In such type of guardian-follower relationship, moreover, there is no room available for dissent from the authority of the *wilāyat al-faqih* even though, at least in theory, the leading jurist is considered only as the first among equals (Judicially, jurists are all conisdered to be the rightful heir to the infallible Imams) So, although the rulings mandated by the jurist's

regime may not be considered as divine as those laws of the Prophet, but they have the stature of pseudo divinity because they have to be obeyed even by other jurists who disagree with their textual authenticity or their derivation. They argued that the society must have stable legal system and order to follow, and confusion and disagreement will beget anarchy and disintegration. Even the dissent of other jurists is to be severed for the sake of unity of the community or the survival of the legitimate Islamic regime. And if dissent is to be allowed or expressed, it should be within the close circle of jurists and through the medium of their adjudicational exercises.[22] Their dissent and opposition are considered only a matter of having different juristic opinions on the extrapolation of laws, and each may be right or wrong. To realistically resolve the matter and minimize its spread on the social level, hence, the one who has the de facto power to enforce his opinion in the social settings should have the final say. Accordingly, punishment to violate the ruling of jurist is legitimate and just since they are enactment of the original divine punishment.

Populist Argument:

Of course, not all Shi'ah jurists subscribe to the argument that they only have the divine rights and legitimacy to rule the Islamic society. Although they don't dispute the idea that the holy Twelve Imams are the legitimate rulers to succeed the Prophet, they raise serious objections about the legitimacy of the jurists to position of authority. Chief among them is Muntazari.

Muntazri's work, *Dirāsāt fī Wilāyat al-Faqīh*, was in a way meant to be a political treatise in defence of "Guardianship of the Jurisconsult" and a justification for the type of political system founded in the post-revolution's Iran. However, he went in length to review all the Prophetic traditions that were supposed to support the legitimacy of the jurist to authority. His textual criticism turned out to conclude that all traditions don't stand up to the juristic analysis as authentic or of sound references.[23] He explicitly states that "the proof of those traditions to demonstrate the designation of authority to the jurist is not conclusive."[24] Their meanings either have been misinterpreted,[25] stretched,[26] overstated,[27]

or in other cases the whole textual evidences been of weak sources to be
relied upon.[28] The definite and the most sound tradition, he argues,
delegate authority to the totality of jurists and not one of them.[29]

Nonetheless, he deduced a different argument to defend the authority
of the jurist as instituted in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. His argument incongruity rests not on the divine right of the jurist to
the authority, but from the people divine right to participate in politics.
Muntazarī argued that God has instructed them to conduct their affairs in
consultation with each other, to honour their contract, and to respect their
oath of allegiance. It is obvious, according to Muntazarī, that these
religious responsibilities are the bases of political relationships and
therefore are the foundation of the Islamic State.[30] In due respect, the
concept of "bay'ah" (oath of allegiance) resembles some form of social
contract between the people and their leader. On this he writes:

> "...the essence of *bay'ah* is to signify in itself a means to form an authority
> when contract and consent have been achieved. It is known that the [Arabian]
> tribes when they feel in need of a chief to protect their [tribal] system and
> defend it against foreigners they summon with whom they find suitable to
> [leadership] to conclude a contract and disclose with him its terms and
> obligations, and when mutual agreement is reached, they instate what they
> have contracted and agreed upon by shaking hands. And through this form of
> institution authority used to be confirmed."[31]

Such type of formation of authority, i.e., the popular election of the
head of the Islamic State, suggests Muntazarī, seems to have more
religious legitimacy than the divine designation of the jurist as argued by
Āyatullāh Khumaynī and the statist's jurists. In other words, the
leadership in the Islamic State during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam
can be formed and gain legitimacy only by "social contract," and
Muntazarī cites many religious textual evidences to support this view.[32]

However, the popular sovereignty does not mean that the jurists are
left with no role to play in Muntazarī's state model. He addresses this
question from a different angle. The people, he argues, although have the
divine right to choose their leader, but their choice is confined to those
who are "competent" and not to everybody else. Since the Islamic State
must enforce the commands of God in lieu of man-made laws, competency

hence means knowing the divine command. The people, therefore, must choose someone amongst those learned individuals who are versed with Sharī'ah. In sum, Muslims are supposed to elect only the qualified jurists for the position of leadership.[33] If others to be chosen, they may lead the people astray from the straight path.

Furthermore, Muntazarī's theoretical formulation not only preserves a leading political role for the jurist, but it also puts an end to the perennial problem of plurality of sovereignty that has weakened the consolidation of authority in *wilāyat al-faqīh*'s theory. Since the divine sovereignty designated to the jurists in general, then every jurist has the divine rights to claim authority and has the legitimacy to assume its functions. Such multiplicity of authority is amplified by the doctrine that every Shī'ī for the sake of his salvation must conform to a rule constructed by a jurist. Muntazarī, who was part of the political setup of Āyatullāh Khumaynī's government, by designating the sovereignty with people has diminished this political dilemma. Jurists, Muntazarī may concede, have no claim to authority except through popular election. Once a jurist has been elected and contract been invoked with him, people including jurists must obey his command. And because legitimacy can only come through election and social contract, other jurists have no divine claim to the leadership in any means once people have spoken their choice. The jurist-leader henceforth has total authority not only over the legislative, executive and judiciary functions of government,[34] but to include all aspects of social life.[35] Muntazarī explicitly denied other jurists from even their traditional religious authority of guidance within the framework of the Islamic State.[36] Plainly put, he disqualified them from one of the most Shī'ī basic religious concepts and practices that a believer should refer to one qualified jurist.[37] All members of the jurist-led state have to obey the laws and commands of the political system.

Central to his theory, religious as well as civil affairs will become part of the domain of the Islamic government. Pluralistic sovereignty is intolerable to Muntazarī to the point that he even argued that the jurists are not allowed to announce publicly the seeing of new moon.[38] Considering that the observance of some of the important religious rituals, such as fasting the month of Ramadān or making pilgrimage to Mecca, is

set to follow a lunar calendar, difference in assigning the beginning of new month among jurists may cause social disarray. Therefore, the Islamic government, claims Muntazarī, has the sole jurisdiction on this socio-religious matter.[39] The jurist-leader conclusively is the sole royalty and should be the only recognized legitimate authority within the Islamic State.

Having defined a leading role for the jurist within the popularly elected Islamic state, it became plausible for Muntazarī to elaborate on the dynamic of popular sovereignty. Although he has a positive view on the role of the people to make mature and responsible decision with regards to electing their leader (unlike the jurists of the *wilāyat al-faqīh* who argued that people are emotional, mostly ignorant to make wise decision), he has some reservation as to the ability of making it possible for every body to participate in the decision making of electing the jurist-leader. Muslims, he argues, even at the dawn of Islam, were impossible for them to convene in one place to cast their vote. Instead, only the residents of Medina, i.e., the first believers of Islam, had the right (or probably the accessibility) to choose the Khalīfah. They had acted as representatives of the whole Islamic community, who were mostly of new converts to the faith, on this critical issue.[40] Muntazarī deduce from this precedence the principle that the people should choose their representatives of well qualified and pious individuals who they in turn would form the council to choose the leader. In other words, his vision of political system resembles some kind of representative theocracy that has some features of parliamentary system.[41]

Underpinning Popular Sovereignty:

Notwithstanding popular sovereignty did materialize theoretically through the works of Muhammad Bāqir al-Sadr of Iraq. Although he was the founder of the first Shī'ī political party, Islamic Da'wah, that made him the intellectual guru of the Arab Shī'ī fundamentalist movement, and who was a renowned champion of *wilāyat al-faqīh* well before the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran; yet he had advocated for more people's involvement in politics.[42] His leniency toward popular sovereignty is inconsistent with his general theory and perspectives of the dynamic of

politics in Islam. For him, popular sovereignty and the governorship of the jurist are the two faces of the same coin, so to speak, or the integral parts of Islamic politics.

Ideologically, Sadr based his theory on two fundamental religious concepts about man's destiny on earth. These are: 1) the vicarage role that God has entrusted to man; and 2) the divine guidance and salvation of man on earth.[43] The two above concepts were derived from the understanding of the story of creation of man as narrated in the Qur'an. Adam (personifying mankind) was created to live on earth, yet to be superior to all creatures including angeles in heavens. Şadr writes that:

> God has honoured human being with vicarage on earth for he was a unique creature among other elements in the universe to be the delegate of God on earth and through this vicarage he was worth for the angeles bow before him.[44]

This superiority was reinforced by man's capacity to acquire the divine knowledge (the names which God taught him). Sadr went to argue that Adam and Eve's short residence in heaven was only a training point to prepare them to live on earth.[45] Their experience with the temptation of Satan, performing sins, and repentance were necessary ingredients for hospitable life on earth. It is due to this human experience that man gained the intellectual-spiritual capacities to live on earth by his own and behold to divine responsibilities of vicarage.[46] God again warned them of their enemy (Satan), and promised henceforth to provide them guidance.

Yet vicarage implies that man to be the agent of God on earth, a role which indicates his free will, the freedom to act according to his understanding of his divine mission. However, he has the capacity either do good or bad. Plainly put, he is by nautre to be a moral creature. What makes him swing from one side to the other are two internal and two external mechanisms: the formers are his rationale and his passions; and the latters are divine guidance and Satan's deceptions. The crucial factor of keeping man in the "straight path" in this scheme is the divine guidance that God sent to man at times of need to enable him reinforce his rationality and provide him with the divine knowledge to control his inner temptations and that of Satan and enable him to emancipate toward

perfection. Prophethood hence to play this role to guide man throughout history. Prophets were the bear witnesses (*shuhadā'*) to the progress of man and his steadfast to the responsibilities of vicarage. In other words, divine drama of life on earth is contingent on the play of two main actors: the vicarage and witness; or let's say between the role of man and that of God; or between the deeds of man's free-will and the divine guidance.

Vicarage role implicitly denotes certain values beholden to man that pertain to his role as an agent of God on earth: that he, 1) belongs to no one but he, 2) is responsible only to God, 3) services no other than the Most-High, and 4) is equal to others before the Lord.[47] In political terms, respectively, entails that man is bound in universal brotherhood to other men, that he has a mission to fulfill as free-will agent before God, that he has the liberty to act according to his capacity, and that he will be treated equally before the law. These divine privileges are parallel to notions that later known to man as the natural rights of man or universal values of people: universalism, progression, equality and liberty.

Moreover, the divine guidance is in a way to protect the above rights and privileges of man and secure the purpose of humanity of continuing progression toward the perfection. The divine guidance has materialized through revelations to prophets and the leadership of Imams. Besides having clear knowledge of the divine message, these infallible persons were responsible to: 1) safeguard God's message and laws from degeneration, 2) supervise man's conduct from deviating from his vicarage role, and 3) interfere when corruption becomes rampant in the society.[48] Accordingly, the "witness' is in fact the spiritual and the political point of reference for the people.

However, to claim such larger-than-life role to the prophets and Imams because they are the messengers of God and protectors of that message, respectively, can well be taken; but questions of doubt will be raised if jurists are fit to assume the role of witness! Sadr's theoretical framework subscribes to the idea of placing the jurist, more specific the Grand Jurist or *"marji'"* in the Shī'ah's hierarchy, as the witness to succeed Prophets and Imams. Does the jurist has the merits to bear the grandiose role in the divine design? Affirmatively, Sadr has argued for the jurist to be capable of exercising the role of witness because of his high

intellectual and spiritual training that provides him with the necessary capacities that guard him better than others from mischiefs. The *"marji'*," Sadr eloquently has defined as,

> "the person who through his individual efforts and long forbearance has achieved unbroken, comprehensive, and vibrant grasp of Islam and its sources, and gained deep piety to tame himself to it so [Islam] can become a power controlling his life and behaviour."[19]

So although the grand jurist is not divinely identified in person to be a witness, but his attributes clearly qualify him to take such responsibilities. Sadr grounds his opinion with a reference to the following verse:

> *Surely We sent down the Torah, wherein is guidance and light; thereby the prophets who had surrendered themselves gave judgment for those of Jewry, as did the masters and the rabbis, following such portion of God's Book as they were giving to keep and were witnesses to. (Emphasis added) [5:44][20]*

According to Sadr, God identifies those who can rule by the Book and can uphold the role of witness: the prophets, the masters (who Sadr identifies to be the Imams) and the jurist of God's laws.[21]

Sadr accordingly sets up the type of relationship between the "jurist-witness" and the vicars of God, i.e., between the *marji'* and the people within the Islamic State. His state's model gives the notion that there is division of power between the two main actors as well as there is some form of check-and-balance mechanism between them. On the one hand, as mentioned above, Sadr identifies the main political functions of the witness; which are to supervise the activities of the State, to make his juristic opinions the legal standard of the legislative process, and to command people to uphold their vicarage responsibilities in this life.[22] Simply put, the witness is legal and moral guardian of the people and of the State. On the other hand, Sadr's model places the main course of politics at the hands of people through the exercise of elections. He justifies political rights as being inconsistent with the Prophetic tradition of receiving the oath of allegiance from people. Prophets and holy Imams although were identified by their names *per se* to the position of authority by Almighty God, "their convention [of receiving the oath of allegiance

from people] was to emphasize the importance of such public rights and to put in practice the theoretical concept of vicarage to people in general."[3][3] People, Ṣadr concludes, are to assume the executive and legislative powers of government. Yet, the question that might arise is that-for people to elect their leaders and government officials is well understood, but isn't there seems to be inconsistency in the basic formulation of Ṣadr's theory to suggest that they can legislate before God! Isn't that role, if theoretically being justified, to be assigned to the witness? Yes and no perhaps Ṣadr might have answered.

Although Ṣadr, like all Muslim thinkers, believes that the Islamic laws are comprehensive of all matters concerning man on earth, but he leaves an open-window for human legislation and man-made laws within the divinely guided State. He argues that Islam albeit has concrete rules that must be followed, there is a wide area of unlegislated matters that the Providence left it intentionally for people to provide for people the opportunity to legislate rules according to their circumstances.[34] Ṣadr says that there are clear-cut laws of *Sharī'ah* that are binding as articles of the constitution. However, he identifies other two areas where there can have popular inputs. The first of which is being in the "indeterminate sphere" of laws where the jurists have different legal opinions on certain unsettled religious issues. In these cases, the people, through their legislators may vote for one of the available juristic options. The second is the "discretionary sphere" where divine legislator left no specific rules or regulations, mostly are related to socio-economic issues. Here, the human legislators can enact legislations and derive laws by referring to the general principles of Islam and its basic tenets.[55] In retrospect, Ṣadr gives the notions that there are two spheres of social laws, the divine and the civil, both he considers are within the domain of Islamic jurisprudence. The jurist-witness is supposed to have veto-power over legislations that are in conflict with the basic Islamic ethical and juristic principles.

Needless to say that such broad jurist's supervision in the state has been realized by Ṣadr and he has proposed mechanism to balance its political effects. He acknowledges that the *marji'* conduct his socio-political activities in a primitive manner. There is no institutional structure he relied upon or to exercise his authority. Decisions that

concern the welfare of whole community are mostly derived from consultation with relatives and close associates. To undo the shortcoming of this tradition, Ṣadr proposed setting up an institution of *"marji'iyyah"*[56] where committee of experts on different fields give advice to, and execute decisions taken by the *marji'*. Such modern phenomenon, he maintains, will not only save the jurist-witness from arbitrary decision-making, but also serve as a medium to train new jurists for the responsibilities of witness and benefits them by having the experience from the ongoing exercise of authority.[57] The second mechanism, Ṣadr adheres to, is the traditional way of free competition to the position of authority.[58] The jurists must gain his credibility through proving his intellectual and spiritual qualities to the public in a thorough manner. Once there are many contenders for the position, it is then the right of people to elect in popular vote their *marji'* from among the different choices.[59] In other words, such practice will give leniency away from the Platonic notion that is deeply inherent in the Shī'ī juristic thought of selecting the one with best mind and finest soul toward electing the one who is more popularly desired. As a result, this process of selection of the *"marji'"* from among the many jurists to the position of witness by popular vote will place the vicars of God to be entrusted with the power of making the divine appointments. A much greater responsibility and honour were given to people indeed. In Ṣadr's theory, people at the epoch of occultation of the Twelfth Imam were to act in behalf of God and elect their leaders and determine their fate.

In short, Ṣadr undoubtedly is advocating for more open system that the one adhered to by his peers of *wilāyat al-faqīh*. He explicitly categorizes his political system as a modified democratic one. He declares bluntly that:

> The Islamic theory rejects kingship and monarchy; dictatorship of one person in any form; aristocratic government; but it advocates a type of system that provides all the positive elements of democratic system plus distinctive factors that optimize the objectivity of its structure and guard it against corruption.[60]

Ṣadr, furthermore, portrayed the Islamic system to have comparable

political structure as of the parliamentary form of government where there is no clear separation of power between the legislative and executive branches.

As for the type of relationships between the branches of government, the Islamic State is closer to the republican system but with major differences with those that exist in the democratic capitalist states, which are founded on the principle of separation [of power] between the executive and legislative branches.[61]

Annulling Juristic Sovereignty:

The last judicial view to be analyzed here are those of Muhammad Jawād Maghniyyah. He was prominent Shī'ī jurist and prolific writer from Lebanon who has produced voluminous works on varieties of religious subjects most of which are aimed at simplifying the complex Islamic teachings and jurisprudential studies to the general public. Yet some of his books on jurisprudence, Islamic laws, exegesis of Qur'ān are considered renowned scholarly works of in-depth investigation and deliberation. One of which, *Fiqh al-'Imām al-Ṣādiq*, was praised by Sadr as a masterpiece on understanding the social dimension of Islamic laws.[62] His last work, *al-Khumaynī wa al-Dawlah al-'Islāmiyyah* (Āyatullāh Khumaynī and the Islamic State), although lacks analytical theme or thesis but contains critical points to Āyatullāh Khumaynī's *al-Hukūmah al-'Islāmiyyah*. It is probably the only known Shī'ī work of an eminent jurist that attacks the basic premises of Āyatullāh Khumaynī at the height of his successful revolution. The book has not been in publication since its first edition in 1979.

Maghniyyah starts by questioning Āyatullāh Khumaynī's claims that the jurists are the heirs of Prophets and Imams to the leadership of the Islamic State. He employs rational and jurisprudential argument to refute such claim. First by arguing that the jurists are definitely not of superb qualities and attributes as that of divinely chosen individuals, therefore the scope of their authority must correspond to their stature.[63] Maghniyyah views that the level of authority must be proportional to the capacities of the leaders. God when He commissioned to the Prophets and Imams the

all-comprehensive authority was because they were of considerable traits and of direct links to the Providence that immuned them from misusing the power of their office. And due to their infallibility, they deserve total obedience from the people because their rules and decisions will always be for the best of the individual and of the public interests. That is not so for the jurists, however. They are fallible human beings who are "subject to oblivion, pride, deception, personal emotion and influence by the environment."[64] Taken this into consideration, they should not anticipate unquestionable obedience from people. Rationally speaking, the basic primes that Maghniyyah is advocating for is that "difference in personal traits must correspond definitely to differences in deeds."[65] That is why the infallible persons are more entitled to the selves of believers than the believers to themselves, but not so for the jurists to deserve such supremacy.

To support his thesis, Maghniyyah resorts to citing the views and deliberations of well renowned Shī'ah jurists, such as al-'Anṣārī, Baḥr al-'Ulūm and Nā'īnī[66] who have reached to the same conclusion.[67] Furthermore, he disputes the justifications for the governorship of the jurists that Āyatullāh Khumaynī provides for in his *Islamic Government*, which states that the Islamic religious taxes are instituted to finance government's activities and not for helping the poor and the needy only. No such evidence, Maghniyyah maintains, can be found in the Holy Book or Prophetic tradition to affirm such claim. He goes on to say that Āyatullāh Khumaynī "who has great interest in textual proof" has not produced such evidences.[68] In fact the religious text overtly states the purpose of these taxes is for the welfare of the unfortunates and the improvised.[69]

In sum, Maghniyyah sees that sovereignty at the time of the Infallible Imam's absence belongs to the people in general and not to the jurists only.[70] People, jurists among them, should elect government officials and representatives to make legislation, execute laws and establish order. Furthermore, he argues that the function of the state is not all concerning religious matters, but mostly are within the realm of administration and social affairs of which there are no religious texts or laws pertaining to these issues.[71] Therefore, the extrapolation of laws, Maghniyyah advocates,

"must be left for culture and for the experts to meet the general interests even if we are to imitate the West as long as it does not legalize the forbiddens or prohibit the permissibles."[72]

Maghniyyah's articulated views stem from his conviction that the nature of the state is contingent solely on the basic doctrine of its laws, practices and constitution, and not on the nature of the class of its leaders.[73] Moreover, the Islamic State, he maintains, can borrow the wisdom of others even in the forms of regulations and legislative practices if it serves the general welfare of people. To support his views, Maghniyyah cites textual traditions that values the reign of the just pagan ruler more than that of the unjust Muslim ruler because in the former the people will benefit from its justice and in the latter they will suffer from its tyranny.[74] By anticipating public resistance to his views on Islamic government, Maghniyyah made reference to one of Iran's grand jurist and leader who was vocal in his opposition to Āyatullāh Khumaynī, Sharī'at madārī as saying:

> The concept of Islamic government is vague, and has had given the impression to others the values of rudeness and dictatorship. Such fear was reinforced to them by our rejection to add the word democracy to the slogan of the Islamic Republic. The principle we are advocating for is that the people govern themselves and that what Islamic Republic is. Because it is not permissible for one individual or one class to rule alone. It is [the right] of people to elect their representatives to the parliament in free election, and the obligation of every government that wants to rule is to gain the confidence of parliament once it has been appointed by the president of the republic. And when the parliament legislates laws it must consider the views of the majority, for these laws will not be in conflict with Islam because the great majority of the people [in Iran] are Muslims.[75]

Conclusion:

The gist of this endeavour is to trace the development of popular sovereignty in the contemporary Shī'ī political thoughts. Needless to say that one can conclude that the contemporary Shī'ah jurists have different opinions and understanding of the basic political questions. Although they

all have been graduates of the same traditional religious schools in Najaf or Qum, their views are far wide apart. The jurists I examined in this comparative study are renowned activists and of major intellectual contributions in the field of jurisprudence. Yet each has raised his views in opposition of the other in a subtler way in order to achieve the best solution for the rising contradictions in their societies. One must take values in encouraging such debate for the sake of contributing to the process of political development of that part of the world.

In achieving the purpose of this study, I have to expound on the range of views regarding the basic political concepts. I have examined their views on: the legitimacy of authority and who should inherit the transcendent sovereignty in our time? What is the scope of authority the legitimate leader should have? Can the legitimate rulers legislate or enforce new laws in conjunction with divine laws? In the process, I have discovered noticeable poles among the jurists that can account for the existence of two main political schools of thought, the Statist and the Populist. Notwithstanding, this endeavour has shown that there is what one can call an Islamic political spectrum.

The Statist school believes that authority is divine, only the transcendent sovereign has the right to appoint rulers to lead the community. Jurists, because of their knowledge of the divine message and of their superb moral qualities, are responsible to govern. Many religious texts have been provided to indicate that jurists only are the heirs of prophets, the source of guidance to people and the means to safeguard God's laws. People hence should obey their commands and submit to their ruling with no condition attached. It is the jurist who should extrapolate, not make, laws out of the divine texts; enforce them on people; and establish justice and security within the community. It is not in the power of individuals to legislate in conjunction with God's laws because the divine scripture and the tradition of the Prophet has provided a comprehensive legal system to mankind. The duty of the Islamic ruler, therefore, is only to execute the divine will. As for the role of people in this holy environment is to act positively to the will of the legitimate government, i.e. voluntary obedience, because its rulings are for the good of general public and oneself interests.

On the other side of the spectrum, the Populist schools doesn't subscribe to the idea that the jurists are only the legitimate heirs of Prophets and Imams to head the Islamic state. Their knowledge of jurisprudence qualifies them to be judges, their piety makes them the source of guidance to others, but these merits do not legitimize them to be competent leaders. The State as a social phenomenon that progresses steadily through out history is an instrument of justice, public security and social welfare, and not only concerns with religious issues or matters of worships. Thus, it needs more than jurists to administer its functions and run its activities. People as a whole are responsible for selecting experts of different scientific and technical fields to governorship of the State. God has advised them to run their affairs in consultation with each other, and the Prophet and Imams have had accepted the general opinions of the people. Therefore, general election can be considered as a legitimate means to select leaders and government's officials. Furthermore, people's representatives have the rights to legislate laws and orders that are beneficial to public welfare and to the maintenance of social justice but do not violate divine scripture. In sum, State should work for the social justice and welfare of the people, which are the main purpose of divine laws and commandments.

One can notice, however, that the advocates of Statist school are more liberal in their interpretation of religious texts. Their basic argument is rational, which is then being justified by verses and Prophetic tradition that their meanings have to be inferred to support their thesis. They mainly rely on consensus of jurists' opinions, or popular understanding to reinforce their thesis. The populists, however, are stricturist on their view, so they tend to adhere to the literal limits of the text. If the scripture does not mention that the jurists should be rulers *per se* then one should take precaution (*ihtiyat*) to go beyond what has been revealed or known. For example if the text portrays the jurists as guides to others and protectors of God's message one should not extrapolate the idea that it might mean that they are the legitimate rulers, but only as preachers and jurists. Likewise, if God did not forbid people to borrow from others in their social practices and legal edicts that benefits their general welfare, then they are free to do so. And so on.

In the final analysis, it can be concluded that popular sovereignty has more solid foundation in the religious texts than that of the jurists' supervision.

Islamic Political Spectrum

Populist _____ Statist

Maghniyyah   Ṣadr   Muntaẓarī   Khumaynī   Ḥā'irī

Concepts

Populist	Concepts	Statist
people	(1) Authority	jurists
popular	(2) Legitimacy	divine
pluralism	(3) Power	absolutism
equality	(4) Social Stratification	hierarchy
conditional	(5) Submission	total
social justice	(6) purpose of the State	emancipation
law-making	(7) Legislative Process	extrapolation

NOTES:

1. The broad meaning of *faqīh* in Islam is denoted to one who is a jurist, a theologian and/or a preacher. However, I will take the liberty henceforth to refer to *faqīh* as jurist by inferring from the specific definition of *fiqh* in Islamic studies which means jurisprudence.

2. Kāẓim al-Ḥā'irī, *Asās al-Ḥukumah al-Islāmiyyah*, (The Foundation of the Islamic Government), (Beirut: al-Nail Publications, 1979), p. 13.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

4. Rūḥullāh Khumaynī, *Baḥth Istidlālī 'Ilmī fī Wilāyat al-Faqīh*, (A Jurisprudential Study on the Governorship of the Jurist), (Beirut: al-Falāḥ Institution, 1985), p. 11.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

7. Ayatullāh Khumaynī, *al-Ḥukumah al-'Islāmiyyah*, (Islamic Government), 4th edition, (np., n.d.), pp. 24-37.

8. Ḥā'irī, *Asās*, p. 64.

9. Ayatullāh Khumaynī, *al-Ḥukūmah*, pp. 45-47, 55.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 88-89.

12. Ayatullāh Khumaynī, *Baḥth*, p. 31.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-62.

14. Ayatullāh Khumaynī, *al-Ḥukūmah*, p. 42.

15. Abdulaziz A. Schedina, *The Just Ruler in Shī'ite Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 105-118.

16. Kāẓim al-Ḥā'irī, *al-Kifāḥ al-Musallaḥ*, (The Armed Struggle), (Qum, Iran: al-Rasūl al-Musṭafā Publication, n.d.), pp. 9-72.

17. For the full text of Ayatullāh Khumaynī's letter to President 'Alī Khāmene'ī, see *Iṭṭilā'āt*, (Jan. 7, 1988).

18. Ḥā'irī, *Asās*, pp. 141-142.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

21. Ayatullāh Khumaynī, *al-Ḥukūmah*, pp. 133-134.

22. Ḥā'irī, *Asās*, pp. 189-197.

23. 'Alī Ḥusayn Muntaẓarī, *Dirāsāt fī Wilāyat al-Faqīh*, (Studies on the Governorship of the Jurist), Volume I, (Qum, Iran: International Centre for Islamic Studies Press, 1988), p. 489.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 461-466.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 467-477.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 430-455.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 427-429.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 493-500.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 500-512.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 489, 491.

34. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 51-55.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-109.

37. *Ibid.*,

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 593-610.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 796-780.

40. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 553-562, and pp. 577-579.

41. Muntazarī considers the Islamic political system as a theocracy. See, *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 10.

42. On Sadr political activism and intellectual achievement, see my "The Role of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr in the Shī'ī Political Activism in Iraq from 1958-1980," International Journal of Middle East Studies, (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-222.

43. Although Ṣadr's short pamphlet, *Khilāfat al-'Insān wa Shahādat al-'Anbiyā'*, which was compiled with other pamphlets in *al-'Islam Yaqūd al-Ḥayāt*, was primarily to define the two concepts, his other previous works give more in-depth analysis to his political theory.

44. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, *Khilāfat al-'Insān wa Shahādat al-'Anbiyā'*, (the Vicarage of Man and the Witness of Prophets), in Ṣadr, *al-'Islam Yaqūd al-Ḥayāt*, (Iran: Islamic Ministry of Guidance, 1981), p. 133.

45. For the details of Ṣadr's views on this prehistoric period of human life, see Kāzim al-Ḥā'irī, "al-Tafsīr al-Mawḍū'ī li al-Qur'ān," *al-Hiwar al-Fikrī wa al-Siyasī*, (August, 1985), pp. 63-65.

46. Ṣadr, *Khilāfat*, pp. 152-153.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

50. *The Koran Interpreted*, Vol. I, trans. A.J. Arberry (New York: McMillan Publishing Co., 1955), pp. 134-135.

51. Ṣadr, *Khilāfat*, p. 144.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 145, 168-170; and Ṣadr, *Lamḥah Tamhīdiyyah 'an Mashrū' Distūr al-Jumhūriyyah al-'Islāmiyyah*, (A Preliminary Jurisprudence Basis of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic), in Ṣadr, *al-'Islam Yuqūd al-Ḥayāt*, (Iran: Islamic Ministry of Guidance, 1981), pp. 12-13.

53. Ṣadr, *Khilāfat*, p. 162.

54. Ṣadr calls this discretionary area of Islamic laws the "hollow sphere of laws," where the Supreme Lawgiver did not specify prohibition or permission on these matters. See Ṣadr, *Iqtiṣādunā*, (Our Economics), (Beirut: Dār al-Ta'āruf, 1981), pp. 721-722.

55. Ṣadr, *Lamḥah*, pp. 10-11.

56. Ṣadr labels his modernized version of *marji'iyyah* as the "*objective*" one vs. the existing form of "*individualistic*," or the "*subjective*." See his "*Uṭrūḥāt al-Marji'iyyah al-Suhlah*" (Thesis on Suitable Marji'iyyah), in *Kāẓim al-Ḥa'irī, Mabāḥith fī 'Ilm al-'Uṣūl*, (Oum, Iran: Dār al-Zahrā', 1988), pp. 92-100.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

58. Ṣadr refers to such traditional style of selection of the *marji'* as the "natural process of a historical precedence." See his *Lamḥah*, p. 13.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

62. Ṣadr, "al-Fahm al-'Ijtimā'ī li al-Nās" (The Social Interpretation of Religious Texts), in Ṣadr, *Ikhtarna Lak* (Beirut: Dar al-Zahrā', 1982), p. 91.

63. Muḥammad Jawād Maghniyyah, *Khumayni wa al-Dawlah al-'Islāmiyyah*, (Beirut: Dār al-'Ilm lil Malayīn, 1979), pp. 61-62.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

66. Three prominent jurists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries whom their works became the basic text-books of the religious studies in jurisprudence.

67. Maghniyyah, *Khumayni*, pp. 62-64.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-103.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

72. *Ibid.*,

73. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

Lapses In Islamic Information

Ḥujjat al-'Islam Muḥammad 'Alī Taskkirī

The Islamic Information media has been entrusted with lofty goals which could be summed up as follows:

First:

To communicate to the world the Message of Allah, explain its characteristics and bring into sharp focus those elements of the Message which are likely to induce mankind to fulfil its aspirations;

Second:

To promote the cultural standard of the Ummah so that it becomes an even-handed nation, a witness and at the vanguard of nations;

Third:

To purify the nature of the Ummah, deepen the Islamic spirit and restore to the Ummah its genuine mettle conferred by Islam;

Fourth:

To achieve Islamic unity at political, intellectual and emotional levels, so as to bring about the great Islamic renaissance willed by Allah for mankind, which prospered and dwindled and is emerging stronger today to ensure obeyance of the Will of Allah on this earth;

Fifth:

To counter imperialist and heretic conspiracies hatched against our Ummah, its tenets and divine system; expose and warn against their overt and covert schemes.

Recalling such objectives, becoming aware of our responsibility to carry out part of the historic role of Prophets, in terms of conveying the Message of God to mankind, and bearing in mind that we will be judged for our actions, both positive and negative, not only on Judgment Day, but also in this world, insofar as our international stand is concerned, it becomes incumbent on us to save this Ummah, otherwise it will be doomed to perdition and we as well.

Bearing this in mind, we may easily identify the reasons underlying the shortcomings in our Islamic information media, as well as the obstacles which impede the success of this great information task.

Such shortcomings might be either the outcome of earlier shortcomings or due to external circumstances beyond the control of those who manage and orient information activities.

Summing up the shortcomings, and seeking the reasons which prevented the information media from keeping pace with the Islamic world course, we can identify the ills that beset it. The chronic ill of our information media is that it is backward, slow, opportunistic, servile, confined to a given region, and ignoring the Islamic world, as a whole. It is materialistic, in the sense that it ignores its Islamic identity, its divine commitment and also ignores that the Muslim firmly believes that a materialistic life inevitably relates to moral causes, just as the repentance of a given nation relates to its ensuing material welfare and the defeat of an unrighteous nation and its ultimate destruction is but the outcome of God's Will and His Commandment.

God says:

"If they tread the right Path, We shall give them to drink in abundance." *(72:16)*

"If they had observed the Torah and the Gospel and which was revealed unto them from God, they would surely have been nourished from above them and from beneath their feet". (5:66)

"And if the people of the townships had believed and kept from evil, surely We would have opened for them Blessings from the sky and from

the earth. But (unto every Messenger) they gave the lie, and so We seized them on account of what they used to earn." (7:96)

We also read this Promise from Allah in the Holy Qur'ān:

"And We desired to show favour unto those who were oppressed in the earth, and to make them examples and to make them the inheritors".

Our information has almost forgotten all these considerations, and hence has been proceeded, weakened and servile, vis-a-vis the arrogant international information media, until it fell prey to colonialism. But it proceeded on its way as if nothing had happened, neither surrender nor exploitation. Such earlier shortcomings might be attributed to a given person or a given authority. But, the fault lies mainly with those whom circumstances, and not the nation, provided with the opportunity of being officially in charge of Islamic international information activities. However, the fault of those who should improve the standard of the information media in no way minimizes that of earlier authorities, but emphasizes it.

The reasons underlying the shortcomings of the information media, generally resides in the lack of well-studied planning, in addition to negligence. We may sum it up as follows:

First: The individualism and narrow-mindedness of those who are non-committed and the commitment of agents to their rules or funders.

An insight into present-day Islamic information indicates that it emanates from narrow-minded individuals beset by a paucity of funds, unable to express themselves, having little access to intellectual, political information sources, voicing their personal perception of Da'wah, and the need therefore, as well as the need to convey the Message of Islam to the world at large. Such information activities are beset by several shortcomings, and remain limited to an expression of a narrow-minded viewpoint—usually that of the person in charge—as regards public causes. They lack planning and fail to convey the sentiments of the Islamic world

as a whole. Hence, an erroneous assessment of a given position due to
ignorance of its various elements. Consequently, the proponents among
the Muslim masses feel perplexed by a distorted outlook. Once again, I
should like to emphasize that information should not be viewed as a
personal affair, limited to a narrow horizon or become the monopoly of a
given person. What is at stake, is the Ummah itself and the Message of
Islam which has to be conveyed and, as such, cannot be belittled.

Having touched upon individual information, we can now proceed to
deal with the official information media. It is truly heartbreaking to note
that the fate of this Ummah, at social and political levels, is manned by
people who, at best, can be described as not being at the level of their
responsibilities. People who indulge in inflicting oppression, live as the
heretic and enemy, reiterate withered materialistic views, seek a barren
and materialistic life, associate with colonialism, condone its harshness
and cruelty, and join the ranks of either the Eastern or Western Bloc. Yet
we are enjoined by our faith, our Sharī'ah, our sentiments, our honour,
and even by our real interests, to refrain from getting involved with either
bloc and we are ordained by the Almighty to follow the straight path, the
path of those whom God has favoured; not the path of those who earn
God's anger nor of those who go astray.

Such people heed the Message of Islam only in so far as meets their
own ends. They also satisfy the people only in so far as it prevents said
people from calling for discipline and rulings. Hence the official
information media, consciously or unconsciously, is not independent, and
caters for personal interests. This type of information is merely called
upon to perpetuate the lethargy of the people, turn them into dried-up and
sluggish men, divert their attention from the onward march of Islamic
revival, gives an image of Islam which reflects the views of the manager and
funder and analyzes events in a way which seems to relate to Islam, but in
fact, serves the interests of the exporting source. This type of information
fails to influence the proponents of Islamic revival, because its
spuriousness is easily uncovered, and is viewed by the masses of the
Ummah as a loathesome, distorted and valueless material. It is heard by
the helpless Ummah with great scorn.

This was the feeling of the people in Iran as it listened to the

Information media, which was related to Islam during the gone-for-ever reign of the Shah. Every word uttered, then, had a contrary meaning to the people and anyone dealing with the reigme was an unforgiveable crime. I will devote the final part of my intervention to the means whereby to remedy such a situation.

Second: Another reason underlying the shortcomings of information is the existing gap between its theoretical and practical aspects.

Our Islamic Information Media does not keep pace with the feelings of our Ummah, nor does it live its problems, but is alien to it and has involved itself in problems of its own creation, as if it wished to vindicate the common adage. "Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's." When has our information media--albeit seldom--stood up to major schemes and exposed them? When has it even promoted an active spirit among the ranks of our Ummah so that it could firmly oppose those who looked at it with contempt or unsurfed its rights? When has it ever tried to project the Glorious Qur'ân into the realities of our contemporary social and political life. Had it done so, we would not have been plagued by this shameful situation, and it would not have lost its standing before the people.

This gap is manifest in solutions that do not correspond to problems, or in emphasis being laid on one aspect, while ignoring another of greater importance, and on trifling matters to the detriment of issues affecting our destiny.

Third: The lack of planning for the Islamic information process.

Those versed in Shari'ah and its provisions are aware that Islam has paid considerable attention to this field so as to relate learning to the imparting of knowledge, and closed the ranks of the Ummah to bring about a common outlook at major problems. Islam also wished to ensure that the bonds linking the members of the Ummah would ever remain strong so that it would never fail to seek the achievement of its goals. Islam prescribes some rites which are of considerable importance in so far

as information is concerned, such as the Friday Prayers, the two feasts, the Pilgrimage, the enjoining of right conduct and the forbidding of indecency, the Da'wah to Islam and other rites as well, but our information does not reflect them. The sermons at some Friday Prayers are texts written in the light of directives given by the authorities, and the Imams have become civil servants of the information media and are not allowed to add a single word to the written text. Can we then speak of the objectives of the Friday Prayers? It is indeed sad to behold what befell this great rites. In Iran, the Friday Prayers have become a great source of Islamic information. The sermons are prepared by officials who raise frankly the problems faced by the country and the Ummah, fearing no one but God Almighty.

As regards the two Islamic feasts, they had been turned into occasions to exchange official greetings, day of hueless festivities and revelry and were even over-shadowed by official, national or other occasions. This also applies to Pilgrimage and other Islamic rites.

Fourth: Failure to benefit from the information aspect of social services.

Some social services provided by Islamic Governments are attributed to the Head of State and are given for purely political purposes, whereas they should have been extended in the name of Islam, because they are an integral part of Islam and of its Divine Tenets. Should we succeed in applying such a policy, we will certainly help generate a climate of unity among Muslims which, in turn, will strengthen their commitment to their faith, and enables them to invite others to embrace their mode of life.

There are other shortcomings which could also be mentioned.

--The neglect of some information fields such as that of the Muslim woman, the Muslim child, the Muslim youth and the Muslim worker, which have never been given their due;

--The isolation of genuine intellectuals from the information media, which is of great significance;

--The non-diversification of the methods and the loss of its artistic and attractive facet;

--The unforgiveable negligence of the potentials of movies, theatre, TV and other media which translate ideas into tangible realities to an

audience.

Whereas our information media is plagued by such shortcomings, huge media potentials are available to our heretic enemies, manned by large numbers of well-trained experts, who entrench their positions, information-wise on the territories of Islam, paving the way for imperialist occupation. To this end, our enemies are resorting to every possible shoddy and vile means, believing that the end justifies the means. Are we capable of challenging them? Or are we still involved in petty quandaries over political terms and public statements which when translated into concrete facts, are totally meaningless?

I am not calling for recourse to the same means utilized by our enemies. Islam is above petty means and seeks only to fulfil lofty goals. I am only urging the use of ethical means to void the enemy's propaganda, and then straightforwardly proceed to their strongholds and invite their people to follow the straight path of Islam, and we shall witness a favourable response.

Let us set ourselves to achieve the great revival of the Islamic information media, and raise it to the level of the lofty message of Islam and that of the aspirations of Muslims or, as a first step, to enable it at least to counter our enemies' campaigns. God will bless your endeavours, your militant masses will support your efforts, and your moral and material resources will provide you with the means whereby to carry out your obligations to the best of your abilities.

In the light of my statement I would like to conclude the following proposals for consideration, and implementation so that we may fulfil our duties at this crucial period in the life of our Ummah.

First Proposal: To establish a General Council for Islamic Information entrusted with the following:

a) To lay down a general information policy, bearing in mind the need to convey the message of Islam to the world and to promote a militant Islamic spirit in our Ummah;;

b) To supervise all the information material disseminated by the audio-visual media and the Islamic press;

c) To finance and manage the Islamic News Agency;

d) To conduct a survey of all areas where Islamic information activities are carried out and provide the necessary material, and conduct a similar survey of the information potentials in Islamic countries;

e) To provide all mass media at all levels with trustworthy material.

Composition of the Islamic Information Council

1. This proposed council shall be composed of prominent Islamic scholars known for their commitment to Islam and their non-committed views.
2. The council shall establish offices in each Islamic country.

Second Proposal:

To call for direct and sustained relations among members and between them and other people concerned with Islamic causes. It is through such direct and continuous relations that we can provide the people with true facts so that they do not fall prey to the distortion and ambiguity of the world information media.

Third Proposal:

To set up a committee entitled "Islamic Social Services Board" to be entrusted with the task of extending social services in the name of Islam, instead of extending them in the name of a Head of State or a King;

Fourth Proposal:

To raise the political, cultural and information levels of our Ummah, through available media, by means of public debates primarily the live

transmission of parliamentary and Shurf'ah sessions so that our Ummah can really live its problems.

Fifth Proposal:

To call on governments throughout the Islamic world to strive seriously and unrelentingly in order to denounce wrongful practices such as luxury, a materialistic life and indecency, and prohibit the circulation of pornographic publications and those disseminating insidious secular notions. To call for the application of Islam and the repudiation of all matters that do not conform to the general spirit of Islam. This is the way to generate the propitious climate that will enable the Islamic information media to develop and have an impact on its audience.

Assalamu' alaikum Warahmatullāhi Waharakātuh.

The Development of Mysticism In
Subcontinent:

An Inerview with Prof. Waheed Akhtar

What follows is an interview with Dr. Waheed Akhtar in Iran. He had been invited to participate in International Congress on al-Shaykh al-Mufīd in Qum and International Congress on Sabzawārī in Sabzawār. He is presently Professor and Chairman in the Department of Philosophy at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh (India). He was born in 1935 at Aurangabad in the erstwhile Hyderabad state. He pursued his studies in science and mathematics at Aurangabad and then switched over to philosophy and obtained his M.A. from Osmania University (Hyderabad) in 1956. He was awarded a Ph.D. in 1960 for his valuable research on Khwajah Mīr Dard's Contribution to Sufism and Poetry. He was appointed a lecturer at Aligarh Muslim University in 1960. In 1979, he was appointed Professor of philosophy. His fields of specialization are sufism, existentialism, aesthetics and philosophy of literature. He has participated in a number of national and international conferences and seminars on philosophy.

Q: Kindly tell us why did you choose *Taṣawwuf* for your docterial Thesis? Also throw light on the significance of the topic chosen for research?

W.A: The truth is that since my childhood I was interested basically in poetry and literature. I started composing poetry in Urdu from very young age. The reason for selecting philosophy instead of mathamatics and physics for my future career was also motivated by my interest in poetry, because I thought that writing poetry without studying philosophy was not worthwhile. I selected an Urdu ṣūfī poet because of his original contribution to ṣūfī doctrine in India. For my research work I had to take

recourse to his persian and urdu poetry also besides his scholarly works in prose on sufism. His major work is 'Ilm al-Kitab written in chaste and poetic persian of the 18th century Indian style of prose. Apart from this he wrote four small treatises viz. Nāleh-e Dard, Āhe sard, Nūr-e Mahfil a n d sham'a-e mahfil in persian. Each part of these books ends with some persian verses of the author. These are based on his own mystic experience. I had a chance to work on Dard's poetry also alongwith his sūfi doctrine. I was therefore attracted towards this topic later on while studying his works I realised that his major works was actually a comparative study of two major sufi doctrines i.e., Wahdat al-wujūd and Wahdat al-Shuhūd. It is important to note that Dard employed the method of analysis. I would rather say linguistic analysis, to reconcile both the doctrines that were considered earliar to be radically opposed to one another. In this context I had to study in detail Ibn 'Arabī and Shaykh Ahmad Sarhandī, popularly known in the Indian sub-continent as Mujaddid Al Thānī.

Q: Would you kindly expound the nature of differences between wahdat al-wujūd and wahdat al-shuhūd. Ibn 'Arabī is well-known in the Muslim world for his sufi doctrine since he has greatly influenced Iranian and other sufees, but in Iran or outside India Shaykh Ahmad Sarhandī still remaines an obscure personality. Would you please tell us briefly about Sarhandī's contribution to sufism.

W.A: You are right. Ibn 'Arabī is perhaps the most influential sufi thinker in the world. He has not only influnced the Muslim sufi tradition and the later development of the sufi doctrine, but also non-islamic thought. For instance Dante, the well-known Italian poet borrowed many ideas from Ibn Arabī's Futūhāt al-Makkiyyah and incorporated them in his famous epic, Divine comody. His doctrine of the unity of being is often compared with the mystical doctrine of the great Indian thinker Shankar Achariya. Ibn 'Arabī had great infuence on Indian sufies and all the Shaykhs of various sufi orders in India. The Chishtyyah, The Naqshbandiyyah, The Suhrawardiyyah, The Qādiriyyah, The Firdawsiyyah, The Shuttāriyyah etc. were under his infuence. Even the spiritual guide of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhandī, Khāwajah Bāqī bi Allah, the founder of the Naqshbandī order

in India was a staunch follower of Ibn 'Arabī and fully subscribed to his
doctrine of *wahdat al-wujūd*. I would like to point out that among all the
sufi orders. The *Naqshbandī* represents orthodox sunnī *sharī'ah* and has
been very closed system from religious point of view. This *Silsilah* (order)
was founded by Bahā al-Dīn Naqshband on the central Asia. The Shaykh
of this *silsīlah* had immense influence on the rulers of this region and
some of them amassed great wealth. This order is also known as sīlsīlah-e
Khwājegān. This is the only order that traces its origion to the first three
caiphes viz. Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān.

The name of 'Alī comes after them. All the other orders trace their
origion to the mystical teachings of 'Alī. But a branch of *Naqshbandī*
order known as the golden chain (*silsīlat al-thahab*), begins with 'Alī
delighting the names of three earlier Caliphs. Khwajeh Mīr Dard attaches
himself to this golden chain which comprises of the names of eleven Imams
of the prophet's family (*Ahl al-Bayt*). However, Khwajeh Baqī bi Allah
belong to the orhodox sunnī branch of the *Naqshbandī* order. His pupil,
Shaykh Ahmad Sarhandī was a more stunch sunnī opposed to all other
sects of Muslims. In some of his writings which consist of his persian
letters written to his followers he has expressed his opposition not only to
Hindus but also the Shī'ah. He was born in a town named Sarhand in
Panjab and lived in the times of Akbar the great. The greatest of the
Moghul empror of India. Akbar was very liberal in his religious outlook. In
the beginning of his carrier, being very young and immature, he came
under the influence of two sunnī *'ulamā*, shaykh Ābd al-Nabī, Sadr
al-sudūr (The chief justice) and Makhdūm al-Mulk, who represented
country priesthood and exploited religion for the sake of their own
interest, ammassed great wealth by distorting religious laws of Zakat etc.
and took recourse to all kinds of unholy means for remaining in power,
gradully Akbar came to realize how he was being cheated and abused by
such 'ulamā. The details may be found in *muntakhab al-Tawārīkh* of Mulla
Abd al-Qadir Badāyunī himself an extremely orthodox person and closely
related to the court of Akbar. Badāyunī has given a detailed account of the
misdeeds of both 'ulamā, mentioned above. He is of the view that Akbar
after being disgusted with the rule of so called religious leaders gravitated
towards shaykh Mubārak and his two sons, Faydī (The famous persian

poct) and Abū al-Faḍl, the wazīr of Akbar and the author of *Āīn-e Akbarī and Inshā-e Abu a-Faḍl*, who were known for their Shī'ī inclination and radical religious out-look. Badāyunī is of the view that it were they who persuaded Akbar to adopt a very religious attitude. But it is controversial in my view, that these three persons of high intelect and scholarship were responsibe for Akbar's invention of a new religion called *Dīn-e Ilāhī* in which he sought to combine the beliefs of different religions, particularly, bringing about reconciliation between Hinduism and Islam. Anyhow, Akbar's religious policy of tolerance and reconciliation Motivated by his desire for religious integration of Indians, was seen by orthodox 'ulamā as a threat to the very existence of Islam in India. In a later period a similar attempt by Dara Shukūb, the grand son of Akbar, was seen in the same light and resulted in his defeat at the hand of his younger brother, Awrang Zaib Ālamgīr, an orthodox muslim that had become a follower of shaykh Aḥmad Sarhandī's son Khwajeh Maṣūm. Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhandī known as Shaykh Mujaddid, supported the orthodox group of 'ulama and politician of his time and wehemently opposed Akbar's son, Jahāngir, he was imprisoned for refusing to prostrate in front of the emperor and was seen as a threat to the throne and the unity of India. During Akbar's reign he could not influence many influential courtiers and *umarā*, but he had become a vital factor in the religious thinking of those days. He criticised and opposed Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* from orthodox points of view and dubbed it as non-Islamic.

Q: Was Shaykh Aḥmad a practicing ṣūfī and did he refute Ibn 'Arabī on the basis of his spiritual experience or his argument against him was theological?

W.A: Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhandī claimed to be a ṣūfī who had spiritual experience which in his own view was of a higher stage than that of Ibn 'Arabī. He maintained that Ibn 'Arabī reached a stage of mystic journey that terminated at the vision of unity of all beings. This stage, according to him reveals that God's, nature and man are essentially one and there is no duality, no being except Divine Being. This stage is called the stage of *Jam'a al-jam'a*. Shaykh Aḥmad says that there is a higher stage where it is

witnessed that instead of unity there is duality; that is, God is separate from and over and above all His creatures. This is called muqām faqi *jama' b'ad al-jam'a* (differentiation after unity). Ibn 'Arabī never reached this stage and therefore remained stock in the vision of the unity of being. He made this assertion on the basis of his own *kashf*. He argued that no body, not even the Prophet (ṣ) could attain unity with God and remained always a man slave of God ('Abd) in this context he refers to: اشهدان محمداً عبده ورسوك . Muhammad (ṣ) is first a man and because of his being a prophet the Qur'ān addresses the prophet (ṣ) to say: انابشرمثلکم (I am a man like you). Shaykh Aḥmad infer from these assertions that man's highest stage is that of his slave to God and he has to retain his individuality separate from God. Instead of emphasising *Fanā' fī Allah* (فنا فی الله) *he emphasises baqā fī Allah,* saying that man can reach the highest stage by retaining his personality and reserving it within realm of Divine Being. He was opposed to the notion of *fanā* (annihilation of self). He criticised Ibn 'Arabī for his notion of unity (*Vaḥdah*) and *Fanā* holding him responsible for muslims decline who renounced the world taking recourse to this notion and become socio-politically inactive.

Q: Do you agree with this critique of Ibn 'Arabī?

W.A: In my view this critique is to a large extent unjustified. Firstly, *kashf* of one ṣūfī may be different from the other but it cannot serve as a criterion to judge the validity of other types of *kashf*. Secondly, logic has no place in spiritual experience. Shaykh Aḥmad's logic based on his interpretation of some Qur'ānic verses or religious utterences seems to be out of place here. Interpretation of the Qur'ān in different ways by different *Mufassirūn*s and Islamic sects has resulted in the division of muslims. Such differences may be merely linguistic, as was later shown by some ṣūfī and muslim scholars. In his zeal to refer Ibn 'Arabī, Shaykh Aḥmad made certain claims, such as that he reached a stage higher than those attained by some prophets, which were put to severe criticism by his critics.

As for his claim to have mystic experience, it may be said that he could never rise above sectarian differences. Traditionally ṣūffes have

been very liberal tolerant to other faiths and views throughtout the history contrary Shaykh Aḥmad is purely puritan and intolerant with regard to non-muslims and the Shī'a. I would like to say that in his enthusism in cleaning Islam from alien influences, he was unwittingly and probably unconciously, traped in the labyrinth of vedantic ideas. He considered the physical world a copy of the reality (ẓill), while Ibn 'Arabī regarded the word as real obviously. This is vedantic notion of the physical world. Similarly, he prescribed to his followers certain mystical practices that were prevalent among the *yogies* (Hindu mystic). His motive was more social and political in nature than being purely spiritual. I have expounded and criticised his views in detail as compared to those of Ibn 'Arabī in my thesis *Khawjah Mīr Dard: His ṣūfī doctrine and poetry*. Because of his intolerance he could not excersise any great influence on later ṣūfī literature and poetry. Ibn 'Arabī despite Shaykh Aḥmad's critique remained the major influence in the sub-continent. However, politically shaykh Aḥmad's views found champion and exponents among the later muslim thinkers who were concerned with the awakening and political revival of muslims. Shāh valī Allah, a ṣūfī theologian and a social reformer of the sub-continent in the 18th century, a disiple of the Naqshbandī-Mujadid order, champion Shaykh Aḥmad socio-political philosophy and he is supposed to be the first exponent of pan-Islamism that found in the later period advocates among thinkers like jamāl al-Dīn al-Afgānī (Asad Abādī), Iqbāl (Lahurī), Sayyed Quṭub, al-Mawdudī, etc. Iqbal in his philosophical poetry reinterpretated shaykh Aḥmad's notion of the preservation of man's personality and individuality in the form of his philosophy of *khudī* (egohood or selfhood). Thus shaykh Aḥmad's ideas have socio-political relevence in the modern context, but his ṣūfī doctrines remained obscure and unknown outside India.

Q: Was any attempt made to reconcile shaykh Aḥmad's views with the popular ṣūfī doctrines?

W.A: Among his successors Shāh Valī Allah made such an attempt. Another ṣūfī of the Naqshbandī Mujaddid order, Mirzā Mazhar jān-e jānān, designated one of his pupils Ghulām Yaḥyāh, to write a rejoinder of

Ibn 'Arabi's *wahdat e-wujūd*, but at the same time another ṣūfī poet of the same order, Khawjah Naṣir 'Andalībī wrote a large book *Nāleh-e 'Andalīb* making an attempt to reconcile *wahda al-wujūd* and *wahdat al-shuhūd*. He also founded a new *maslak* that he called *Ṭarīq-e Muhammadī*, the path of the prophet Muhammad (ṣ). His son, Khawajah Mīr Dard, one of the great Indian poets of persian-urdu tradition and a ṣūfī of eminence, in his magnum opus *'Ilm al-kitāb*, narrates that one day when he was sitting in front of the room of his father, its door was closed and remained closed for seven days. When after the lapse of a week the door was opened, Khāwajah Nāsir came out and told him that he was visited by the spirit of al-Imām al-Ḥasan (ibn 'Alī ibn Abū Ṭālib) that told him to give up all the terms and practices of ṣūfīs which were not prevalent in the days of the prophet (ṣ) and taught him the spiritual path of the prophet (ṣ) himself, and also advised him to name it *Tariq-e Muhammadī* in order, to be distinguished from other ṣūfī doctrines. Naṣir 'Andalīb and Dard made a thorough analysis of the terms used in *wahdat al-wujūd* and *wahda al-shuhūd* inferring that the difference between the two doctrines was linguistic and not doctrinal. This was also an attempt at the reconciliation of the ṣūfī doctrines of Ibn 'Arabī and Shaykh Ahmad. What the former termed *fana*, the latter called *baqa*. Since both had as their substratum in Divine Existence. Similarly *jama' al-jama'* and *Farq bad al-jama'* denoted the same reality of being. Unfortunately these studies and works remained unknown outside the Indian sub-continent. Recently a book was published by Annemarie Schimmel entitled *Pain and Ecstasy*, in English, dealing with these developments in Indian ṣūfīsm. My own work, being in urdu, was not and is not accessible to readers outside the urdu knowing world and I could not find time to render it in English. Prof. Schimmel has refered to my work in her books *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* and *pain and Ecstasy*. The need of the time is that Muslim scholars of various parts of the world should know the thinkers and writers of different regions. During the last one and a half centuries a wide gulf has been created among Muslim scholars living in different countries. Unless this gap is filled and bridged one cannot hope to have a comprehensive and complete picture of the intellectual development in the Muslim world. For example as Iranians and Arabs are unacquainted with the names and works

of Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhandī, Shah Valī Allah, Khawajah Mīr Dard etc.
Muslims of the sub-continent are largely ignorant of post-Ibn Rushd
philosophy in Iran and particularly of the contribution of even great
thinkers like Mullā Ṣadrā and Sabzawarī. Our ignorance of our own
thinkers and great men is mainly responsible for the general intellectual
stagnation in the Muslim world.

Q: Is it so that in India Muslim scholars are totally unawre of the recent
intellectual development in Iran?

W.A: In India presently there is only one university where Muslim
philosophy is taught. Earlier it was taught in some other universities also.
But unfortunately Muslims there are not showing any interest in Islamic
thought. Non-Muslims because of lack of teaching of Muslim philosophy
are totally ignorant of recent development in Muslim thought, that is why
people do not study Mullā Ṣadrā or Sabzawārī. Iqbal wrote a few pages
about Sabzawārī's philosophy of existence in *Development of metaphysics
in Persia.* He has just mentioned the name of Mullā Ṣadrā in his works
without elaborating his philosophy of time and particularlly his doctrine of
Harakat al-jowharyyah. Recently I have introduced in the paper of Muslim
philosophy at Aligarh philosophical ideas of Mullā Ṣadrā and Sabzawārī.
But we lack reading material in English for our Students. I myself wrote an
article in detail on "Sabzawārī's analysis of being" in English, but it failed
to reach many scholars of philosophy in India. It is for the Iranians to
introduce Iranian thinkers to the outside world. In this respect there is
much scope for cooperation between India, Pakistan and Iran. Just before
the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, intellectual circules in our
country came to know about Imam Khomaini and 'Alī Sharī'atī.
Sharī'atī's books were in wide circulation among university students.
Sometime later Muṭahharī's works also came to be known through Urdu
and English translations. My wife Mahliqa Qarā'ī translated *jamia' wa
tārikh* of Muṭahhari into English under the title *Society and History.*
Besides a number of articles by Muslim thinkers. She translated first
twelve traditions of the prophet from Imām Khomaynī's *chehel Hadith* into
English and urdu. Now due to the great emotional and ideological impact

of Islamic Revolution of Iran not only Muslims but also non-Muslims are acquinted with the works of the intellectual leaders of contemporary Iran. In this context I would like to mention specially the impact of Imam Khomaini, who as the leader of the Islamic Revolution influenced the people all over the world and in a way revived Islamic thought. It may be mentioned that in the last century many Muslim thinkers sought to reconstruct Islamic thought, but none of them could translate it into practise and reality. Imam Khomeini had his roots in the Shí'í tradition of the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayin, through which he could directly influence and mobilize the Muslim masses against the exploitive monarchy and the imperialism of the west and the East. Thus he succeeded in the general awakening of Muslims. It is important that the appeal of his thought is not continued to the Shi'ah only. Other sects of Muslims were equally attracted to his message of revolution. In India the suppressed classes of Hindu society, known as *Dalits* were also influenced by him and admired his policys of true non-alienment (لااشرقی و لاغربی). He made the people to realise that fighting against tyranny and exploitation was the formost duty of all the Muslims, and the Shí'ah did not have to wait for the appearance of the Twelft Imam for this purpose; secondly he advocated for the Unity of the Muslims irrespective of their sectarian tenents of faith. In this respect he held that both the Sunni and the Shí'ah should forget their differences by ignoring controversial issues and unite against the imperialism and zionism. He also introduced the concept of *vilāyat-e faqíh*, his most important *ijtihād*, and implimented it successfully by establishing the supremacy of Islamic law in the areas of legislation, judiciary and executive through the elected body of *fuqahāh* (jurisconsult) or a *marja'*. By issuing his religious decree against blesphemous writings of Salman Rushdi, he showed an unparralleled covrage of conviction that influenced even those Muslims who were not sympathetic towards his political ideology.

Q: Is in your view the impact of Imam Khomeni confined to legalistic aspect of Islam only or did his interest in philosophy, particularly *Irfān* attract people towards Islam? If so, how did he reconciled fiqh, rational philosophy, 'Irfān and politics? Has there being any tradition in Shí'a

Islam of revolutionary Sufism?

W.A: I think that one of the distinguishing feature of Imām Khomainī was his successful attempt of reconciling rationality with spirituality and politics with profound moral sensibility. His was a prophetic vision in which subjectivity and objectivity, worldliness with other worldliness, and concern for present with anticipation of the future where all combine together. He had a comprehensive understanding of the history of the past and could anticipate the course of future. His study of philosophy and religious sciences enable him to solve socio-political and enconomic problems of the Muslim society. But what strengthen his appeal was his unique mystic experience. Apart from being a practising suñ, he was a specialist in the doctrinal aspect of 'Irfān. Most of his writings reveal his expertise in mystic literature. I may refer here to his letter to Gorbachove in which he particularly recomended him to study works of 'Irfān in order to understand the nature and spirit of Islam. In my view, had he not combined scholorship with inner experience, he would not have succeded to attract millions of masses who unquestionally excepted him as their spiritual leader. According to the tradition of Shī'ah Islam, the Imām combines spiritual and wordly power and he is embodiment of the Divine world and human action. Imām Khomainī being a staunch Shī'ah always kept this ideal of leadership in his side. It is said that sufism or 'Irfān represents the essence of ethical teachings of Islam. It is moral philosophy based upon subjective existential experience. I think that Imām Khomaini's main concern was moral. He saw social, political, economic, cultural, and religious problems from moral points of view. He was opposed to the monarchy in Iran and the exploitative nature of imperialism of the east and the west because he considered these to be immoral. What is immoral is unislamic as well. Here I would like to point out that the Shī'a line of sufism has been more revolutionary from socio-political view point than the sunnī tradition of sufism. The Shī'a 'urafā retained throughout the spirit of early sufis who were opposed to the tyranny and injustice of Banu Umayyah and later rulers of the Islamic world. Sufis in general kept themselves away from the courts and declined to accept anything from the members of the privileged class. They shared

the suffering and deprivation of the common people and worked tirelessly for their moral and social uplift. In the course of time at the time of the establishment of rijid system of sufi orders and *khaniqas*, Sufism gradully lost its rebelious spirit and sufis indulged in trivial and prepheral controversial issues related to doctrines borrowed from non-Islamic sources. But on the contrary shi'ah 'urafā took keen interest in the socio-economics of the people and fought with them for their rights and for the establishment of a just social order. In this respect one may refer to the *sarbidārān, the Ḥurufiyyah, the Nuqtaviyyah, the Safavis, Nimatullahis, the Nūrbakhshiyyah, the Kuroveyyah,* and *the Bektashis* orders of *'Irfān. The Sarbadārans* and the *safaviyyah* established political states based upon Islamic ideals of justice. It is another matter that in the course of time deterioration set in among them due to the corruption of true spirit of 'Irfān. In the sub-continent, there is a general misunderstanding regarding sufism and 'Irfān. The Shī'a in this part of the world wrongly believe that *Taṣawwuf* is opposed to Shī'ah beliefs. The root cause of this misunderstanding lies in the fact that Mawlanā Dildār 'Alī Ghufran Maāb visited Iraq and Iran at the time when the 'ulama attached to the ṣafavi court were engaged in opposing and supressing sufisim. He was influenced by this trend which was essentially politically motivated. The safavis had come to power with the help of the huge armies of their followers. They made use of their spiritual leadership for attaining worldly power. When they saw the other sufi orders such as the Nimatullāhis growing followers and popularity among the people, they saw it as a thread to their throne and therefore suppressed those orders. The Nimatullahis were banished from Iran and the Shaykhs of this *silsilah* (ṣūfī order) had to flee Iran and take refuge in the states of southern Shī'a states of India. It was during this period that the Shī'a were thought to believe in the opposition of 'Irfan to shī'a creed. This was a false notion. In Iran during the Qajār period ṣūfīs and 'urafā required some of their lost hold over the people. The shī'a 'ulama of Iran and Iraq had been not only studing but also practising 'irfān till the time of Imām Khomani. But most of them remained indifferent to social and political problems. Imām Khominī re-established the link between the worldliness and other worldliness. He made use of his mystic insight and experince for his ideological preachings

and succeeded in gaining followers among the masses. It may be said that the Imams of the prophet's family believed in mystic experince (کشف) and were considered to be the spiritual guides of ṣufīs and 'urafā. Imām Khomenī was fully aware of this tradition. Probably he was aware of the capacity of Taṣawwūf and 'Irfān as a cementic force for unite various sects of muslims. I also subscribe to this view and I believe that it is only 'Irfān of this tradition which can bring about unity among Muslims and the spiritual brotherhood of all mankind. This is one of the very important contribution of the Imām Khomeinī to the world's civilization.

In Memory of Grand Ayatullah Gulpaygani

Grand Āyatullāh Seyed Muhammad Reḍā Gulpāygānī departed for his heavenly abode on Thursday night, 9th of December at the age of 96. He suffered from acute respiratory deficiency and lung infection for which he was confined at hospital.

The Āyatullāh who was the supreme religious authority of the Shī'a world, became terminally ill immediately after midnight Tuesday and was rushed to the Cardiac Care Unit of the hospital but his condition continued to deteriorate despite the extra care and attention of his doctors.

The grand Āyatullāh went into a coma in the wee hours of Wednesday morning and eventually left the mortal world minutes before evening prayers Thursday.

He saw the light of day in the village of Koukeh near the city of Gulpāygan (135 kms northeast of Isfahān) in the closing years of the 19th century and at the age of 20 went to Arāk which was the Center of the Theological studies. There, he received his education under Āyatullāh Abdul Karīm Hāerī. Later in 1921 he went to the Shrine city of Qum to complete his studies.

In the early 1960s following the death of Grand Ayatullah Boroujerdi and during the banishment Ayatullah Imam Khumayni from Iran, he became superintendent of the Qum Theological Seminary. He took over the administration of the school at a crucial time when both the theological school and Islamic scholars were in at staeke due to represive

measures directed by Shah. At that time he had about 800 students who attended his classes and received advanced training in religious studies.

Ayatullah Gulpaygani is the author of a number of scholarly works and treatises as well as commentaries on various other works of scholastically abstruse character. Among them is an annotation on the *'Al-Urwat-ul-Wuthqa'*, *'Tawzih-al-Masa'il'* the *'Manasik-e Hajj'* and so on.

He rendered valuable services during his superintendence of the Theological Seminary in Qum, and also helped establish almost 30 theological schools in various towns and cities throughout Iran, as well as health clinics for students and other types of public utility centers in many parts of the country and abroad as well.

Ayatullah Gulpaygani was a great scholar and a *'Marj'a'* and he had many followers throughout the world. He subscribed to the concept of *'Willayat-e-Faqhih'* put forwarded by Imam Khumayni.

The Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatullah Seyed Ali Khamenei expressed deep condolence over the sad demise of the Grand Ayatullah Muhammad Reda Gulpaygani.

He was one of the pillars of the Islamic Revolution and The Islamic Republic, said the leader in a statement.

During the oppressive rule of the former regime and in confronting the bitter incidents which occurred in the years after the banishment from Iran of Imam Khumayni (1963), there was some occasions when the voice of this great personality was the only threatening voice against the former regime, which raised from the Qum theological seminary and gave enthusiasm to the Islamic movement, the statement said.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, he had an active contribution in managing the general affairs of the revolution, said the statement adding that he unequivocally supported the Islamic Republic system and its exalted leadership. He was respected and honoured by the late Imam Khumayni.

The departure of this divine scholar was a grave and irreparable loss, the statement added.

The statement also said that the grand Ayatullah was *Marja'-e Taqlid* for 32 years, and a teacher at the Qum theological seminary for about 72 years while keeping on learning and teaching *Fiqh* (Jurisprudence) for

about 85 years.

He was the first person to establish modern theological seminary and the first great institute for Qur'ānic studies in Qum. He was the first person to prepare a table of contents of *Fiqh* and *Ḥadīth* (Tradition) by using modern technology and knowledge, the statement said.

He founded hundreds of schools, mosques and Islamic propagation centers in Iran and other countries and brought up thousands of disciples, said the statement.

International Congress on the Occasion of the Bicentennial Anniversary of Sabzawari's Birth: A Report

Dr. A. N. Bāqirshāhī

The ninteenth century has witnessed the emergence of a great mystic-philosopher in Iran whose contribution to Islamic philosophy is remarkable. With a view to exploring the contribution of this great philosopher to Islamic learning in the fields of philosophy, logic, mysticism and literature, an international congress was held on the occasion of the bicentenary anniversary of Sabzawārī's birth. This congress was held under the auspices of Sabzawær Teachers' Training University with the collaboration of the Academy of Islamic Philosophy of Iran and was attended by four hundred delegates from different countries, viz. Germany, India, Pakistan, U.S.A., Norway, Canada, Lebanon, and Iran. This congress was held at the campus of the Teachers' Training University of Sabzawār for three days. Out of 140 articles 30 articles were selected for presentation at the congress. Papers were scholarly and relevant to the theme of the seminar. The following list gives a general view of the themes that were discussed:

1. The state of Islamic philosophy in Sabzawārī's time.
2. Sabzawārī's own views on philosophy.
3. Western Existentialism and Sabzawārī's view of being.
4. Sabzawārī's life, works and teachers.
5. Theoretical and practical mysticism and Sabzawārī.
6. Influence of other philosophers on Sabzawārī.
7. Illuminative and peripatetic element in Sabzawārī's philosophy.

8. The Distinctive features of Sabzawārī's philosophy in general and the *Manzūmah* in particular.

9. Sabzawārī and mystical literature and poetry.

10. Critical approach to Sabzawārī's philosophy.

11. Sabzawārī and the transmitted sciences.

12. Sabzawārī's fiqhī views.

13. Socio-religious and intellectual atmosphere of Sabzawār in Sabzawārī's time.

14. *Manzūmah* (versified philosophical works) before Sabzawārī.

15. Orientalist works on Sabzawārī.

16. Sabzawārī's students.

17. Sabzawārī and the *Mathnavī* of Rūmī.

18. The Qur'ānic verses and *Hadīth* in Sabzawārī's works.

19. Sabzawārī and logic.

20. Sabzawārī and kalām.

The following books were released on the occasion of the congress:

1. *Sharh-e Du'ā-e ṣabāh* by Sabzawārī, edited by Dr. Najaf Qulī Habībī.

2. *Sharh-e Du'ā-e jawshan kabīr* by Sabzawārī, edited by Dr. Najaf Qulī Habībī.

3. *Sabzawārī's life and works* by Ghulām Husayn Ridānezhād.

4. *Sabzawār*, by Muḥammad Bayhaqī.

5. *Sharh al-Manzūmah* in four volumes by Āyatullāh Hasanzādeh Āmulī.

6. *A Selection of Sabzawārī's poems* by Husayn Shīnawā'ī.

What follows is the Sabzawārī's life and work extracted from professor Waheed Akhtar's article on Sabzawārī's Analysis of Being, presented in the congress.

SABZAWĀRĪ'S LIFE AND WORKS:

According to Mīrzā Sayyid Hasan, son-in-law of Sabzawārī, Sabzawārī was born in 1212 A.H. in Sabzawār and died in 1289 A.H. His

father was a merchant, but he was himself interested in the pursuit of knowledge. He started his studies at the age of seven or eight, with Arabic grammar. His father died when he was about ten years old. Whereafter his cousin al-Ḥājj Mullā Ḥusayn Sabzawārī took over his education. Mullā Ḥusayn always proclaimed the necessity of logical reasoning. After ten years of intensive training under Mullā Ḥusayn Sabzawārī went to Iṣfahān, where he studied for five years the philosophy of the illuminationist school under the guidance of Ākhund Mullā Ismā'īl Iṣfahānī. After his death he studied for a period of two to three years with Ākhund Mullā 'Alī Nūrī. Earlier he had also studied with Āqā Muḥammad 'Alī, famous as al-Najafī. He devoted another five years to the study of *fiqh* and *tafsīr*. For the following two years he remained in the Holy City where he had gone to perform the *ḥajj*. After returning from his pilgrimage he took up the job of teaching, of course, without any remuneration. Soon his fame as a scholarly and pious man reached the highest places in the country, and attracted the attention of the king and his ministers, who reportedly visited his humble dwelling with the utmost regard, and recorded their reminiscences later on. Mullā Sabzawārī was an authority on the traditional religious sciences as well as logic and philosophy, particularly Suhrawardī, Ṣadrā and other *al-ḥikmah* exponents.

Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī wrote and compiled twelve books and eight tracts (*rasā'il*).

1. *Sharḥ-e manẓūmah-ye ḥikmat*: His major work consists of the two volumes of *Sharḥ-e manẓūmah*: the first part is a treatise on *al-ḥikmah*, and the second part is a treatise on *manṭiq*, i.e., logic. *Sharḥ-e manẓūmah-ye ḥikmat* is a commentary on Sabzawārī's own philosophical poem *Ghurar al-farā'id*, a systematic exposition of his views on general principles, physics, theology, and epistemology. This book is delvided into seven parts and is the most popular textbook taught in Iran's madrasahs. The seven major themes of the book are as follows:

1. *First Part*: On General Principles
2. *Second Part*: On Substance and Accidents
3. *Third Part*: On the Special Idea of Theology
4. *Fourth Part*: On Natural Phenomena

5. *Fifth Part*: On Prophecy and Prophetic Dreams

6. *Sixth Part*: On Resurrection

7. *Seventh Part*: On Selected Principles of Ethics

The first two parts have been usually translated and commented upon by the later scholars. These two parts comprise Sabzawārī's ontology. I, therefore, give somewhat detailed index of the issues discussed in them.

FIRST PART

1. First Gem: Existence and Non-Existence

2. Second Gem: Necessity and Possibility

3. Third Gem: Eternity and Becoming (coming -into-being)

4. Fourth Gem: Actuality and Potentiality

5. Fifth Gem: Quiddity and its Properties

6. Sixth Gem: Unity and Multiplicity

7. Seventh Gem: Cause and Caused

SECOND PART

1. First Gem: The Descriptive Definition of 'Substance' and a Discourse on its Divisions

2. Second Gem: The Descriptive Definition of 'Accident' and a Discourse on its Divisions

3. Third Gem: The Divisions of Accidents

There are fifty-nine sub-headings under the major headings, which show the depth and width of the analysis undertaken.

Sharh-e manzūmah-ye ḥikmat deals with the problems of existence and accidents (first two parts), the Divine Existence (third part), physics (fourth part), prophecy and prophetic dreams (fifth part), *al-ma'ād* or the Day of Judgement (sixth part), and morality (seventh part).

2. *Sharh-e manzūmah-ye manṭiq*: This is the second volume of *Sharh-e manzūmah*, which deals with the problems of logic. This is a commentary by Sabzawārī on his own poem *al-La'ālī' al-muntazamah*, which is a

treatment of the sixfold objects of logic.

This volume needs to be carefully studied and evaluated from modern point of view. It may be helpful to understand how the tool of logic was sharpened and used for conceptual clarification by a Muslim philosopher who represents the culmination of logical reasoning in Muslim philosophy.

Sabzawari's other books are as follows:

3. *Asrar al-hikam*: a treatise on *al-Mabda'* and *al-Ma'ad*, a comparison of the views of the peripatetic and the emanationist philosophers with those of the Sufis.

4. *Sharh-e ba'dī ash'ar-e mughlaqeh-ye mathnawī*: a commentary on some difficult verses of Rumi's Mathnawī.

5. *Dīwan-e asrar*: a collection of Sabzawari's own verses.

6. *Hawashī bar al-shawahid al-rububiyyah*: a commentary on Mulla Sadra's book of the same title. The book deals with some delicate points of the Sufi doctrines and practices.

7. *Hawashī bar asfar*, Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī.

8. *Hawashī bar mafatih al-ghayb*, Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī.

9. *Hawashī bar mabda' wa ma'ad*, Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī.

10. *Sharh-e al-Nibras ft asrar al-'asas*: a commentary on the pattern of the *Sharh-e manzūmah*, dealing with the principles of orthodoxy and jurisprudence from philosophical and mystic point of view.

11. *Sharh al-'asma'*: an explanation of a popular *du'a'* called "*Jawshan-e Kabīr*".

12. *Miftah ul-falah wa misbah al-najah*: on a *du'a'* called "*Du'aye Sabah.*"

Apart from these works Sabzawari wrote eight tracts or *rasa'īl* in answer to various questions put to him.

Mahdī Muhaqqiq, in his introduction to *Ghurar al-fara'id*, states that it is generally believed that Muslim philosophy came to an end with Ibn Rushd and a vacuum was created in the Muslim world of learning. He quotes Sabzawari himself with regard to the unacceptability of philosophy among the Muslims: "Philosophy is like a ruler whose people have revolted against him, not realizing that their good lies in seeking its support and taking refuge in it. It is a science which holds a special place in the domain of the knowledge of God and is lord of all the sciences."

He laments the indifference of the Muslims towards philosophers like Mīr Damād and Sabzawārī, who are the most significant thinkers of the later period of Muslim philosophy. Iqbāl, in his doctoral dissertation on the development of metaphysics in Persia, gives an important place to Sabzawārī and has devoted major part of the chapter on recent developments in Iranian philosophy to the exposition of his philosophy.

Iqbāl holds that when the Muslims became aware of the futility of New-Platonic philosophy, and had access to the works of Plato and Aristotle, the Arabs turned to Aristotle and the Iranians to Plato. He, however, does not agree with Lewes that the Arabs were unable to appreciate Plato's thought. Iqbāl holds that if the Arabs had access to Plato's works in the early period, they would have even then rejected Platonism, for it was incompatible with their temperament. In Iran, the shift from Neo-Platonism to Platonism gave birth to a system of thought that culminated in Sabzawārī's philosophy. The salient feature of this tradition is its absorption in religion. This always happens if people are cut off from sciences. The periods of crisis turn thinkers' attention from the external world to the internal reality through concentration upon God. What Iqbāl says is applicable to the mystic philosophy also. In a sense the later Iranian philosophy is predominantly mystical in nature.

Sabzawārī, in his epistemology, distinguishes between two types of reason; theoretical and practical. In order to understand the nature of reality one has to analyze the phenomena. This understanding indicates three types of existence, viz., being or light, appearance or shadow, and non-being or darkness. According to Sabzawārī, being is the absolute good. It is self-evident. The potential being, before coming into existence, has equal possibility of being existent or non-existent. He argues that a being that brings the potential into actuality can never be non-being. He further argues that non-being cannot act upon non-being. Sabzawārī, at this stage, turns against Plato and tends to agree with Aristotle that reality is the source of both permanence and change. Here, he takes recourse in the mystical terminology and says that it is love which controls the course of evolution. Here again he banks upon Aristotle and advances the cosmological argument to prove the existence of the Prime Mover i.e. God. Sabzawārī, a staunch believer in the Unity of God, believes in the plurality

of things. This again Aristotelian position. It is also possible to derive pluralism from Platonic philosophy. But Plato does not accept the physical objects as real, while Sabzawārī regards them as real. He believes in a specific type of pantheism, the doctrine of the Unity of Being. The Being is real, and consequently all the phenomenal expressions of Being are real. *Sharh-e manzūmah* deals with this problem in detail.

The following are the gist of other papers presented in the congress:

A Critical Study of Sabzawārī's Views on the Compatibility of Reason and Revelation

By: M. Muhaqqiq Dāmād
Department of Law, Tehran University.

The main thrust of this paper is to shed light on Sabzawārī's view on value-judgement propositions and to contrast it with the views of his critics. According to the author, Sabzawārī has put forward a new theory regarding the essential relation between reason and revelation. However, some scholars of *usūl-e fiqh* (jurisprudence), such as Muhaqqiq Khurāsānī, criticized Sabzawārī's approach. In his book *Fawā'id al-'usūl,* Muhaqqiq Khurāsānī has devoted one chapter to this issue. Later on Muhammad Husayn Isfahānī, one of the pupils of Khurāsānī took it up and dealt with it thoroughly.

There is a controversy over the nature of such propositions as: "Justice is good," or "Justice is bad." The question is whether these propositions are among *awwaliyyāt* (self-evident propositions) or *mushāhadāt* (commonly-accepted propositions).

In his commentary on *Du'ā jawshan kabīr,* Sabzawārī sheds a new light on this issue. He is of the view that such propositions are necessary and self-evident, as he says: "The necessity of such propositions is self-evident." These judgements of theoretical reason are based on the exigencies of practical reason, which takes into consideration the common benefit or harm of a community....This is why such propositions are commonly accepted; so, there is no room for contradiction. They are also

self-evident from two different points of view.

The essence of Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī's criticism of Sabzawārī's approach is related to the role and function of reason.

According to Iṣfahānī, the function of reason is merely intellection, and propositions derived from revelation, such as those relating to *ba'th* (resurrection) and *zajr* (prohibition), are excluded from the domain of reason.

To sum up, Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī concludes that value-judgement propositions are neither self-evident nor demonstrable.

In this paper, the views of Ibn Sīnā, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, 'Allamah Quṭb al-Dīn are touched upon as well.

The Doctrine of "The Mental Existence" and the Theory of Knowledge

By: Dr. Gh. 'A. Ḥaddād 'Ādil
Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Literature and Humanities
Tehran University.

The doctrine of mental existence has epistemic relevance and deals with the theory of knowledge. In his *Manẓūmah*, Sabzāwarī has devoted one chapter to this issue. The relevance of this doctrine to the theory of knowledge is due to the fact that the mental existence of a thing is considered to be distinct from its external existence. Referring to the post-Kantian empiricist approach to the theory of knowledge in the West, the author is of the view that there is no such distinction between external and mental existence in Western thought, as a result of which the problem of knowledge has found no satisfactory answer, and as a result knowledge has been deprived of its creative nature. In this article, the author has elaborated this approach with special reference to Sabzawārī's contribution to the doctrine of mental existence. According to the author, the problem of knowledge is not resolvable without the recognition of gradation or heirarchy in the realm of existence. This philosophical notion is one of the most distinctive features of Islamic philosophy. Dr. Ḥaddād 'Ādil maintains that Sabzawārī's doctrine of mental existence can be

better understood when studied in contrast with modern Western perspectives.

Phenomenology in Islamic Philosophy (Mulla Sadra) and Western Philosophical Thought

By: Dr. Mahdi Dehbashi
Department of Philosophy
Isfahan University, Isfahan

One of the most debated problems in the history of philosophy is the problem of the relation between mind and the external world.

This problem is not a new one and is as old as philosophy itself. Philosophers from Plato to Kant, and recently phenomenologists and existentialists in the West, have attempted to overcome this dichotomy, but there has hardly been a thinker in the West to satisfactorily tackle this problem.

Husserl, who is the exponent of the phenomenological movement in the West, set out to find some solution but ultimately relapsed in idealism. He failed to establish a reciprocal relation between these two realms, that is, the mind and the external word.

In the East, Mulla Sadra and Sabzawari succeeded in overcoming this problem.

Mulla Sadra is the founder of a philosophy according to which *wujud* (being) is fundamental reality and *mahiyyah* (quiddity) is derived from and dependent on being. His philosophy is known as *al-Hikmat al-muta'alihyah. Al-Hikmah* is an attempt to synthesize myticism and peripatetic philosophy on the basis laid down by Suhrawardi and Ibn Sina. Mulla Sadra's philosophy is the culmination of the Hikmah philosophy. This philosophy has produced a galaxy of outstanding thinkers. Sabzawari is one of them and he represents Islamic philosophy in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, he differs with Mulla Sadra regarding some important issues.

As far as the relation of subject and object is concerned, Mulla Sadra's philosophy considers quiddities as relational, as a bridge between

two realms. Mulla Ṣadrā maintains that the object of knowledge in the real sense is the object known by essence not object known by accident, that is, the thing as existing in the external world. He also holds that the object known by essence is united with the knower.

Aṣālat al-Wujūd (Fundamental Reality of Existence) and Aṣālat al-Māhiyyah (Fundamental Reality of Quiddity) in Islamic Philosophy: A New Approach

By: Dr. Ahmad Ahmadī
Department of Philosophy
Tehran University.

The main thrust of this article is to demonstrate that the dispute between the exponents of the two approaches in Islamic philosophy, viz. aṣālat al-wujūd and aṣālat al-māhiyyah arises out of a confusion between epistemology and ontology. In elaborating this point, Dr. Ahmadī explains three meanings of the term māhiyyah (quiddity) and two meanings of the term wujūd (being).

He is of the view that the second meaning of being and quiddity is identical. Hence one party calls it wujūd and the other brands it māhiyyah. So when the exponents of aṣālat al-wujūd remark that essence has no extra-mental reality, they have the first meaning in their mind and when the upholders of aṣālat al-māhiyyah consider being as a mental abstraction, they have the first sense of existence in their mind. In his article, the author, while pointing to the logical aspect of the matter, deals with a special kind of predication, that is, kāna-i tāmmah and sālibah muḥaṣṣilah, which constitute the origin of this dispute. The role of wujūd-e dhihnī (mental existence) is touched upon as well.

The Problem of Universals: From Porphyry to Sabzawārī

By: Dr. S. Yaḥya Yathrabī
Department of Philosophy

Tabriz University, Tabriz

The problem of the universals was a burning issue in medieval philosophy. Philosophers such as Anselm, Roscellinus, and Abelard viewed this problem from different angles. Each of them attempted to substantiate his views and repudiate his opponents.

The author of the article is of the view that the lack of a proper examination of the issue has given rise to this problem (i.e. of the universals). Accordingly, every school should be studied in terms of its own principles and fundamentals. For instance, if we consider the universal in its philosophical sense, then philosophical principles should be applied. If we take the universal in its mystical and Neo-Platonistic or even its Platonic sense then the universal would be a genus and concrete reality and particulars would be its manifestations.

The author points to the following points to be kept in mind:

1. The notion of the universal should be considered as one related to the domain of philosophy and mysticism rather than to that of logic. However, there is enough controversy over this issue between philosophers and mystics as well.

2. The two different concepts of the universal in the peripatetic and Neo-Platonic views should be taken into consideration separately. According to peripatetic philosophers the universal is a mental and abstract concept; therefore, it does not have any external existence and is merely a mental abstraction. Hence, only individuals and particulars have external existence. But, for mystics and Neo-Platonic philosophers, a universal possesses an extended and comprehensive existence. Accordingly, only the universal has real and actual existence, whereas individuals and particulars have merely a phenomenal existence and are considered manifestations of the universal.

3. It is necessary to be familiar with the methods applied in substantiating their views by the either group. That is, the universal in peripatetic philosophy is understood with the intellect and mind. But In Neo-Platonism, it is apprehended only by inspiration and intuition. According to this view, if we consider universal existence as a matter of intellection, then, it cannot cover the *shaṬḥiyyāt* (ecstatic utterances), for

what they signify is neither conceivable nor rationally affirmable.

Ḥudāth-e ismī (Nominal Creation)

By: Muḥsin Gharavīyān

Philosophers and scholars of kalām have disagreed regarding the coming into being of the universe. With his revolutionary ideas in Islamic philosophy Mullā Ṣadrā viewed the matter from a different angle. Sabzawārī put forward his doctrine of ḥudūth-e ismī, which is different from that of Mullā Ṣadrā. Though some scholars, such as Mahdī Āshtiyānī, are of the view that this innovation (i.e. Sabzawārī's notion of ḥudūth-e ismī) is only in regard to the coining of the term; otherwise its content and meaning is traceable in the works of Muslim sages, particularly mystics.

The main thrust of this article is to prove that Sabzawārī is not merely a commentator of Mullā Ṣadrā but that he has developed his own views as well, one of these relating to ḥudūth-e ismī. Sabzāwārī says that he has borrowed the term from the Qur'ān and ḥadīth.

Philosophers earlier to Sabzawārī believed in ḥudūth-e dahrī, ḥudūth-e ṭab'ī, and ḥudūth-e dhātī. In ḥudūth-e ismī, that which is posterior is quiddity. But according to the notions of ḥudūth-e dahrī and ḥudūth-e ṭab'ī that which is posterior is being, not quiddity.

The Elements of Illuminationist Philosophy in Sabzawārī's Works

By Dr. S. Ja'far Sajjādī

Ḥikmat al-'ishrāq (illuminationist philosophy) is defined as the philosophy of the orient (al-ḥikmat al-mashriqiyyah). The author holds that Suhrawardī is the reviver of the traditional heritage of the ancient sages. He makes a distinction between dhawqī (intuitive) and baḥthī (discursive) philosophy. The quintessence of his philosophy is kashf (intuition), rather than istidlāl (demonstration). He respects Aristotle but considers prepatetic philosophy responsible for decline in Greek

philosophy. For him, a true sage is he who masters both the intuitive as well as the rationalist vision. Such a sage would be the vicegerent of God (*khalīfah*) on the earth, and the *quṭb* (spiritual pole) of his time.

In his paper, Dr. Sajjadī writes that Suhrawardī has borrowed much of his terminology of light, such as *kiyān khurrah, farrah Īzadī*, and so on from the ancient Persian sages. According to Suhrawārdī the pith of *Khusrawānī* wisdom has manifested itself in his Ishrāqī wisdom. The philosophy of illuminationism has influenced the post-Ibn Rushd philosophers such as Shahrzūrī, Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Dawwānī, Dashtakī as well as Ṭūsī.

Needless to say that Mullā Ṣadrā also has incorporated illuminationist ideas in his trancendental philosophy. The philosophy of being of Mullā Ṣadrā was undoubtedly inspired by the philosophy of light of Suhrawardī, 'light' being interpreted by Mullā Ṣadrā as existence.

Through Mullā Ṣadrā, Sabzawārī was influenced by the philosophy of illumination. This influence is evident in Sabzawārī's the solution of the following problems: (1) the gradation of being, (2) the problem of mental existence, (3) the problem of Divine Knowledge and its relationship to beings, (4) the order of creation, (5) the problem of vision and so on and so forth.

The Issue of *J'al* (Making) in
Sabzawārī's Philosophy

By: S. Raḍī Shīrāzī

The theme of this article is to deal with the question as to what is the first and primary thing brought into being by the Maker (i.e. God), whether it is *wujūd* (being) or *māhiyyah* (quiddity).

It is to be pointed out that the issue of *j'al* is different from the issue of the principality of being or quiddity; for these are two separate issues, and one may be an upholder of *aṣālat al-wujūd* (principality of being) but deny the *maj'ūliyyah* (the being made) of being.

In order to tackle with the problem of *j'al*, Sabzawārī has divided being into two kinds: copulative and non-copulative being. Similarly, *j'al*

also has been divided into two kinds: simple and composite. Simple *j'al* is mere making of a thing, whereas composite *j'al* apart from making a thing, makes its quality as well.

Regarding the question, What is the *maj'al* (the made), or, to put it in other words, What is the object of *j'al*? there are three possibilities: (1) being, (2) quiddity, (3) qualification. The author of this article, who is an eminent authority in Islamic philosophy in general and Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy in particular, has discussed this issue in detail.

Three *Manzūmahs* (Versified Compositions in Philosophy): A Comparison

By: Dr. N. Ḥabībī
Department of Philosophy
The College of Theology
Tehran University

In his paper, Dr. Ḥabībī has contrasted three versified works in philosophy which are as follows:

(1) *Ghurar al-farā'id,* by Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (1212-1289 H.)

(2) *Fayḍ al-Bārī,* by Sayyid Hibat al-Dīn Ḥusaynī Shahristānī (1301-1386 H.)

(3) *Tuhfat al-ḥakīm,* by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Gharawī Iṣfahānī (1296-13061 H.)

The author of this paper has chosen these three works because there is chronologically an interesting relation between these three versified compositions in philosophy. That is, after the publication of *Ghurar al-farā'id,* Shahristānī made an attempt to write his own *Manzūmah Fayḍ al-Bārī.* Afterwards, M. H. Gharawī Iṣfahānī wrote his *Tuhfat al-ḥakīm,* with a view to replacing the *Manzūmah* of Sabzawārī, a desire which was never fulfilled.

Sharḥ-e Asmā-e Ḥusnā
(Commentary on the Divine Names)

by *Dr. 'Alī Shaykh al-'Islāmī*
Department of Philosophy
Tehran University

Sharḥ-e Asmā-e Ḥusnā is the name of a book by Sabzawārī dealing with the Divine Names. The author, Dr. Shaykh al-'Islāmī, elucidates the mystical aspect of Sabzawārī and his contribution to the field of *'irfān*. He divides Sabzawārī's works into three categories: (1) Textbooks like *Sharḥ-e Manẓūmah;* (2) specialized texts on particular subjects, like his commentary on the *Mathnawī* of Rūmī; (3) collection of commentaries such as *Sharḥ-e Asmā-e Ḥusnā.*

Needless to say that one of the most important issues in Islamic philosophy, *'irfān, kalām,* and exegesis is that of Divine Names and Attributes. This issue attracted the attention of philosophers like Mullā Ṣadrā, who in his *Asfār,* book three, says: 'In this science one may attain the highest reward....' He further says: 'Know that this branch of wisdom is the best branch.' He devoted five hundred pages of his book to the issue of Divine Names and Attributes.

If the whole of *'irfān* is divided into twelve chapters, one chapter would be devoted to this issue. For a person like Sabzawārī, with a strong philosophical and mystical background, the importance of the issue of Divine Names and Attributes is evident. Yet the chief motive behind Sabzawārī inclination towards this issue is personal interest and zeal. As he says in the above-mentioned book: "The famous supplication of *Jawshan kabir* is one of the traditional supplications."

The Knowledge of the Effect Necessarily implies the Knowledge of the Cause.

By: Hasan Mustafawi
Department of Philosophy
Imam Sadiq ('a) University, Tehran

The author of this article aims at discussing a general principle in philosophy (perhaps rooted in Aristotelian philosophy) with special reference to Sabzawari and to answer some criticisms made by certain critics as well.

According to this principle, the existence of everything is dependent on its cause. Furthermore, the knowledge of a thing entails the knowledge of its cause. Here a question may arise. For instance, by observing a building, one may infer the existence of a builder (without knowing the builder). Also, by reflecting upon the order as well as regular changes in the world, one may infer the existence of their creator.

The reply to this problem is that, to know the building does not necessitate the knowledge of the builder. But it necessitates our knowledge of the "need" for a builder, for a building is the effect of the quiddity of a builder. So, here, only through the cause (which is the quiddity of a builder) we can deduce its effect as well as its necessity and concomitancy.

The next problem is as follows: There is a general principle in philosophy according to which our knowledge of our existence is an immediate knowledge which is the highest kind of knowledge. It is also believed that our existence is caused by a necessary being: we should know our cause, that is, the necessary being, with the highest kind of knowledge which is immediate knowledge, whereas such knowledge is not necessary for us. It is merely contingent in nature.

In answer to this problem, Sabzawari gives three solutions. In the third solution, which is his own innovation, he says that, although our knowledge of our existence is immediate, but immediate knowledge is not the surest kind of knowledge; hence, from this knowledge, our knowledge of the necessary being does not follow necessarily.

Sabzawārī's Philosophy of Being:
A Comparison with Western Existentialism

By: Tubā Kermānī

The author contrasts two approaches to the notion of existence, viz. Sabzawārī's philosophy of being and Heidegger's existentialism. Owing to his metaphysical system which is a synthesis of mystical intuition and analytical insight, Sabzawārī attempted to unravel the mysteries of being. According to Suhrawardī, being is 'light'. Referring to the Qur'ānic statement: "God is the Light of the heavens and the earth," he takes it to mean that God is the being of the heaven and earth.

In analyzing the notion of being, Sabzawārī made distinction between the concept of being and the reality of being. It is not possible to understand Sabzawārī's ideas without making the distinction between the concept and reality of being. According to Sabzawārī, the notion of being is self-evident and is apprehended by the mind without reflective effort, and without such *a priori* understanding of being, nothing can be understood.

According to Martin Heidegger, the concept or the notion of being (varstellung) as an *a priori* conception of the verb "being" is self-evident and it is the most original of all concepts that we have in our mind. This does not mean that the reality of existence is philosophically self-evident, but, on the contrary, it is covered by a halo of darkness and ambiguity.

$$ مفهومه من أعرف الأشياء   وكنهه فى غاية الخفاء $$

(Its notion is the most evident of things, whereas its reality is most hidden.)

Another parallelism between Sabzawārī and Heidegger relates to their distinction between the adjectival and verbal senses of being. That is, "a being" and "being". According to Heidegger, Western philosophy in the course of its historical development has been throughout concerned with the adjectival sense of being.

The Additionality of *Wujūd* (Being) to *Māhiyyah* (Quiddity)

By: Dr. Zahrā Muṣṭafawī
Department of Philosophy
Theology College
Tehran University

A section of Sabzawārī's book *Sharḥ-e Manẓūmah* concerns the issue of 'زيادة الوجود على الماهية' (Additionality of being over quiddity). This topic is traceable to the Imam Fakhr's philosophical works.

The main thrust of the paper is to elaborate the relevance of this issue in Islamic philosophy and to review its historical perspective. In his *Manẓūmah*, Sabzawārī, after demonstrating the principality of *wujūd* (being) over *māhiyyah* (quiddity), refers to the meaning of *wujūd* (being) as being univocal in the case of all existents.

The word *wujūd* and *māhiyyah* possess different meanings and there is no single concept in our mind corresponding to both *wujūd* and *māhiyyah*. He points out that in the case of an object such as a stone, the *wujūd* of the stone and the word stone (i.e. quiddity) possess two different meanings. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī and Abū al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī held a contrary view and maintain that they are identical.

In this paper Sabzawārī's views as wel as the ideas of Aḍud al-Dīn Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī and Saʿd al-Dīn Taftāzānī have been discussed. Mullā Ṣadrā's views also have been discussed in detail.

Sabzawārī's Role in the Qājār Period

By: M. A. Shaykh Nūrī
Department of History
Tabriz University, Tabriz

Sabzawārī's work is significant for the following reasons:

1) It gives a clear picture of the development of post-Mullā Ṣadrā philosophy. That is, by going through the Sabzawārī's work one can understand the atmosphere of contemporary philosophy as well.

2) The relentless and idefatigable campaigns of Sabzawārī against the devious currents of thought prevalent in those days are worthy of attention and study. During the Qājār period, the rivarly of big powers and their power-politics in Iran became more intense, and their strategic, political, economic as well as cultural pressures gained ascendency. To acquire political hegemony over the region those countries took recourse to the policy of divide and rule. That is, they attempted to promote corrupt and deviant currents in the Islamic community. Consequently, we witness a host of such activities both in Iran and other Islamic countries.

For instance, among the devious currents of thought promoted by Western powers in that period, one can mention Babism and Shaykhism. In refutation of the later school, Sabzawārī wrote a book entitled: *Fī radd al-Shaykhiyyah* (In Refutation of the Shaykhiyyah).

Sabzawārī pupils found the works of Shaykh Aḥmad Alīsā'ī, the founder of Shaykhiyyah, quite unphilosophical and wrote many works to refute and criticize his views.

Keeping in view the favour and popularity enjoyed by the Shaykhiyyah in Iraq, the writing of such books had a tremendous impactt at that time.

The author of the article is of the view that if Sabzawārī's works are studied from this perspective, the contemporary significance of his philosophical works would become more conspicuous.

The First Congress In Commemoration of 'Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji in Iran

Dr. 'A. N. Baqirshahi

'Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji (1051-1072 H.) and Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani were two eminent pupils as well as sons-in-law of Mulla Sadra, the great philosopher of Safawid period. In fact, it was Mulla Sadra who has given the nickname Fayyad to Lahiji and Fayd to Mulla Muhsin Kashani. Lahiji was a great logician, mutakallim, and philosopher, whereas Mulla Muhsin Kashani was a great mystic-philosopher. Moreover, both of them were masters in poetry and literature as well. Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani has composed near about six thousand verses and Lahiji has composed some five thousand verses.

On the occasion of commemoration of 'Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji, a congress was held on July 14-15, 1993 at the city of Lahijan in northern Iran, in which eminent scholars from different cities and universities of Iran participated. In the congress some 43 papers were presented and it was attended by 300 delegates. What follows is a gist of some of the papers presented.

In his keynote address, Zayn al-'Abidin Qurbani, the secretary of the congress and Friday prayer imam referred to the importance of holding such academic discussions in order to confront the cultural onslaught of the West as well as to introduce the cultural heritage of Islam. In his address, he pointed out that 'Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji compiled nearly fifteen books and regretably only four of them have been published so far. Regarding the importance of holding such congresses he said that if people become acquainted with their religious and cultural heritage, the poisonous propaganda of the West would be neutralized.

The second speaker was Natiq Nuri, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament. He threw light on Lahiji's personality and said that holding such congresses is a positive step for introducing the great scholars of Islam. He referred to the relationship between reason and revelation and

remarked that the pursuit of reason result in following revelation. He refuted the idea according to which there is a conflict between reason and revelation, considering such views as misleading and untrue. He cited Mullā Ṣadrā and Lāhījī as examples of those who succeeded in proving that it is possible to fathom the realities of revelation through reason.

The vice-chancellor of Imam Ṣādiq ('a) University, Tehran, in his short speech referred to Lāhījī as a great scholar of Islam and stressed the need of serious research on his works.

Muḥammadī Gīlānī, the member of the Gaurdian Council and an eminent scholar of philosophy, called Lāhījī a great literary figure, a researcher, as well as a religious philosopher.

Muḥammad Lārījānī, the Minister of Islamic Guidance, was one of the speakers at the congress. In his speech, he discussed the methods of Muslim philosophers in general and Lāhījī's approach in particular and put it in historical perspective. He also regretted that several works of a great philosopher like Lāhījī have remained unpublished so far. He asked concerned authorities to take measures for early publication of these works. In another part of his speech he pointed out that there was no doubt that Lāhījī has bewen the most popular philosopher after Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. *Gawhar-e murād*, is Lāhījī's major work in Persian and is the best book in Shī'ī Kalām. Another important work of Lāhījī is *Shawāriq al-'ilhām.*

A. A. 'Amīd Zanjānī of Tehran University spoke on the relation of reason and revelation and the level of their compatibility. He examined the place of reason in Islam and remarked that those who parted reason or revelation are, in fact, suffering from different knowledge on reason and revelation.

Wā'iẓ-zādeh Khurāsānī, director of the World Assembly for Rapprochement of Schools of Islam discussed Lāhījī's *"Shawāriq al-'ilhām fī sharh Tajrīd al-kalām.* He first discussed the original texts of *Tajrīd al-kalām* by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and cited its importance and remarked that *Tajrīd al-kalam* is a meeting point of different Islamic sects, Shī'ī and Sunnī, and therefore both Shī'ī and Sunnī scholars have given importance to this work. Referring to various commentaries on Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd*, Khurāsānī said that Lāhījī's commentary of *Tajrīd* covers all the views of philosophers before him and is informative as well.

Muḥammad Ṣādiq Lārījānī from the centre of religious studies at

Qum presented his paper on "Muslim Philosophers and Ethical
Propositions." In this regard, first, he referred to Greek philosophy and
pointed to the contribution of Muslim philosophers. He held that Lāhījī
believed that ethical propositions, dealing with good and evil of things, are
of the category of *mashhūrāt* (indemonstrable). The author of this paper
then referred to the views of two groups of Muslim philosophers and
examined critically their views.

Tūbā Kirmānī in her speech attempted to answer the question
whether Lāhījī was a philosopher or mutakkallim (theologian). For this
purpose she shed light on different definitions of kalām by early and latter
mutakallimūn, and concluded that Lāhījī was one of the greatest Shī'ī
mutakallimūn.

Mr. Rabbānī Gulpāygānī, in his paper entitled "An Introduction to
Kalām," considered Lāhījī a pioneer in the field of kalām and threw light
on Lāhījī's main work *Gawhar-e murād*. He referred to the new edition of
Gawhar-e urād which has been edited in a masterly manner. He remarked
that *Gawhar-e murād* is one of the most important books in kalām in
Persian. He also believed that kalāmī issues are very relevant in solving
the contemporary problems of Muslim world.

Muhammad Bāqir Muhaqqiq from Tehran University discussed the
notion of jinn and angel in Shī'ī works of kalām. He said that the strange
thing about angel and devil (satan) is that these words have been repeated
eighty-eight times in the Qur'ān. Then, he referred to Lāhījī's seven
Persian and six Arabic works that exist in Iranian libraries. His paper was
the best paper of the congress because of bibliographical information.

Dr. Ahmad Ahmadī, of Tehran University, presented his paper on
"Lāhījī and Asālat al-Māhiyyah." Lāhījī, in the view of Dr. Ahmadī,
believed in *asālat al-māhiyyah*. But the question is what he meant by
astālat al-māhiyyah, whether he believed in *asālat al-māhiyyah* as opposed
to *asālat al-wujūd* or if he had some other conception in his mind. So far
as his works are concerned he attempted to posit ontology as the basis of
epistemology.

The last speech was made by Haddād 'Ādil from Shahīd Beheshtī
University Tehran. He discussed how post-Mullā Sadrā philosophers
attempted to reconcile philosophy, kalām, and mysticism with special
reference to Lāhījī. He considered Lāhījī and original philosopher and
concluded his address by reciting some verses of Lāhījī.

Book Review:

The Iran-Iraq War

(The Politics of Aggression)

S.H. 'Alamdār

In 1988, a number of Iranian universities and research institutions sponsored the International Conference on Aggression and Defence, which was held in Tehran. Dr. Kamāl Kharrāzī, a professor at Tehran University and present permanent representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the United Nations was the chairman of the conference, and took keen interest in the preparation of the said book, which was edited by Mr. Farhang Rajāee, a teacher of political science with the sincere cooperation of the staff at the University Press of Florida (U.S.A.).

The book has three parts, Part One: Genesis, Development, and Implication, Part Two: Superpowers, International Law and Politics, and Part Three: Theoretical Aspects and Meanings. Altogether 17 papers were presented which are compiled in the said book with a detailed introduction written by the editor.

Part One deals with why the war happened, how it began and ultimately how it came to a halt. It examines, in detail, the areas in which the Iraqis have inflicted damage not only on the Iranian people but on many of their neighbours and allies as well. And, of course, damage inflicted upon Iraq itself, considering that the pre-war Iraq had reserves in excess of $ 35 million, a massive investment program to develop the infrastructure of the country, a growing skilled labour force, and increasing numbers of professionals, turning into a post-war Iraq with an estimated $

100 billion debt, with its main oil terminals and refineries destroyed, and a huge number of war casualties. It analyzes the "War of Cities", chemical warfare, and damage to cultural treasures.

Part Two looks beyond Iran and Iraq to the effect of war on the region and on the powers outside the region, and analyzing how others saw, interpreted, and reacted to the war. The most interesting is the sensitivity of the Soviet Union about the "Islamic factor", and the vulnerability of Soviet Central Asia's Muslim population to the influence of the Islamic Revolution. The renewed prospect of an Iraqi collapse (so prevalent after the conquest of Faw in 1986), and the emergence of an Iran-centric Islamic order in the Soviet Union's Southern Republics that might align with fundamentalist Afghanistan, become not only a worry for Washington, but a nightmare for Moscow. Therefore the decision to give Iraq the military edge over Iran was universal. Not only the Soviet Union but the entire Western alliance system, largely financed by conservative Arab states, engaged in the most comprehensive and massive arms transfer in history to a third world state involved in the conflict. France alone, in less than two years, supplied Iraq with arms valued at about $ 5.6 billion. China, Great Britain, West Germany, Brazil, Egypt, Colombia, Spain, the United States and many other countries also provided Iraq with an enormous amount of high-tech conventional and chemical weapons. The Western package for Iraq, however, paled in comparison with the Soviet's. Between 1988, the Soviets delivered to Iraq arms valued at roughly $ 8.8 to $ 9.2 billion, comprising more than 2,000 tanks (including 800 T-725), 300 fighter aircraft, almost 300 surface to surface missiles (mostly Scud Bs) and thousands of pieces of heavy artillery and armoured personnel vehicles. Most of these weapons reached Iraq via the Jordanian port of 'Aqaba, thereby giving Jordan a significant logistical role in the Iraqi military build-up.

Part Three deals with war in terms of international laws, Islamic jurisprudence, international relations and historical perspective. It also introduces those aspects of the war that constitute new developments in international laws of war and suggest ways in which these laws could be improved.

The following papers were selected for our detailed review:

PART One

Analyses of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord:

By Mr. Keith McLachlan, who is a director of the Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (U.K.).

PART Two

U.S. Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers:

By Ms. Elizabeth Gamlen and Mr. Paul Rogers. Ms. Elizabeth Gamlen is a Ph.D candidate in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford (U.K.). Mr. Paul Rogers is professor of conflict analysis at the University of Bradford (U.K.).

PART Three

Morale Vs Technology: The Power of Iran in the Persian Gulf War:

By Mr. James A. Bill, who is a professor of government and director of the Reves Centre for International Studies at the college of William and Mary, Virginia (U.S.A.).

1. Analyses of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord: By Mr. Keith McLachlan

In this paper Mr. McLachlan analyses 1979-80 as the core period in any chronology for determining how and whose errors the conflict arose which will be critical in the final resolution of the matter. The writer has taken pain to review the observers' writings, proclamations, and published opinions that were printed before the outbreak of the war, and discusses the findings of the principal studies concerned with the war published after

its beginning. The writer has tried to present sources other than the warring sides so that an independent observer could make a judgement in the light of the evidence presented.

The risks of the war with Iraq clouded the future of the nascent Islamic Republic from its inception. A large number of informed observers took the view in 1979 that there was a possibility of a serious military conflict between Iran and Iraq. An academic authority, Mr. R.N. Schofield, stated that: "The Iranian revolution's success in early 1979 in toppling the monarchy was to effect a considerable destabilization in relations between Tehran and Baghdad. Saddām Hossein's accession as president of Iraq in July of the same year further accelerated such destabilization. It was by now clear that Iraq's B'ath rulers had signed the Algiers accord as the only viable alternative to their imminent collapse and that, when the power equation was perceived to have altered across the Shatt Al-arab, action would be taken to restore the river to its 'rightful owner' ".[1]

According to McLachlan, the accession to the presidency of Iraq of Saddam Hossein in July further detoriated the already bitter relations between the two countries. In May 1979, after the Iraqi artillery and air strikes against the town of Mehran and Iranian retaliation there and elsewhere along the common frontier, The Economist reported:

"The destabilization of Iran will adversely affect security in Iraq and might drag Iraq into further conflict with the Iranian Central Government". On August 3, 1979, it reported that the Iraqi-Iran conflict will worsen, while characterizing the relations as "bitterness and anger".[3] On October 31, 1979, the Iraqi regime threatened to abrogate the Algiers Accord of 1975, therefore less than nine months after the Iranian revolution the political climate was poor and deteriorating. The risk of war was appreciated, and documented by scholars, commentators, and risk analysts in 1979. Anothary Cordesman, a respected authority on the Middle East in the United States, spoke about the antagonism affected the relations between the two states from the beginning of the Iranian revolution.

Here it is worthwhile to point out that the term used by all the Western writers for the Islamic Revolution of Iran is Iranian-Revolution. Likewise all the letters received by Western countries never mention the

Islamic Republic of Iran, but prefer to write Iran only. I really do not understand whether this is a matter of omission or if it is done intentionally. The question here must be asked that if it was simply an Iranian Revolution, limited to the change of regime of Iran, then in that case, was there any need of this superimposed war? We think it was the Islamic dimension and the pious leadership of this revolution which took the sleep away from the eyes of all oppressors.

McLachlan, then adds the comments made by other professional geopoliticians Mr. G. Blake (Durham University, U.K.) and A. Drysdale (University of New Hampshire) as follows: "Following the 1979 revolution, relations between the two states deteriorated. The boundary became a symbol of their hostility. Border incidents occurred with increasing frequency, more than 560 being reported by Iraq in 1979 and 1980."[34] The observers notice a change in the Iraqi foreign policy, specially starting with the accession of Saddam Hossein, and the cultimination of this change came in the late 1970's as Iraqi policy consolidated towards challenging the Iran on control of the *Shatt al-'Arab*. The main aim was to curb the influence of Islamic Iran as a whole in the neighbouring countries, a political struggle for hegemony of the Persian Gulf, and the last but not least was to suffocate and destroy the Islamic Revolution.

In Feb. 1980, the danger of war worsened to the point that the official organ of the U.S. Government were reported by Mr. Gary Sick a member of the National Security Council staff until 1981, to be "quite aware that there were difficulties on that border, and that there was a threat and that became more obvious as time went on."

According to the writer, there was consensus among responsible and informed commentators, as expressed in the media, journals, and analyses at the time, was that some form of conflict was brewing. In Feb 1980 the Economist reported that: "Iraq remains the most violently antipathetic to Ayatollah Khomeini and partners. A virulent propaganda compaign is in progress from Baghdad in support of the Arab guerrillas operating in Khūzestān. It is believed in Tehran that Iraq is actively training and equipping Arab, Kurd, and Baluchi opposition groups. Iraq has, meanwhile, embarked on a policy of naval expansion designed to make the Iraqi navy the equal of Iran's and is determined to challenge Iran as the

future power in the Gulf area in the near future. A number of clashes on the Iraq-Iran border took place in January, though not between regular troops. Iraqi diplomatic premises in Iran had been occupied, later closed, and some stuff held hostage. Iraq responded by expelling Iranian nationals on a large scale."[5]

(Regarding the expulsion of Iranian nationals, according to a special commentary broadcasted from the Iranian Television in 1988 during the "week of sacred defence of eight years", it was reported that, "simultaneously in Iraq 50,000 Iraqis of Iranian origin were forcefully deported, leaving their belongings behind. Iranian schools were attacked and religious scholars were beaten and insulted)

According to the paper, there was fear in Baghdad that the new Iranian regime would use subversion against the Ba'th as part of the ideological competition to win the hearts and minds of the people of the Middle East and in particular the Gulf. There was also the fear that Shi'te revolutionary groups inside the Iraq would gain Iranian support to undermine the government. In the first quarter of 1980, the regime of Saddam Hossein demanded the return of Abū Musā and Tunbs Islands located in the Persian Gulf and concessions for the autonomy of the state of Khūzestān. Mr. P. Marr of the University of Tennessee described the conditions as follows: "Events played into their (the Iraqi Regime's) hands..... rather than a strong Iran facing a weak and isolated Iraq, a strong Iraq appeared to face a weak and divided Iran. Saddam Hossein reasoned that Iraq would never have a more favourable opportunity to reverse the 1975 decision on the Shatt"[6]

On Feb 8, 1980, an important policy statement promulgated as the "National Charter" was brought to the world's attention by the Iraqi regime in which two closely related policies were announced. First, there should be Arab political and economic integration in general but specially in the P.G. area. Secondly Arab Unity would mean joint confrontation against Iran. As Mr. O. Nooeman, a specialist on Iraqi political affairs, puts it: "The principal of the Arab character of the Gulf meant opposition to Iranian (non-Arab) influence."[7]

Mr. McLachlan then describes in this paper the political wheeling-dealing maneuvers of the Iraqi regime before launching their

full-scale massive invasion of the Islamic Republic by land, sea, and air on a 1200 km long border on September 22, 1980. The Iraqi regime started simultaneously building up its alliances against Iran in 1980. An arrangement on mutual security was signed with Saudi Arabia in Feb 1979, bringing Iraqis and Saudis closer on a number of policy issues, the most important of which was a joint security interest in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. In May 1980, Crown Prince Shaykh Sa'ad 'Abdullah of Kuwait made a five-day official visit to Iraq. Saddam Hossein paid an unscheduled visit to the Saudi Royal Family on Aug 5, 1980. The pattern of Iraqi contacts with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Omãn, and Ra's Al-Khaimah pursuant to the "National Charter" was indicative of a regime establishing new pro-Iraqi areas to include all anti-Iranian force.

The conditions continued to deteriorate throughout 1980, as Iraq acted more openly in support of Arab autonomists' claims in Khūzestān and as Shi'ah opposition to Saddam Hossein in Iraq became more active. The expulsions of Iranian citizens from Iraq increased in tempo in April after accusations that Iranian interests were behind an attempt on the life of Ṭãriq 'Azīz. The Algiers Accord was formally abrogated on Sept 17, 1980, and immediately after that a full-scale invasion was launched.

In the end the writer concludes that the Iraqi authorities appeared to believe that Iranian internal weakness offered an opportunity for Iraq to change the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and possibly solve their problems of Kurdestān and the Shī'ah domain of the south in one stroke. According to Mr. McLachlan by any fair measure Iraq began the war against Iran in 1980 and must be considered aggressor. He ends his paper by quoting the following statement from Bill, (the writer of the Eagle and the Lion), that: "It is also true that Iraq invaded Iran and was by any standards of International law the aggressor."[8]

2. U.S. Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers - By Ms. Elizabeth Gamlen and Mr. Paul Rogers

In this paper the writers have provided an outline of the so-called tanker war, including a consideration of its legal inference and its impact upon on exports from the Persian Gulf region. The reasons for the Kuwaiti

request and its acceptance by the United States have been analysed in detail. Also the consequences of this act in the international arena and their implications have been presented thoroughly.

Until the first phase of the tanker war was initiated in Feb 1984, such attacks were infrequent and perpetrated solely by Iraq. After 1984, Iraq appeared to have twin goals: to tempt Iran into trying to close the Strait of Hurmuz and thus interrupt the West's supply of oil and percipitate Western action to end the war, and to limit Iran's oil exports and its ability to finance its war efforts. The first strategy of Iraq failed when Iran made no attempt to close the Strait and by the surprising degree of international indifference to attacks on neutral civilian shipping. Iran did not launch retaliatory attacks on any shipping until May 1984, and even then, the retaliation was not on a one-for-one basis.

According to the writers, Iraqi attacks on tankers did significantly affect Iran's ability to export its oil and thus weakened its economy. Iran was forced to adopt a "shuttle service" of small tankers to tranship the oil to less vulnerable loading points further down the Gulf. However, Iran's refusal to be provoked into extensive retaliation had its effect and the tanker war died down, until Iraq came under severe pressure again in the land when Iran captured Faw in Feb. 1986. In accordance with the tables presented by the writers in this paper, Iraq persistedly attacked more ships in the Gulf than Iran did. Almost invariably the first attack was carried out by Iraq.

The paper proves by rationally reviewing all the available evidence that there were factors other than Kuwaiti export of oil, which, precipitated the sudden Kuwaiti request for outside help. Kuwait's claims that the prime concern was the safety of its exports is further undermined by the fact that it relied heavily on non-Kuwaiti-flagged vessels for transporting its exports. The eleven reflagged tankers account for only 20% of Kuwait's daily export of crude and refined products. If Kuwait's main concern was to protect its ability to export, an initiative to protect all neutral shipping would have been more effective than one directed only on Kuwaiti-flagged vessels. Therefore, according to the writers of this paper, Kuwait requested help largely to draw international attention to the war because of fears of its safety, rather than because of any physical problem

with its export shipments.

According to officials of the government-owned Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company (KOTC), "Kuwait simultaneously approached both the U.S. and the USSR in September 1986 seeking the protection of their ships. The U.S. response was positive in principle but only if Kuwait could qualify under stringent U.S. codes and regulations and did not offer to provide naval protection for the reflagged ships."[9] By contrast the Soviet response was an immediate offer of full cooperation and in Jan. 1987 KOTC delegates went to Moscow to negotiate the specific terms. Only when these talks were made known to the U.S. did Secretary of Defence Mr. Casper Weinberger declare U.S. willingness to reflag all eleven vessels and provide them with naval protection.

Kuwait subsequently requested similar help from all the permanent U.N. Security members. These responses varied. There was little publicity about the request to the French, and it was presumably refused. Similar was the case with China. The request by Kuwait appears to have been merely a formality as a part of its policy to approach all the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Also three KOTC vessels were registered in Britain. If the KOTC version of events is correct, and the basic outline has been certainly corroborated by other reports, the U.S.A. was initially reluctant to reflag and protect Kuwaiti tankers. The decision to do so has been taken hastily, without adequate study of the military implications.

In the opinion of the writers of this paper the official rationale for the United States to agree to the reflagging was two-fold: "First, to help Kuwait counter immediate intimidation and thereby discourage Iran from similar attempts against other moderate Gulf states; second, to limit to the extent possible an increase in Soviet military influence in the Gulf"[10]

The paper describes the reaction of the other GCC States regarding this matter, which was ambivalent, because of their fear that the U.S. action was likely to increase tension in the region, whereas the long-term interests of the GCC States would have probably better served by minimizing friction. Kuwait's main objective (shared by other GCC States) was not to protect the exports but to internationalize the war and thereby bring pressure for its termination.

Finally in 1986, for the first time in four years, Iraq appeared to be facing the possibility of total collapse. A number of statements by U.S. administration officials indicated that such an outcome would not have been acceptable. For example, a report of the U.S. House of Representative Armed Services Committee, while describing the administration's strategy for ending the Iran-Iraq war, claimed that "while the administration has proclaimed a policy of strict neutrality.... a minimal requirement of its strategy is to see that Iraq does not collapse. If it did, radical Islamic fundamentalism could well spread to Iraq itself, and quite possibly to the moderate Gulf States and beyond."[11]

The public rhetoric used to justify the U.S. decision to reflag was at some variance with its official rationale, which was to intervene for the sake of its "vital interests." The rhetoric was concentrated in four areas:

1. Protection of Freedom of Navigation.
2. Protection of oil supplies.
3. Silkworm Missiles.
4. The U.S. responsibility to protect U.S. flagged ships.

Despite these superficial arguments, the majority of the U.S. public accepted the action because people saw it as an opportunity for the United States to reassert itself after the hostage crisis of 1979-80. The intense animosity Americans still felt towards Iran should not be underestimated. This animosity was fed by general ignorance of both the Islamic and Ba'th regimes and the media which constantly presented the Islamic Republic of Iran as fanatical and out of control.

The writers present their conclusions regarding the reaction of Iran, Iraq, GCC States, European allies, and Japan about the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers. For Iraq it was obviously a useful development. As long as it could attack tankers with relative impunity it could determine the tempo of the tanker war, and therefore the level of Iranian attacks and U.S. retaliation for them. Iran saw the action taken by all outside powers as a partition, which was taken only when for the first time the total defeat of Iraq was considered a serious possibility. While claiming to be interested in protecting the rights of neutral shipping, no attempts were

made by any outside power to prevent Iraqi attacks on tankers serving Iran. Regarding the reaction of the GCC States, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, the others were taken by surprise by the Kuwaiti initiative. The United States hopes for land bases, initially cited as essential for the effective operation of U.S. forces were not fullfilled. Even Kuwait refused to allow the establishment of foreign military bases of any type of nationality on its territory, and U.S. naval forces only escorted the reflagged ships beyond the outer limit of Kuwait's territorial waters.

The European allies gave a little support to the United States initially, however a major change in European policy was caused by the discovery of mines outside the Strait of Hurmuz. If, as widely assumed, these mines were laid by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, then in the opinion of the writers it was a major tactical error on Iran's part as it immediately caused reversals from all the European countries. Regarding the assumption of the writers, it must be emphasized that these accusations against Iran started when a small Iranian commercial ship Iran Ajr was attacked and later on sunk by U.S. Naval forces, killing 7 and arresting 23 of its inmates.

Japan did not send ships to the region but contributed 10 million dollar's worth of navigational systems that would have assisted the U.S. Navy in locating mines, and donated another 10 million towards U.N. efforts to end the Gulf War. As far as the Soviet Union, the situation worked out well for them because it was able to establish patrols in the region quietly, while criticizing the U.S. handling of the consequences of its high profile reflagging operation. The biggest tragedy of the tanker war occurred on July 3, 1988. A U.S. warship, the U.S.S. Vincennes, shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, killing nearly 300 innocent people. In sharp contrast to the events following the attack on the USS Stark, the United States expressed regret only for the loss of innocent lives and did not make a specific apology to the Iranian Government.

The writers further mentioned the following partisan nature of U.S. actions against the Islamic Republic as follows:

1. The political and military intimidation of Iran, such as the reflagging, operation staunch, and U.N. Resolution 598.

2. The signing of a five-year trade agreement with Iraq while

Instituting a trade embargo against Iran.

3. The provision of military intelligence to Iraq, such as that given in compensation for "Irangate."

4. Assistance to Iraq's regional supporters, such as provision of military hardware, training and advice and pledges of "all necessary diplomatic and, if requested, military assistance" to them.

In the end the writers conclude that despite the popular impressions to the contrary, the main responsibility for the tankers war rested with Iraq, not Iran. Iraq conducted the tanker war with the specific objective of involving outside powers in the Iran-Iraq war and of damaging Iran's economy. Iranian attacks were largely retaliatory and, until 1987, were considerably less frequent than those of Iraq. Because there were no Iraqi tankers in the Gulf for Iran to attack, Iran concentrated mostly on shipping connected with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The purpose of these attacks was to encourage Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to pressure Iraq to cease its tanker attacks and to warn Kuwait against supporting Iraq too overtly.

Finally, it is concluded that the U.S. decision to reflag the tankers, when considered in the context of other actions, can reasonably be considered as it seriously constrained Iran's ability to conduct the war. Iraq was able to continue attacking tankers with impunity while increasingly severe penalties were imposed on Iran. In addition the U.S. oil embargo, pressure, particularly applied to China, to cease supporting arms to Iran and U.S. actions in the UN Security Council, all had combined adverse effects on Iran.

3. Morale Vs Technology: By: Mr. James A. Bill

Out of all the 17 papers presented in this book, this paper, Morale vs Technology, was a special one, as it addresses the real thing which keeps the Islamic Revolution going.

"We have an ideology which is founded upon truth. It is such a
fountainhead of learning that from it flows out several streams of wisdom
and knowledge. It is such a lamp that from it several lamps will be lighted.
It is a tall beacon lighting the path of God. It is a set of principles and
beliefs which will satisfy every seeker of truth and reality."[13]

The above statement is quoted from a sermon of Imam 'Alī--peace be
upon him--from his book "Path of Eloquence" (*Nahj al-Balāghah*). The
paper Morale vs Technology begins with the following quotations from the
same.

"I prefer a thousand strokes of the sword to dying in bed," which
means that Bill has a fair knowledge about the school of thought and
ideology which is responsible for the victory of the revolution in Iran. The
paper analyzes in detail Islamic Iran's glorious, tenacious, and courageous
performance in the Persian Gulf War of the 1980's in a lonely battle with
the invading Iraqi Army which was supported by both the superpowers. It
was supplied with the most sophisticated modern military equipment,
primarily supplied by the Soviet Union and France, and simultaneously
was financed with huge financial resources of oil-rich countries like Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. In addition to these factors, throughout the conflict
the Islamic Republic was confronted with the difficult task of
institutionalizing a revolution. But in spite of all that it took ninety-five
long months before Iran would even agree to a ceasefire.

According to Bill, it was only in the spring 1988, after a massive Iraqi
campaign of unprecedented missile and air attacks on both military and
civilian targets and extensive use of chemical agents and poisonous gases
which finally convinced the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran to look
into the diplomatic alternative instead of continuing war. The real cause of
the war was Iraq's ambition to gain hegemony in the Persian Gulf and
specially Saddam Hossein wanted political domination of the region.
Another important goal of the invasion, which was of special interest to
the traditional governments of the region was to destroy the Islamic
Revolution. Like the previous writers the word used by the writer is
Iranian Revolution. It was the Islamic dimension of the revolution which
became a nightmare for the regional Governments.

The paper then provides a comprehensive analysis of the objective

and subjective dimensions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iraq enjoyed massive superiority over Iran in military, equipment, material, technology, and sophisticated intelligence gathering techniques. By 1988, Iraq had great superiority in such important tools of war as aircrafts, missiles, battle tanks, and heavy artillery; on the contrary Islamic Iran was much more isolated in the international community than the Iraq. Both the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., supported Iraq in the war.

The paper stated that, although Iraq had a decided edge because of its larger arsenal of weapons and material and its more varied and extensive access to financial resources, Islamic Iran was not without objective strength of its own. One of the important factors was Iran's population of over 50 million, a population more than three times that of Iraq. The population of Iran is twice that of all the other Persian Gulf States combined. In addition, Iran had one of the highest birth rates in the world. Further, unlike Iraq, the military forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran were an integral part of the population. Both the Revolutionary Guard (Sepāh-i-Pāsdārān) and the regular army steadily acquired important traits of professionalism and competence. Therefore the improvement in manphwer and professionalism helped the overwhelming Iraqi edge in the actual tools and weapons of modern warfare.

The paper emphasized that the most significant factor which enabled Islamic Iran to overcome many of Iraq's material and technological advantages was the religious zeal, commitment and dedication of the Islamic forces. Bill appears to have sound knowledge of the books of Shaykh Murtada Mutahharī, and Imam Khomeini, as he refers to a speech delivered by the then President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sayyid 'Alī Khāmene'ī, when addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September 1987, describing this doctrine as "Blood overcoming the Sword."

It would have been more appropriate if he could have included the similarities between the Revolution of Imam Husayn--peace be upon him--1400 years ago in the plains of Karbalā' in Iraq, and the Islamic Revolution of Iran.[14] The fact that the Islamic Revolution of Iran was motivated by Husaynī ideals and infused with the spirit of martyrs of Karbalā', was manifest in the consciousness of the people. This is borne

out by the slogans shouted by the people during the days of the revolutionary struggle.

نهضت ما حسینی است
رهبر ما خمینی است

Our Movement is Husayn!!
Our leader is Khomeini!

ایران شده کرب و بلا
مهدی بیا مهدی بیا

Iran has become Karbala'
Mahdī! Come! Mahdī Come!

خون بر شمشیر پیروز است

Blood triumphs over the sword!"

And the weekly slogans of the masses in the Friday Prayers throughout Islamic Iran,

حسین حسین شعار ماائت
شهادت افتخار ماائت

Husayn! Husayn is our slogan!
Martyrdom is our pride!

The article starts with a quotation from Imam 'Alī—peace be upon him--that he prefers a thousand strokes of the sword to dying in bed, which is indeed a good beginning to describe the real thing behind the Islamic movement in Iran, but it would have been better if the starting quotation by the father of Imam Husayn could be supplemented by the following saying of the Lord of martyrs:

"Death, for the sons of Ādam, is as beautiful as a necklace around the neck of a young and beautiful girl. Death is an ornament for mankind."[15]

According to Bill the essence of this high morale that infused the Islamic soldiers is contained in the words of "*Jihād* and *Shahāda*." The word *jihad*, meaning the sacred struggle, in the West is poorly misunderstood, but instinctively is understood by all practising Muslims. The writer quotes the following from martyr Ayatullah Murtadā Mutahhari: "*Jihad* is both the "garment of piety" and the "impenetrable armour of God," "A Muslim community equipped with the spirit of *jihad* is not vulnerable to enemy assaults. Jihad is the reliable shield of God. The armour is the defensive covering worn during fighting, but the shield is taken in hand to foil the enemy's strokes and thrusts. A shield is meant to prevent a blow, and armour is meant to neutralize its effect.... God will clothe with a garment of humiliation a person who refrains from *jihad* because he dislikes it. The people who lose the spirit of fighting and resisting the forces of evil are doomed to humiliation, disgrace, bad luck and helplessness. The Muslim community is a community of power and force. Islam is a religion of power."[16]

The writer stated in the paper that in the view of the leaders and citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the war against Iraq is referred to as "imposed war" (*Jang-e-tahmili*), and was indeed a *jihad*. The writer then quotes a speech of Imam Khomeini, describing the imposed war as a *jihad* as follows:

"Those who fight in *jihad*, against the external enemy never fear superior members, for the Prophet said that he would never turn back even if all the Arabs united against him. His cause was the cause of God, and the cause of God can never be abandoned.

The writer admits that the Islamic belief system at the centre of which lie these concepts of *jihad* and *shahādat* carries enormous consequences of morale and spirit of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The system inculcates a powerful form of courage and fearlessness that are so critical to success on the field of battle. The writer then adds a quotation from General C. Marshall, who once stated: "You can have all the material in the world, but without morale it is largely ineffective." He also wrote that "it is not enough to fight, it is spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the

issue. It is morale that wins the victory."

In oder to further define the terms of *jihad* and *shahādat,* the writer has supplemented his explanation by quotations from Martyr Āyatullāh Muṭahharī, who described *shahādat,*" the death of a person who, in spite of being fully conscious of the risks involved, willingly faces them for the sake of a sacred cause or as the Qur'ān says, *fī sabīl Allāh* (In the way of God)." *Shahādat* has two basic elements: the life is sacrificed for a sacred cause, and the sacrifice is made consciously.

Bill appreciated that Western observers do not understand the political and religious culture of Shī'ī Islam. A complete commitment and willingness to sacrifice for a community in the West is viewed as irrational behaviour or fanaticism. He said that most of the external observers and mostly Westerners predicted an Iraqi victory or immediate defeat, and then cites the exceptional reporting by two American military observers in late 1984 as follows:

"That the Iraqi leaders were learning one of the primal truths of war: that morale cast a long shadow over all other aspects of fighting power" and they concluded by stating, "Having misplaced their faith in the machinery of war, the Iraqis have rediscovered the truth of oriental aphorism that the fierest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants."[19]

The writer mentions that the revolution has a broad base of popular support specially among the oppressed masses. In order to prove this point he quotes the following from a speech of Imam Khomeinī as follows:

"To which class of society do these heroic fighters of the battlefield belong? Do you find even one person among all of them who is related to persons who have large capital or had some power in the past? If you find one, we will give you a prize. But you won't."[20]

The paper concludes that when Saddam Hossein, swept up by personal ambitions and dreams of domination of Persian Gulf, ordered his military forces to attack Iran in September 1980, he committed a monumental error. He found himself fighting a revolution fired by religious faith and supported by the masses. The revolution is a fact of life. It will not be destroyed and nor will it disappear. Bill suggests that the Islamic Revolution must be recognized and respected and its independence and autonomy must be honoured.

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NOTES:

1. R.H. Schofield, The Evolution of the Shattal Arab Boundary Dispute (London: Menas Publishers, 1986), 64.

2. Economist Intelligence Unit, "Iraq" (May 2, 1979:8).

3. *Ibid.*, 3.

4. A. Drysdale and G. Blake, The Middle East and North Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 86.

5. Economist Intelligence Unit, "Iraq", (November 1980): 10-11.

6. P. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1985), 292.

7. Nonneman, Iraq, 13.

8. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 304.

9. War in the Persian Gulf, 37.

10. Washington Post, July 5, 1987. "National Security Policy Implications," 37.

11. *Ibid.*, 25.

12. The famous quotations from Imam Khomeini, during one of his speeches at the beginning of war.

13. Sermon of Imam 'Ali—may peace be upon him--from *Nahj al-Balāghah.*

14. Husayn bin 'Alī, The Savior of Islam, *Tawḥīd* vol.1, p.42.

15. Martyrdom Arise and Bear Witness By Dr. Ali Shariati, p. 48.

16. Murtaḍa Muṭahharī, "Shahīd" in Jihād and Shahādat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, ed. Mehdi Abidi and Gary Legenhausen (Houston, Tex: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986), 131.

17. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar, 1981, 387.

18. Discussions about the Patience by Āyatullāh Khāmene'i, trans. by Syed Hussain Alamdar, 106.

19. David Evans and Richard Company "Military Strategy: The Reasons of conflict (November 1984), 26-34."

20. Quoted in Tehran Times, Feb 10, 1982, p. 6.